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CHAPTER SIX 
`BARLEY AND PEACE': THE BRITISH UNION OF FASCISTS IN 
NORFOLK, SUFFOLK AND ESSEX, 1938-1940 
1. Introduction 
The local impact of falling agricultural prices and the looming prospect of war 
with Germany dominated Blackshirt political activity in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex 
from 1938. Growing resentment within the East Anglian farming community at 
diminishing returns for barley and the government's agricultural policy offered the 
B. U. F. its most promising opportunity to garner rural support in the eastern counties 
since the `tithe war' of 1933-1934. Furthermore, deteriorating Anglo-German relations 
induced the Blackshirt movement to embark on a high-profile `Peace Campaign', 
initially to avert war, and, then, after 3 September 1939, to negotiate a settlement to 
end hostilities. As part of the Blackshirts' national peace drive, B. U. F. Districts in the 
area pursued a range of propaganda activities, which were designed to mobilise local 
anti-war sentiment. Once again though, the conjunctural occurrence of a range of 
critical external and internal constraints thwarted B. U. F. efforts to open up political 
space in the region on a `barley and peace' platform. 
2. The B. U. F., the `Barley Crisis' and the Farmers' March, 1938-1939 
In the second half of 1938, falling agricultural prices provoked a fresh wave of 
rural agitation in the eastern counties. Although the Ministry of Agriculture's price 
index recorded a small overall reduction from 89.0 to 87.5 during 1937-1938, cereals 
and farm crops were particularly affected due to the heavy yields from the 1938 
harvests. ' Compared with 1937 levels, wheat prices (excluding the subsidy) dropped 
by 35 per cent, barley by 23 per cent, and oats by fourteen per cent. 
2 Malting barley, a 
1 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics 1938 (London: H. M. S. O., 1939) Vol. 
LX3üII, Part I, p. 7 and pp. 11-12. 
2e Agricultural Register 1938-9 (Oxford: Oxford Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 
1939), pp. 30-31. 
291 
staple of Suffolk and Norfolk farming, fetched l Is. 3d. per cwt. in December 1937 but 
could command only 6s. 10d. per cwt. twelve months later. 3 Faced with dwindling 
returns, East Anglian barley growers were also highly critical of the limited scheme 
introduced under the 1937 Agriculture Act, whereby oats and barley producers were 
subsidised when the price for oats from September to March did not rise above 7s. 7d. 
per cwt.. Financial assistance was given at a rate per acre which amounted to six times 
the difference between the average price of oats per cwt. and a standard price of 8s., 
up to a maximum of £1 per acre. Thus, barley payments were also determined by the 
price of oats. The full subsidy was restricted to a `standard acreage', an area 
eleven-tenths the size of the oats and barley acreage qualifying for government support 
in 1937. If this limit was exceeded, the rate of subsidy per acre decreased 
proportionately. Farmers were not entitled to apply for the oats and barley subsidy if 
they were already receiving deficiency payments for wheat. The latter (averaging £3-4 
per acre) covered the total output per acre, whereas the oats and barley subsidy was 
paid only on 6 cwt. per acre. 4 
Across the region, farmers aired their grievances at various protest meetings, 
which were convened to express concern at the plight of the barley grower in particular 
and the condition of the agricultural sector in general. On 22 November 1938, for 
example, business at the Ipswich Corn Market was brought to a halt by a public 
gathering of farmers and merchants, which unanimously endorsed a resolution calling 
on the government to take immediate action to tackle the low prices being received for 
barley and other agricultural commodities. 5 The following month, nearly 500 Norfolk 
farmers assembled at the Stuart Hall, Norwich to voice their concerns. At this meeting, 
arranged independently of tiie National Farmers Union (N. F. U. ), the government's 
3 Ibid., pp. 190-191. 
4 The Agricultural Register 1937-8 (Oxford: Oxford Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 
1938), pp. 6-7 and p. 199. The Agricultural Register 1938-9_ pp. 192-194. The Agriculture Act, 1937 
(I Edw. VIII and I Geo. VI, c. 70,30 July 1937) made subsidy payments available for land under oats 
and barley for the five years from 1937 to 1941. 
5 Suffolk Chronicle and Mercury (S. C. M. , 25 November 1938, p. 2. 
This resolution was sent to the 
Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture. 
292 
attitude towards agriculture was condemned. It was also agreed that Norfolk farmers 
should arrange a protest march to Westminster, invite other rural areas to participate, 
and approach Charles Joice, the Norfolk delegate to the Council of the N. F. U., to 
organise and lead such a demonstration. 6 
Between November 1938 and February 1939, the B. U. F. launched what was, in 
effect, a renewed agricultural campaign in Norfolk and Suffolk in an attempt to 
capitalise on the growing discontent within the farming community. During this period, 
Mosley addressed large audiences at Fakenham, Lowestoft, Ipswich, King's Lynn and 
Eye on the general Blackshirt programme and the movement's proposals for 
agriculture.? Speaking at the Central Cinema, Fakenham, on 20 November 1938, for 
example, Mosley argued that only the B. U. F. 's exclusionist policy could save the barley 
grower, since the "financial masters of the old parties" preferred the interest on their 
foreign loans to be paid in imported goods and produce, and this arrangement enabled 
the government to buy "allies in the foreign wars in which they were forever 
meddling". 8 
The B. U. F. press also highlighted the specific difficulties faced by the East 
Anglian farming community from late 1938. Articles appeared in Blackshirt and 
Action condemning the profits made by the brewing industry at a time when barley 
growers in the eastern counties were facing poor returns. 9 According to Blackshirt 
commentators, cheap foreign barley had flooded the British market, causing the 
domestic price to fall to such a level that home producers could not recoup their initial 
financial outlay. Furthermore, in the B. U. F. 's estimation, some brewing firms were 
engaged in "price depressing conspiracies" by failing to honour an agreement to use a 
fixed percentage of British barley and purchasing inexpensive imported supplies instead 
6 Eastern Daily Press (E_D. P_), 16 December 1938, p. 9. 
7 E-D. P.. 22 November 1938, p. 7; Lowestoft Journal (L. i), 3 December 1938, p. 6; East Anglian 
Daily Times (E. A. D. T. ), 13 December 1938, p. 12; Lynn News and County Press (L. N. C. P. ), 31 
January 1939, p. 10; Norfolk and Suffolk Journ aI and Diss Expre (N. S. J. D_E. l, 3 February 1939, p. 
2; Action, 26 November 1938, p. 1,17 December 1938, p. 11,4 February 1939, p. 3. 
8 Action. 26 November 1938, p. 1. 
9 Ibid., 26 November 1938, p. 6,3 December 1938, p. 8; Southern Blackshirt January 1939, p. 1. 
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to reduce their raw material costs. 10 The movement maintained that, under `Financial 
Democracy', brewing enterprises were able to act in such a self-interested way because 
their wealth gave them an influence denied to the less affluent farming sector. 
Consequently, Mosleyite propagandists stressed that the only effective solutions to this 
problem were to reorganise agriculture within the protective framework of the 
proposed Corporate State and to adopt the fascist policy of excluding all imports which 
could either be grown or produced in Britain. 
Local Blackshirts echoed these themes at rural meetings and in the East Anglian 
press. Three District Leaders from the area, Ronald Creasy, Charles Hammond and 
William Sherston, attracted a large farming audience when they addressed an open air 
meeting outside the Diss Corn Exchange on market day in early December 1938.11 The 
speakers concentrated on the B. U. F. 's proposals for agriculture and the economic 
difficulties currently facing the barley growers. Shortly afterwards, the three men held a 
similar gathering at Eye. 12 Henry Williamson, one of Norfolk's most prominent 
Blackshirts, attended the farmers' meeting at the Stuart Hall, Norwich in December 
1938 and offered to organise a march in London to demand justice for the British 
barley growers in the third or fourth week of January. Openly stating his B. U. F. 
affiliation, Williamson told those present that "Mosley has promised me by telephone 
that he will come to address this meeting on this subject if you like". 13 In November 
1938, Charles Westren, a Blackshirt who farmed at Elmsett Hall, near Ipswich, 
contributed a pro-fascist piece to the North Suffolk Messenger on the "scandalous" 
barley prices. 14 A month later, the same newspaper carried an article by Ronald 
Creasy, the District Leader at Eye, deploring the "Chaos of the Agricultural 
Industry". 15 In letters to the Eastern Daily Press, Henry Williamson also advocated 
10 Acfi= 3 December 1938, p. 8. 
11 Norfolk News and Weekly Press (ME -W, 
10 December 1938, p. 5; Thetford and Watton Times 
10 December 1938, p. 6. 
12 E-A-D 13 December 1938, p. 3. 
13 E. D"P__ 16 December 1938, p. 9. 14 North Suffolk Messenger ( , M~), 19 November 
1938. 
15 Ibid., 17 December 1938 
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that both the barley issue and the wider problems of agriculture required National 
Socialist remedies. 16 The most unusual local Blackshirt method of publicising the 
barley growers' plight was devised by Charles Westren, who drove through two 
counties in a light van emblazoned with large posters which read `BARLEY HALF 
PRICE, BEER STINKING RICH" and "ONE BREWER LEFT THIRTEEN 
MILLIONS, HE ALSO LEFT THE WORKHOUSES FOR FARMERS AND FARM 
WORKERS". 17 
Impressionistic evidence suggests that the Blackshirt agricultural campaign of 
1938-1939 provided a partial and temporary boost in support for the East Anglian 
movement. Mosley's meetings in Norfolk and Suffolk during this period attracted 
sizeable audiences, which often greeted the fascist message on farming with 
enthusiasm. Is For example, the B. U. F. leader addressed 200 farmers and businessmen 
in related commercial areas at the first Suffolk Agricultural Dinner of the British Union, 
which was held at the Great White Horse Hotel, Ipswich on 12 December 1938.19 
According to William Sherston, District Leader at Woodbridge, this event had been 
arranged independently by farmers in the county without assistance from B. U. F. 
National Headquarters (N. H. Q. ). 20 Mosley's speech at Fakenham in November 1938, 
which included the suggestion that the farmers should organise a protest march in 
London and the offer that such a demonstration would be fully supported by the 
Blackshirt movement, was received with an "outburst of cheering". 21 When this 
proposed course of action was repeated the following month at Ipswich, Mosley drew 
"roars of applause", and, at Charles Westren's prompting, about three-quarters of the 
16 E. D. P. 10 November 1938, F 13,17 November 1938, p. 13,21 December 1938, p. 13. 17 Southern Blackshirt January 1939, p. 1. 
E. D. P. 22 November 1938, p. 7; E. AD. T.. 13 December 1938, p. 12. 
19 Woodbridge Reporter and Wickham Market Gazette (W. RW. M. GJ, 15 December 1938, p. 4; 
E. A, D. . 13 December 1938, p. 
12. Mosley's meeting at the Central Cinema, Fakenham on 20 
November 1938 was "crowded", and an audience of 400 listened to his speech at Eye Town Hall on 30 
January 1939. See E. D. P__ 22 November 1938, p. 7,31 January 1939, p. 7. 
20 W. RW. M_G. _ 15 December 1938, p. 4. 21 E-D-P.. 22 November 1938, p. 7. At the Fakenham meeting, Mosley advised the farmers to 
demonstrate in London, and he offered the support of ten Blackshirts for every East Anglian who 
participated in such a protest in the capital. 
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audience agreed that such a procession could take place in the capital on 21 December 
1938.22 
Mosley's speeches also brought public endorsements from at least two 
prominent farmers in the eastern counties. At the conclusion of the Fakenham meeting, 
C. G. Davey, "a well-known Norfolk farmer's leader", obtained permission to address 
those present and endorsed the B. U. F. 's agricultural policy. 23 Another farmer in the 
vanguard of the growing local protest movement, Victor de Appleby Shepherd, who 
resided at Shottisham Hall in Suffolk, attended the B. U. F. dinner at Ipswich and was 
similarly impressed. In a subsequent letter to the East Anglian Daily Times, Shepherd 
maintained that the Blackshirts had "the best policy for agriculture" and considered 
Mosley to embody "the class of man the farmers want". 24 Furthermore, fascist sources 
indicated that the movement was making some headway in rural areas. During 
December 1938, Charles Westren claimed that the B. U. F. was "gaining favour among 
farmers", and the Blackshirt press reported that membership in the Woodbridge 
division had-doubled within a fortnight. 25 
However, as with Blackshirt intervention in the East Anglian `tithe war' in 
1933-1934, the B. U. F. 's efforts to achieve a political breakthrough in the region 
proved disappointing. Even though farmers were prepared to make public protests 
against what they saw as the government's neglect of agriculture in the late 1930s, a 
number of constraints, central to the Griffin-Copsey model, prevented the B. U. F. from 
translating this disaffection into significant support. Consequently, despite its renewed 
impetus, the movement remained on the margins of East Anglian political life. The two 
most notable manifestations of discontent in the area - the introduction of a local 
agricultural candidate in the East Norfolk by-election of January 1939 and the 
22 E-A-D. T. 13 December 1938, p. 12. See also Action, 17 December 1938, p. 11. 
23 ActiM 26 November 1938, p. 1. Davey qualified his support by adding that the N. F. U. should first 
try to settle the barley problem, but if this proved to be unsuccessful then a non-political farmers' 
march should then take place in London. See T. W. T.. 26 November 1938, p. 9. 24 E. A. D. T., 27 December 1938, p. 2. 25 E-A-D. T., 29 December 1938, p. 2; Action. 17 December 1938, p. 11. 
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`Farmers' March' in London at the beginning of February - illustrate the problems 
which faced the B. U. F. in its continuing search for a rural heartland. 
In November 1938, Lord Elmley, the Liberal National M. P., who had 
represented the East Norfolk Division since 1929, succeeded to the peerage as Earl 
Beauchamp, following the death of his father. 26 A 35 year old London solicitor named 
Frank Medlicott was chosen as the Liberal National candidate to contest the seat at the 
ensuing by-election. The selection of an urban professional from outside the area 
offended sections of the local Tory agricultural community, but those opposed to 
Medlicott's nomination did not transfer their loyalties to the B. U. F.. Instead, 
disaffected Conservative farmers in the constituency took independent political action 
to focus attention on the agricultural sector's economic difficulties. Under the aegis of 
the hastily established East Norfolk National Conservative and Agricultural Committee 
(E. N. N. C. A. C. ), J. F. Wright, a prominent Norfolk farmer, was put forward as a 
National Conservative and Agricultural candidate. 27 Captain H. J. Cator, the largest 
landowner in the division, who resided at Ranworth Hall, became Wright's principal 
backer and chairman of the new political organisation. The E. N. N. C. A. C. set up 
offices at Norwich and six other centres and, within a few weeks, had assembled a team 
of nearly 60 paid election workers. 28 The third by-election candidate, Norman R. 
Tillett, carried Labour's hopes of profiting from the split in the traditional government 
vote and overturning the 12,647 majority Lord Elmley obtained at the 1935 general 
election. 29 
The B. U. F was poorly placed to exploit the disaffection within agricultural 
circles which threatened to undermine the National Government's hold on the seat. 
Wright's candidature effectively marginalised the B. U. F. by offering a more credible 
political alternative for disgruntled farmers in the constituency. As a local farmer and 
N. F. U. official, he possessed the necessary qualifications and status to mount a realistic 
26 E-D-P. 16 November 1938, p. 9. 
27 R Douglas Brown, East Anglia 1939 (Lavenham: Terence Dalton, 1980), p. 80. 
28 Ibid.. 
29 Ibid.. See also E. D. P" 16 November 1938, p. 9. 
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challenge on an independent agricultural platform. His by-election campaign was 
further enhanced by the creation of the E. N. N. C. A. C., which possessed money, 
support, organisational skills and influential backers. In contrast, as Mosley had 
conceded in December 1937, the B. U. F. had been able to establish only a rudimentary 
District organisation in the East Norfolk constituency, which precluded the selection of 
a Blackshirt prospective parliamentary candidate. 30 Lacking material resources, activist 
personnel and prominent local figureheads, the East Norfolk B. U. F. was unable to 
conduct the type of sustained high profile propaganda campaign which was vital if the 
Blackshirts were to have any success in winning over a significant number of wavering 
National Government supporters. 
Ultimately, government pressure, combined with official assurances regarding 
the future of British agriculture, ended the E. N. N. C. A. C. 's potentially damaging 
electoral challenge before polling day and also helped to neutralise the B. U. F. 's appeal. 
On 17 January 1939, Wright received a letter from the Prime Minister pointing out that 
the Ministry of Agriculture, in consultation with the N. F. U. and others, was presently 
reviewing the farming industry and would introduce "Whatever legislation is found to 
be necessary". 31 Chamberlain also stressed that this issue did not constitute grounds 
for "splitting the National Government vote", and he requested that, in the interests of 
the National Government and agriculture, Wright should withdraw. 32 Captain David 
Margesson, the government Chief Whip, reinforced the Prime Minister's intervention 
by holding two interviews with Cator in London on 16 January. At these meetings, the 
chairman of the E. N. N. C. A. C. was made aware of the "imperative need for a national 
united front at this critical period" and was informed of Chamberlain's intention "to 
make agriculture an essential feature of our national defence". 33 This information, 
together with the Prime Minister's personal involvement and Cator's "realisation of the 
international situation", persuaded Wright's main backer that the candidature should be 
30 E. D. P. _ 
14 December 1937, p. 9. 
31 Ibid., 18 January 1939, p. 9. 
32 Ibid.. 
33 Ibid., 18 January 1939, p. 13. 
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abandoned. 34 Just a few hours before nominations closed on 17 January 1939, the 
E. N. N. C. A. C. convened a meeting at the Norwich headquarters of the Norfolk Branch 
of the N. F. U., attended by 110 people, to consider these dramatic eleventh hour 
developments. A vote was taken, and by a small majority it was decided that Wright 
should withdraw. 35 The would-be challenger attempted to put the best possible gloss 
on this climb-down: 
I am entitled to claim a victory for the cause that I set out to 
promote. There is an assurance in the Prime Minister's letter 
that has never been given to the farming industry ... I 
know I 
would have won the election all right. But I have always been 
a supporter of Mr Chamberlain and when he personally asked 
me to do a thing what else could I do ? 36 
Polling took place on 26 January 1939. Frank Medlicott retained the seat for 
the Liberal Nationals with 18,257 votes, a drop of almost 5,000 compared with the last 
general election. Labour's total of 10,785 represented only a marginal improvement on 
its 1935 performance. On a 53 per cent turnout, the government's majority fell from 
12,647 to 7,472.37 Before the result was announced, the B. U. F. ran a front page 
headline in Action claiming that "Wright Betrayed Farmers". 38 According to the fascist 
analysis of these events, Wright had demonstrated the "technique of democratic 
politics" in making way for a London solicitor to contest an agricultural 
constituency. 39 His `manipulation' of rural discontent, Chamberlain's personal 
popularity and the mounting criticism of party politics was deemed to be "worthy of a 
Baldwin". 40 The Blackshirts claimed that, by providing an outlet for local agricultural 
discontent, Wright's candidature prevented the introduction of a "real farmer's 
candidate", and his last minute withdrawal effectively handed the seat to the National 
34 Ibid.. 
35 Ibid., 18 January 1939, p. 9. 
36 J. F. Wright. Quoted in Brown, East Anglia 192% p. 82. 
37 E-D-P-- 28 January 1939, p. 5. 
38 lion, 28 January 1939, p. 1. 39 Ibid.. 
40 Ibid.. 
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Government's nominee. 41 Furthermore, the B. U. F. maintained that Wright's "strategic 
retreat" had been induced by Chamberlain's assurances, even though these were 
"virtually identical with the pious sentiments which agriculturalists have been hearing 
from political platforms every year that the National Government has been in offce". 42 
In the estimation of the fascist press, neither the present administration nor 
Conservative Central Office would take steps to help the farmers until the latter "break 
with a loyalty which is being shamefully exploited". 43 
Blackshirt attempts to derive significant long-term political benefits from a 
proposed farmers' march in London were equally unsuccessful. Mosley's call for the 
East Anglian rural community to demonstrate in the streets of the capital apparently 
induced a small number of Suffolk farmers to try to arrange an independent protest in 
the city. 44 However, they "found progress impossible" and approached A. G. Mobbs, 
Chairman of the Suffolk N. F. U., with the suggestion that the County Branch should 
take charge. 45 Mobbs persuaded the Suffolk N. F. U. Executive to plan the event and a 
small organising committee was set up in December 1938 under the chairmanship of 
Neville Stanley, who farmed near Ipswich. By the beginning of 1939, a London march 
and mass meeting had been provisionally arranged for 1 February, and the organisers 
issued an appeal for farmers from other counties, including Norfolk and Essex, to 
support this demonstration. 46 
On 10 January 1939, approximately 1,200 farmers, farmworkers, landowners 
and representatives of allied interests attended a meeting at the Public Hall, Ipswich, 
held under the auspices of the Suffolk N. F. U., and passed two resolutions. The first, 
which was carried unanimously, called for a "united front of all agricultural interests" 
as a means of pressing the government to take steps to improve the prosperity of the 
41 Ibid., p. 10. 
42 Ibid., p. 1. 
43 Ibid., p. 10. 44 A. G. Mobbs, `Eighty Years on Suffolk Soil' (Untitled unpublished memoir), p. 73. See also A. G. 
Mobbs, `Suffolk Farmers Change The Face Of British Agriculture In Less Than Three Weeks', 
ers Journal, Vol. 11, No. 11 (1963), p. 19. 
5 Mobbs, 'Eighty Years on Suffolk Soil', pp. 73-74. 
46 Ibid., p. 74; S C. M.. 6 January 1939, p. 14. 
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farming sector so that agriculture "could play its rightful part in national affairs". 47 A 
second resolution, moved by Neville Stanley, which stated that, unless the authorities 
endeavoured to ensure that agricultural prices fairly reflected production costs, Suffolk 
farmers would oppose the return of National Government candidates at the next 
election, was passed with "a storm of cheering and applause". 48 
Galvanised by this show of agricultural solidarity, a group of Suffolk 
representatives, headed by A. G. Mobbs, attended the annual conference of the N. F. U. 
in London a week later. Dismissing the assurances given by the Prime Minister to J. F. 
Wright as "the old confidence trick", Mobbs told the delegates that farmers were 
"heartily sick of this sort of talk" and were "demanding action" from both the N. F. U. 
and the government. 49 He urged the N. F. U. Council to endorse a protest rally at the 
Albert Hall, since a "large number" of East Anglian farmers were determined to 
demonstrate in London "by some means or other". 50 Due to the Union's impending 
talks with the Minister of Agriculture, however, the N. F. U. leadership considered such 
action to be inappropriate and refused to become involved. Once the Suffolk 
contingent had returned to Ipswich, a meeting of the County Executive was convened, 
which decided to press ahead immediately with the arrangements for a march in the 
capital on 1 February 1939. Over the next few days, special trains were hired from 
Ipswich, Colchester and Sudbury to take protesters to London, a procession route 
from Tower Hill was agreed with Scotland Yard, and the Central Hall at Westminster 
was booked for an end-of-march mass meeting. 51 
Mobbs admitted that, in desperation, some hard-pressed East Anglian farmers 
"had been reluctant to refuse help from the Fascists, who were naturally only too 
willing to throw in their lot with them". 52 Nevertheless, the Suffolk N. F. U. 's central 
role in organising the February demonstration denied the B. U. F. political space and 
47 E. A. D. T. 11 January 1939, p. 2. 
48 Ibid.. See also Farmer and Stock-Breeder_ 17 January 1939, p. 138. 49 E. AD. T__ 18 January 1939, p. 9; Astion. 28 January 1939, p. 6. 50 Ibid.. 
51 Brown, East Anglia 1939_ p. 82. 52 E. AD. T., 18 January 1939, p. 9. 
301 
prevented the movement from obtaining much agricultural support during the `barley 
crisis'. The existence of a County Branch of the N. F. U., which had been set up in 1919, 
ensured that Mosley's movement could not present itself as the only, or most viable, 
vehicle for agricultural protest in late 1938 and early 1939.53 Led by well-regarded 
local farmers, many of whom had considerable experience of fighting for improved 
conditions on the land, the Suffolk N. F. U. represented the authentic voice of grass root 
farming opinion and provided an established channel for pursuing agricultural 
grievances. Thus, the County Branch's decision to take an active role in planning the 
demonstration significantly constrained the B. U. F. 's ability to harness rural discontent 
in the area. Lacking resources, support and a secure organisational structure in the 
county, the East Anglian Blackshirt movement could do little to challenge the Suffolk 
N. F. U. 's pre-eminent position in the protest movement. Despite more intensive 
agricultural campaigning during this period, Blackshirt recruitment in the county lagged 
far behind that of the Suffolk N. F. U., which reported a membership of 2,587 in 
January 1939.54 
With the County Branch committed to more militant action than the N. F. U. 
Council would countenance, the B. U. F. might have had more impact if the Suffolk 
N. F. U. had ran an ineffective or lacklustre campaign. However, drawing on the 
successful tactics employed during the recent `tithe war', Mobbs and his colleagues 
provided resourceful leadership and sought to maintain pressure on the government 
through lawful, publicity-seeking events. This strategy was based on the belief that the 
farmers could mobilise public support, gain positive media coverage, and change 
official attitudes only through peaceful, law-abiding and politically independent 
agitation, which concentrated exclusively on the agricultural issues. The pivotal role 
played by the County Branch gave the East Anglian protest movement a disciplined 
focus and prevented disaffection from spilling over into violence or disorder. It also 
53 For a brief history of the Suffolk Branch of the N. F. U. see P. J. O. Trist, A Survey of the Agriculture 
Qf Suffolk (London: Royal Agricultural Society of England, 1971), pp. 329-332. 
34 E. A. D. T. r 26 January 1939, p. 4. 
302 
supplied the organisational skills required to arrange the London march at short 
notice. 55 
The only way in which the B. U. F. could have capitalised fully on the growing 
rural discontent in the eastern counties in the late 1930s was by acting in alliance with 
the organisers of the demonstration. For two key reasons, however, the Suffolk N. F. U. 
firmly rejected any form of fascist involvement in the proposed march. Firstly, such a 
link would have fatally undermined the County Branch's politically non-partisan 
approach, which was designed to maximise sympathetic consideration of its case. 
Secondly, official connections with the B. U. F. were now even less attractive than they 
had been for the East Anglian tithepayers in 1933-1934. Since then, growing public 
disquiet over Blackshirt violence and anti-Semitism in areas such as the East End of 
London, and fascist aggression abroad had rendered any sort of formal association with 
Mosley untenable. Consequently, the Suffolk N. F. U. quickly distanced itself from the 
B. U. F. and emphasised the non-political nature of the planned demonstration. In 
January 1939, Neville Stanley, chairman of the Farmers' Protest Committee, confirmed 
in the local press that an offer of Blackshirt assistance regarding the London march had 
been turned down. 56 Later the same month, Mobbs also reported that those who were 
taking an "active part" in the protest arrangements had publicly dissociated themselves 
from the B. U. F.. 57 
Government action on 29 January 1939, four days before the march was 
scheduled to take place, helped to dissipate rural discontent, thereby dealing the fascist 
agricultural campaign another critical blow. On that date, Chamberlain announced that 
Major Sir Reginald Hugh Dorman-Smith, who had been President of the N. F. U. in 
1936-1937, was to replace W. S. Morrison as Minister of Agriculture. The appointment 
of a farmer to this post was greeted with enthusiasm by the East Anglian agricultural 
community, and the protest organisers rapidly turned their planned demonstration into 
55 Mobbs, `Eighty Years on Suffolk Soil', Chapter VIII. 56 ýý 13 January 1939, p. 5,12 January 1939, p. 9. 57 Ibid., 18 January 1939, p. 9. 
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a rally of support for the new minister. 58 Dorman-Smith was invited to attend the 
Central Hall meeting, but he was able to decline without giving offence as a debate on 
agriculture was due to take place in the House of Commons on the same day. 
On 1 February 1939, about 1,000 East Anglian farmers and their supporters, 
together with smaller contingents from the home counties, Cornwall, Devon and 
Somerset, arrived in London. 59 After assembling at Tower Hill, they marched along 
Cannon Street, Queen Victoria Street and the Embankment to the Central Hall, 
Westminster. The procession, which was headed by a band and the march organisers, 
was described as "one of the quietest" ever witnessed in the capital. 60 Some of the 
participants carried sheaves of wheat, and others held banners and placards proclaiming 
`Save Agriculture' and `Justice for the Land'. Between 4-5,000, mostly from the 
farming community, attended the Central Hall meeting. A. G. Mobbs, one of the 
speakers at this event, proposed a resolution which urged the government to provide 
agriculture with "immediate help", welcomed the appointment of a farmer to the 
position of Minister of Agriculture as a sign that the authorities recognised "the 
seriousness of the present position", and pledged "wholehearted support" to 
Dorman-Smith in his "responsible and difficult task". 61 This was enthusiastically 
endorsed, and, later, a deputation presented the resolution to the Prime Minister at the 
House of Commons. 
Although an official approach from the B. U. F. had been rejected by the Suffolk 
organisers, the Blackshirt movement nevertheless attempted to use the march and 
meeting as a platform for its agricultural policy. A number of East Anglian Mosleyites 
joined the demonstrators, ostensibly in a private capacity, but some fascists used the 
occasion to march along the route bearing pro-B. U. F. placards, selling Action and 
distributing Blackshirt agricultural leaflets. 62 Throughout the procession, an officer 
58 Mobbs, `Eighty Years on Suffolk Soil', p. 76; E. AD. T. _ 1 February 1939, p. 
7. 
This account of the `Farmers' March' is based on contemporary press cuttings, mostly contained in 
the Mobbs Papers. 
60 Morning Advertiser. 2 February 1939. Press cutting in the Mobbs Papers. 61 E. A. D. T. _ 2 February 1939, p. 9. 62 Farmer's March in London. 1/2/39. Labour Party Photograph Library. National Museum of Labour 
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from Scotland Yard shadowed Mobbs to ensure that the farmers' leader was not 
harassed by Blackshirts who "wanted to claim credit for suggesting the March". 63 J. 
Jarrald, a Suffolk farmer's daughter, who participated in the demonstration, later 
recalled that fascist attempts to capitalise on the event had little effect: "... the 
Blackshirts were a nuisance when we got to Liverpool Street. They tried to latch on, 
didn't they. [They] caused quite a `haroosh'. I don't know who told them but someone 
did.. 
. 
They latched on [as] we were walking along the Embankment because I can 
remember people on the march calling out to them, you know, telling them to `B 
off! "' 64 
At the Central Hall, some of the speakers were frequently interrupted by men 
and women in the audience, who shouted out fascist slogans and tried to distribute 
literature. During the latter stages of the meeting, fascist leaflets were dropped from 
the gallery onto the people below. These disruptive Blackshirt tactics were "bitterly 
resented" by those present and prompted Neville Stanley to tell the noisy fascist 
contingent that "some of you may have political views we don't agree with. Well, keep 
them out of this". 65 In the evening, Blackshirts from East End and other London 
Districts handed out propaganda material on the platform at Liverpool Street station as 
the farmers boarded their train home. 66 
Fascist efforts to exploit the `Farmers' March' had little significant impact, as 
the B. U. F. effectively admitted both before and after the event. In late January, the 
Blackshirt press asserted that Mosley had first suggested the idea of a march and 
bemoaned the fact that the farmers' demonstration was to be `non-political': " ... we 
warn the farmers that something more is required if they are to shake the apathy of the 
History, Manchester; Ronald N. Creasy. Telephone interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1996; Action. 11 
February 1939, p. 9. 
63 Mobbs, `Eighty Years on Suffolk Soil', p. 77. 64 J. Jarrald and J. Cooper, Oral History Tape (O. H. T. ) 586. Elmsett - Farming and General 
Reminiscences, 1990. Suffolk Record Office, Ipswich. See also Jill Goodwin, O. H. T. 625. Women's 
Land Army Reminiscences, 1991. Suffolk Record Office, Ipswich. 
65 E. AD. T. 
_ 2 February 1939, p. 9; Farmers Weekly 3 February 1939, p. 17; Daily Telegraph, 2 February 1939. Press cutting in the Mobbs Papers. 66 No Ingham mal_ 2 February 1939. Press cutting in the Mobbs Papers; N. S. M.. 18 February 
1939. 
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government. They must take care that their spirit of revolt is not deflected by Tory 
pundits into mere ineffectual grumblings. It would be a pity indeed if all the high 
indignation aroused by the recent barley scandal should be smothered under the wet 
blanket of N. F. U. officialdom". 67 
Three days after the march, Action alleged that pro-Conservative elements in 
the N. F. U. and the farming press had tried to stop the procession from taking place, 
since the government was not only keen to avoid damaging publicity about its failure to 
restore agriculture but was also alarmed at the B. U. F. 's progress in the rural areas. 68 In 
the same issue, however, the movement grudgingly conceded that its recent 
propaganda campaign in the eastern counties had won few converts. Claiming that the 
farmers had been "gulled into dropping their present agitation" by the appointment of 
the "N. F. U. boss" Dorman-Smith, the Blackshirts warned that the new Minister of 
Agriculture would neither exclude foreign produce nor pay an economic price because 
the financial interests which controlled the Tory Party received the interest on their 
overseas loans in the form of cheap imports. 69 The B. U. F. argued that a "pretty trick" 
had been played on the farmers, since the N. F. U. leadership was, in turn, under the 
influence of Conservative Central Office. 70 The transient nature of the B. U. F. 's limited 
success in East Anglia during the `barley crisis' was well illustrated by the fact that on 
20 February 1939, just three months after Mosley had filled the Central Cinema in the 
town, an advertised B. U. F. meeting at the Lancaster Hotel clubroom in Fakenham was 
abandoned due to lack of interest. Viscountess Downe and Ann Brock Griggs, Chief 
Woman Organiser, were to have explained B. U. F. policy, but only the two speakers 
and a man attended. 71 
67 Action, 28 January 1939, p. 10. 
68 Ibid., 4 February 1939, p. 11. 
69 Ibid., p. 1; 11 February 1939, p. 9. 70 Ibid.. 
71 E. D. P. 21 February 1939, p. 16; Norfolk Chronicle, 24 February 1939, p. 2. 
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3. The B. U. F. Peace Campaign in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex up to September 
1939 
Blackshirt foreign policy was an amalgam of deeply-held ideological beliefs and 
self-interested political calculation. At its core lay Mosley's conviction that by 
transforming the British Empire into a self-contained economic unit, Britain and her 
imperial possessions would be insulated from the "chaos of world struggle and 
collapse", which was allegedly inherent in the international financial system. 72 By 
removing the Empire from traditional trading rivalries, Mosley reasoned that Britain 
could concentrate on achieving imperial self-sufficiency, the struggle for overseas 
markets and raw materials would be reduced and the cause of peace thereby 
strengthened. The B. U. F. contended that the success of the British example would lead 
to the creation of other large corporate entities or "self-contained national 
organisations", which, in turn, would further dampen international economic 
tensions. 73 Under this new system, the "anarchistic struggle for markets", which had 
characterised "unorganised capitalism", would give way to a new era of rational 
cooperation. 74 
In essence, Mosley's proposals represented a principled rejection of the 
fundamental tenets of British foreign policy. Blackshirt thinking condemned 
involvement in continental alliance systems and the long-standing attachment to 
European balance-of-power politics on the grounds that neither protected Britain's 
vital imperial interests and both threatened to drag the country into disputes and 
conflicts which posed no danger to the Empire. Moreover, Mosley argued that the 
problem of ensuring British security and world peace was compounded by the malign 
influence of `international socialism' and `international finance', which, in their 
ideological drive to destroy fascism, had manoeuvred the old parties in Britain against 
Hitler and Mussolini's regimes. For the B. U. F., such dogmatic opposition to the Axis 
powers undermined Britain's position because it ran counter to the movement's view 
72 10 Points of Fascism (London: B. U. F. Publications, n. d. ), p. 5. 73 Oswald Mosley, The Greater Britain (London: B. U. F. Publications, 1932), p. 141. 74 Ibid., p. 140. 
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that the scattered territories of the Empire could not be safeguarded effectively without 
cultivating good relations with Germany, Italy and Japan. 75 
Embracing the slogans `Britain First' and `Mind Britain's Business', Mosley 
consistently advocated that Britain should steer clear of all conflicts and commitments 
which did not affect her imperial interests. If a threat to Britain or the Empire 
materialised, however, the B. U. F. pledged that British forces would be fully deployed 
to repulse any encroachment. In such a situation, the protection of British interests 
took precedence over the B. U. F. 's desire for international peace. For this reason, 
Mosley also insisted on the need to enhance Britain's military capability, by upgrading 
the country's defences and exploiting the full potential of air power, to deter any 
would-be aggressors from attacking the Empire. 76 
Blackshirt policy also claimed to reflect the realities of international power 
politics by acknowledging the dominance of those `great nations', whose advanced 
populations, material resources and moral standing fitted them for leadership in world 
affairs. Unless these states were able to satisfy their `legitimate' demands for territory 
and raw materials, another war would be inevitable. The B. U. F. maintained that the 
`dispossessed' among these pre-eminent nations should be encouraged to fulfil their 
imperial ambitions in ways, and parts of the world, which did not compromise Britain 
or her Empire. Consequently, Mosley urged that Germany should not only regain her 
pre-war colonies but also be given carte blanche in eastern Europe. Italy's imperial 
ambitions in north Africa should be accepted, and Japan's expansionist tendencies 
channelled into northern China, away from Britain's Far Eastern possessions. The 
resulting `great power' autarchic blocs, together with the British Empire, would 
remove the likelihood of war by eliminating the `international struggle' for markets and 
raw materials and form the basis of a new stable world order. 77 
75 Oswald Mosley, Tomorrow We Live (London: Abbey Supplies, 1938), Chapter Seven. 
76 Blackshirt, 5 July 1935, p. 4; Fascist Week. 26 January-1 February 1934, p. 5. 77 Mosley, Tomorrow We Live, pp. 64-69. 
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Although the B. U. F. adhered to this foreign policy framework throughout the 
decade, several modifications or shifts in emphasis were introduced during the period. 
Firstly, before the Abyssinian crisis of 1935, the B. U. F. accepted that the League of 
Nations could become an important vehicle for peace if its constitution was amended to 
ensure that the largest member states wielded the greatest influence in 
decision-making. 78 Thereafter, Blackshirt propaganda portrayed the League as a 
decrepit organisation, which resisted reform, perpetuated the `outmoded' balance of 
power system and fostered an alliance of "decaying democratic systems, with the 
bloodstained Soviet against the renaissant Fascist countries". 79 The B. U. F. now 
proposed that, in the future, European affairs would be regulated by a formal union of 
the four major fascist nations, comprising Britain, France, Germany and Italy. 
Secondly, by the mid-1930s, Mosley's vision of the harmonious coexistence of 
independent, self-sufficient `great power' blocs was overlaid with the argument that, 
owing to their complementary `missions', Britain and Germany constituted two of the 
central pillars upholding international order. This refinement mirrored the Blackshirt 
leader's assertion that Germany's drive to create a consolidated economic system, 
embracing the Germanic peoples of Europe, and Britain's commitment to maintain and 
develop the Empire were mutually exclusive because neither affected the other nation's 
vital interests. 80 
Finally, the B. U. F. 's contention that war was caused principally by nations 
competing for markets, resources and investment outlets later assumed a distinctly 
anti-Semitic form. The perceived destabilising practices of "international finance" were 
increasingly linked to strident claims that the Jews were seeking to engineer a "mortal 
78 Blackshirt, 7 June 1935, p. 1; Oswald Mosley, Blackshirt Policy (London: B. U. F. Publications, 
1934), p. 59. 79 Oswald Mosley, Fascism: 100 Questions Asked And Answered (London: B. U. F. Publications, 
1936), Question 92. 
80 Oswald Mosley, `The World Alternative', Fascist Quarterly (EQ, ), Vol. II, No. 3 (1936), pp. 
377-395. 
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quarrel" between Britain and Germany in retaliation for the Nazis' summary treatment 
of the "Jewish masters of usury". 81 
Other important motives also reinforced the B. U. F. 's anti-war stance. The 
pacifistic and isolationist elements of the B. U. F. programme accorded with the general 
outlook of the numerous British ex-servicemen who were attracted to the movement 
because of its patriotic values, quasi-military ethos and passionate attachment to the 
cause of the `betrayed' war generation. These Mosleyites, many of whom had 
experienced the horrors of combat at first hand during the Great War, were determined 
to prevent Britain becoming embroiled in another European conflict and shared a 
deeply-felt revulsion against war. These attitudes contrasted sharply with the bellicose 
sentiments often expressed by ex-service fascists on the continent. 82 
The B. U. F. 's peace platform was also conditioned by its desire to forge 
constructive relationships with the European fascist governments. At one level, this 
reflected Mosley's belief that the national variants of the `modern movement' shared a 
common basic ideological affinity, which could be used to restructure the international 
system in the cause of peace. The installation of fascist regimes across Europe, pledged 
to the pursuit of autarchic economics, offered, in the B. U. F. 's estimation, the only solid 
guarantee against another continental war. 83 Blackshirt approval of appeasement also 
rested on the view, shared by many in Britain, that Germany had legitimate grievances 
concerning the punitive terms of the Versailles Treaty, particularly with regard to 
reparations, the loss of colonies, the burden of war guilt and the fragmentation of the 
German-speaking population in Europe. 84 Furthermore, from an early stage, the 
B. U. F. recognised that a war between the fascist regimes and Britain would destroy the 
movement's domestic political prospects and place patriotic Blackshirts in an invidious 
81 Mosley, Tomorrow We Live_ p. 61. 
82 Stephen M. Cullen, `The Development of the Ideas and Policy of the British Union of Fascists, 
1932-40', Journal of Contemporary Historv_ Vol. 22 (1987), pp. 128-13 1. 
83 Fascism for the Million: The New Movement Simplified (London: B. U. F. Publications, 1936), pp. 
66-67; R Gordon-Canning, Mind Britain's Business: British Union Foreign Policy (London: Abbey 
Supplies, 1938). 
84 Blackshirt, 13 March 1936, p. 1; Action, 19 March 1938, p. 1 and p. 11. 
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position. This fear underscored the movement's assertion that the opponents of 
fascism, notably `international finance', would deliberately attempt to precipitate such a 
conflict to prevent the B. U. F. assuming power in Britain and to avert the onset of an 
impending world economic slump. 85 
From the autumn of 1935, when Italian troops invaded Abyssinia, the B. U. F. 's 
peace policy formed an important and ongoing part of the movement's political 
platform as Britain's relationship with the fascist nations came under increasing strain. 
During 1938 and 1939, the Blackshirts stepped up their anti-war campaign in response 
to the international crises which threatened the maintenance of peace. When Hitler 
annexed Austria in March 1938, the B. U. F. instructed its formations to make a "very 
special effort" the following weekend involving newspaper sales and leafleting duties, 
since only the movement could show the public "the fatal errors by which recent British 
Foreign Policy has led us to the brink of war" and "point the way to a permanent 
European peace based on the National Socialism of great nations". 86 Under the banner 
of `Stop the War', the B. U. F. also held numerous peace meetings in east London and 
hundreds of Blackshirt newspaper sellers descended on the West End one evening in 
March to promote a `Mind Britain's Business' response to the Anschluss. 87 Six months 
later, the imminent prospect of armed conflict with Germany over Czechoslovakia 
injected a new urgency into the movement's anti-war campaign. On 14 September 
1938, N. H. Q. issued a circular calling on all Districts to demonstrate their commitment 
to peace through "Meetings, leaflet distribution, chalking, personal propaganda" and to 
"carry our message of sanity to the people". 88 Local Blackshirt initiatives were 
85 W. Joyce, `Collective Security', F Q., Vol. I, No. 4 (1935), p. 422; `Notes on the quarter', F Q.. 
Vol. II, No. 3 (1936), p. 340; Action, 16 December 1937, p. 8,11 June 1938, p. 8. 
86 Circular to all Districts from B. D. E. Donovan, A. D. G. Administration, Department of 
Organisation, Administration. 16 March 1938. Saunders Papers A3. University of Sheffield Library. 
87 Actio 19 March 1938, p. 1,26 March 1938, p. 3. 
88 Public Records Office, Home Office series (P. RO. HO) 144/21281/95. `National Campaign For 
Britain, Peace and People'. Circular from B. D. E. Donovan, A. D. G. Administration, Department of 
Organisation, Administration to all British Union formations. 14 September 1938. 
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supplemented by a number of high profile B. U. F. anti-war activities held in the West 
End, Whitehall and Downing Street during the Sudeten emergency. 89 
The signing of the Munich agreement on 30 September 1938 temporarily 
defused the atmosphere of crisis and briefly stalled the progress of the B. U. F. 's peace 
campaign. 90 However, the Nazi military occupation of the rump of Czechoslovakia in 
mid-March 1939 and the British guarantees to Poland, Romania and Greece, which 
followed this act of aggression, gave the Blackshirt anti-war platform renewed impetus. 
The B. U. F. argued that such commitments undermined the cause of peace, benefited 
only Jews and financiers, and entangled Britain in disputes which did not affect her vital 
interests. In particular, the pledge to uphold the independence of Poland was 
denounced at every opportunity throughout the spring and summer of 1939. Blackshirt 
propaganda maintained that, due to the Polish guarantee, Britain was now obligated to 
defend a "sink of iniquity", which contained 3.5 million Jews, mistreated its German 
minority and was largely controlled by international finance. 91 Moreover, the B. U. F. 
asserted that the pact, which placed "the lives of a million Britons in the pocket of any 
drunken Polish corporal", could not be honoured without sustaining an unacceptably 
high casualty rate. 92 
On 16 April 1939, Mosley addressed a "great Peace Rally" at Limehouse to 
launch a "protracted campaign" to keep Britain out of foreign quarrels. 93 From then 
on, Blackshirt efforts to avert conflict continued until Britain declared war on Germany 
on 3 September 1939. The B. U. F. 's 1939 May Day rally in London was organised 
around the theme of "For Peace And People" in protest against the "Government's 
mad policy of committing Britain to fight for all the little Balkan States in turn, in the 
89 Action, 1 October 1938, p. 7; P. R. O. HO 144/21381/88-90. Jew-baiting. Metropolitan Police 
Report for September 1938.10 October 1938. 
90 P. R. O. HO 144/21381/93-96. Jew-baiting. Metropolitan Police Report for October 1938.10 
November 1938; P. R. O. HO 144/21381/102-105. Jew baiting. Metropolitan Police Report for 
November 1938.9 December 1938. 
91 Acfi= 8 April 1939, p. 1 
92 Ibid.; `Notes on the quarter', British Union Quarter] y_ Vol. HI, No. 2 (1939), p. 8. 
93 Agin, 15 April 1939, p. 10,22 April 1939, p. 1. 
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interest of Finance alone". 94 Mosley's public meeting at the Exhibition Hall, Earls 
Court on 16 July 1939 represented the high point of the movement's anti-war 
campaign. Here, before an audience estimated by the police to number about 11,000, 
the B. U. F. leader condemned "the betrayal of the British people into war and financial 
slavery" and advocated the Blackshirt four point peace plan. 95 Fascist contingents from 
Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex were present at this well-publicised event. 96 In late August 
1939, as international tension mounted, N. H. Q. instructed all Districts to intensify the 
peace campaign by making "maximum use" of all available Blackshirt speakers and by 
holding "snap meetings" and propaganda drives in residential areas. 97 The B. U. F. 
considered that every "means within the law must be taken to keep before the People 
our determination not to fight a war for Warsaw" and argued that the government 
"must not be allowed to try to avenge its crushing diplomatic defeats by sending the 
Youth of the Nation to the shambles". 98 ý"h 
Between the spring of 1938 and September 1939, Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex 
Mosleyites used a variety of methods to promote the Blackshirt anti-war message. 
During thi period, the movement's peace proposals were endorsed at open-air 
meetings held by numerous B. U. F. Districts in the region, including the Eye, 
Woodbridge, Lowestoft and Epping formations. 99 Ronald Creasy's regular B. U. F. 
feature in the North Suffolk Messenger denounced "this mad cry for war which would 
destroy civilisation and any security of life for ever". 100 Local fascists also wrote 
94 Circular from U. A. Hick, Senior Administrator, British Union Headquarters, London 
Administration. 21 April 1939. Saunders Papers A4. According to the B. U. F., "thousands" 
participated in the May Day rally. See Actioý3,13 May 1939, pp. 1-2. 
ý P. R. O. H0144/21281/150-153. Special Branch Report on the Earls Court Meeting. 16 July 1939; 
Action, 22 July 1939, p. 1. The B U. F. claimed that 30,000 attended this event. Board of Deputies 
observers put the figure at approximately 15,000. See Board of Deputies of British Jews (B. D. B. J. ) 
C6/9/l/3. The Mosley Meeting At Earls Court. Digest Of Observers' Reports. 
96 When interviewed, several former East Anglian Blackshirts recalled attending the Earls Court 
meeting. 
97 Circular to all Districts from B. D. E. Donovan, Assistant Director-General, Department of 
Organisation, Administration. 23 August 1939. Saunders Papers A4. 
98 Ibid.. 
99 Ronald N. Creasy. Completed questionnaire for Andrew Mitchell, 1997; Arthur Swan. Taped 
interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991; Walthamstow. Ieyton and Chingford Guardian ()8. L. CG"l, 
28 April 1939, p. 5,1 September 1939, p. 1. 100 N'Q iJM. 22 April 1939. 
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letters to the regional press in the late 193 Os defending the `Mind Britain's Business' 
platform. 101 On occasion, too, prominent Blackshirts in the area used local forums to 
publicise the British Union case. Thus, in January 1939, at a meeting of the Thetford 
Debating Society, convened to consider Chamberlain's foreign policy, the B. U. F. 's 
prospective parliamentary candidate for South-West Norfolk, Miss L. M. Reeve, 
advocated a policy of mediation and conciliation to ensure an international 
settlement. 102 Less orthodox activities were also pursued to raise public awareness of 
the B. U. F. 's anti-war message. In Suffolk, for example, working under cover of 
darkness during the early hours of 26 August 1939, unidentified Blackshirts littered the 
main streets of Stowmarket with B. U. F. leaflets and painted `Mosley for Peace' 
slogans on several roads, the market place and a bridge. 103 
National B. U. F. figures also addressed audiences in the three counties during 
the last eighteen months of peace to reinforce District propaganda work. Mosley 
vigorously espoused the Blackshirt four point peace policy (which stressed British 
disinterest in eastern Europe, disarmament between Britain, France, Germany and Italy, 
return of the mandated territories, and development of the British Empire) at a number 
of meetings held in the region during 1938-1939.104 Another N. H. Q. official, 
Alexander Raven Thomson, also made several visits to the area to defend the B. U. F. 's 
peace proposals. In May 1938, Raven Thomson explained the Blackshirt position on 
the Czechoslovakian crisis at a Chingford street meeting held under the auspices of the 
Epping District B. U. F.. 105 Four months later, he deputised for Mosley at the Market 
Hill, Woodbridge. Once again taking Czechoslovakia as his subject, Raven Thomson 
referred to that "sausage shaped country inhabited by five different peoples speaking 
five different languages" and maintained that British interests were not affected by the 
101 See for example E. A. D. T.. 23 April 1938, p. 5; East Ham Echo (EH. E. ), 9 June 1939, p. 7,1 
September 1939, p. 4; W. LC. G.. 27 January 1939, p. 5. 10 N. N. W. P. . 21 January 1939, p. 10. 103 F.. A. D. T., 28 August 1938, p. 3. 
104 For example, Mosley advocated the B. U. F. anti-war policy at Ipswich, Walthamstow, Fakenham, 
Eye and Ilford in 1938-1939. See E. A. D. T_. 9 May 1938, p. 7; Blackshirt, July 1938, p. 2; E DAP-- 22 
November 1938, p. 7; N. S. J. D. E_. 3 February 1939, p. 2; Ilford Recorder (LB.. ), 30 March 1939, p. 8. 105 W. LC. G. _ 27 May 1938, p. 7. 
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current crisis. 106 Shortly afterwards, at the Clacton Debating Society, he proposed that 
"the interests of world peace demand a further revision to the Right of our foreign 
policy", but the motion was defeated by 76 votes to 23.107 
Before the outbreak of war, B. U. F. activity in the region also promoted the 
anti-Semitism which formed an integral part of the movement's peace propaganda. 
Raven Thomson's meeting at Albert Avenue, Chingford, in August 1938 epitomised 
fascist attempts in the locality to saddle Jewry with the blame for the prevailing 
atmosphere of international crisis. The B. U. F. 's Director of Policy launched into a 
tirade against the Jews, accusing them of having "a great hatred against the German 
people" and of trying "to drag all the nations into a war of revenge". 108 Related 
anti-Jewish themes were pursued in the area as well. In January 1939, the B. U. F. press 
railed against the influx of Jewish refugees fleeing from persecution in Europe on the 
grounds that these `aliens' diverted funds away from needy Britons, exacerbated the 
unemployment problem and `stole' British jobs. 109 Local Mosleyites registered their 
antipathy towards the new arrivals in a more direct way. A group of Blackshirts and a 
number of jobless people "almost succeeded in wrecking" a meeting held at Leyton 
Town Hall in February 1939 to discuss the Borough's involvement in Earl Baldwin's 
Fund for refugees from Germany. 110 Those fascists who were present at the meeting 
kept up a "running fire of interruption", complaining that the assistance provided for 
foreigners was at the expense of the British unemployed. Ill Two months later, a 
similar meeting at Gresham Hall, Chingford was also disrupted by B. U. F. adherents. 112 
106 Actioý 1 October 1938, p. 17. 
107 The Clacton Times and East Essex Gazette (C , ), 19 November 1938, p. 10; 
Clacton 
News and East Essex Advertiser (C. N. E. E. A. 1,19 November 1938, p. 1. Several members of the 
Clacton B. U. F. were present at this debate. 
108 B. D. B. J. C6/9/1/3. Report re Blackshirt Meeting addressed by Raven Thomson, at Albert Avenue, 
Chingford, on 20th August, 1938. For another example see The Boro of West Ham. East Ham and 
tford Express (S E), 30 June 1939, p. 7. 
9 Astion, 7 January 1939, p. 1,14 January 1939, p. 1,21 January 1939, p. 3, p. 8 and p. 17. 
110 SJL 24 February 1939, p. 5. 
111 Ibid.; Action, 25 February 1939, p. 7. 
112 W. L. C. G.. 28 April 1939, p. 1. 
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Historians of the B. U. F., whose work appeared before the mid-1970s, 
concluded that the movement had peaked with a membership of about 40,000 during 
the first half of 1934, when the Rothermere newspaper empire gave the Blackshirts 
favourable coverage. Thereafter, according to these earlier accounts, the B. U. F. 
experienced a period of progressive decline for the rest of the decade and could muster 
only 9,000 or so members by September 1939.113 This broad consensus was broken in 
1975, when Robert Skidelsky maintained that previous estimates had not fully reflected 
the impact of a number of factors, including the Blackshirts' mobilisation of anti-war 
sentiment via the 1939 Peace Campaign. Using this line of argument, Skidelsky 
suggested that, by 1939, the B. U. F. 's combined active and non-active membership 
stood at approximately 40,000, marking a return to the recruitment levels achieved 
during the Rothermere period. 114 He later lowered his revised estimate for 1939 to 
20-25,000.115 
Skidelsky's general conclusions were endorsed and refined in the mid-1980s by 
Gerry Webber, following careful analysis of recently released government papers 
relating to the B. U. F.. 116 His research suggested that from the post-Rothermere low 
point of just 5,000 Blackshirts in October 1935, the membership gradually climbed to 
22,500 by September 1939. Furthermore, Webber tentatively concluded that the 
improvement in the B. U. F. 's fortunes after Munich owed much to the movement's 
peace policy, which attracted "predominantly middle-class `Tories' alienated from their 
`natural' party by the creeping victory of the anti-appeasers . 
117 
Impressionistic evidence relating to the impact of the B. U. F. 's peace policy in 
Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex tends to support these revisionist arguments. A number of 
B. U. F. Districts in the area appeared to benefit from the dissemination of Blackshirt 
113 Colin Cross, The Fascists in Britain (London: Barrie and Rockclife, 1961); R Benewick, 
Uggst Movement in Britain (London: Allen Lane, 1972). 
114 R. Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley (London: Macmillan Press, 1975), p. 332. 
115 R Skidelsky, `Great Britain' in S. J. Woolf (ed. ), Fascism In Europe (London: Methuen, 1981), p. 
275. 
116 G. C. Webber, `Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of Fascists', Journal of 
Vol. 19 (1984), pp. 575-606. 
117 Ibid., p. 598. 
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anti-war propaganda. An ex-member of the Norwich Branch remembered that the 
number of Mosleyites in the County Borough rose steadily between 1936 and 1939.118 
At Eye in Suffolk, the former District Leader recollected that the Peace Campaign 
"increased and strengthened" the local B. U. F. formation. 119 The senior official at 
Leytonstone during 1939-1940 also later recalled that, although the Czechoslovakian 
crisis caused a number of local adherents to resign in protest, the movement's anti-war 
stance more than compensated for these losses by boosting the District B. U. F. 
membership from 193 8.120 Police and oral evidence indicates that similar developments 
also affected the progress of the East Ham B. U. R. Special Branch reported that in 
September 1938 many of Mosley's "most ardent followers in areas, such as Bethnal 
Green, Limehouse and East Ham, became imbued with a feeling of antagonism towards 
Germany during the crisis week". 121 The disenchantment expressed at East Ham was 
confirmed by T. M., the local District Treasurer between 1938 and 1940, who 
remembered that several members of the Branch were unhappy with the B. U. F. 
leadership's foreign policy line because they saw it as slavishly endorsing Germany's 
actions. 122 Nonetheless, he maintained that Blackshirt anti-war activity in East Ham 
resulted in "an increase in membership during 1938", which was "well maintained" until 
the military call-up. 123 Pro-Mosley sources indicate that B. U. F. membership was also 
rising at West Ham and Walthamstow West towards the end of the 1930s. 124 
Elsewhere, however, the deepening international crisis and the Mosleyite 
response did not promote B. U. F. growth. At Epping, for example, although "some 
were galvanised by the B. U. F. Peace Campaign and joined", a roughly equivalent 
118 Eric Pleasants. Interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
119 Creasy. Completed questionnaire. 
120 E. G.. Completed questionnaire for Andrew Mitchell, 1997. 
121 P. R. O. HO 144/21281/98. Special Branch Report on the B. U. F.. 14 October 1938. 
122 T. M.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
123 T. M.. Completed questionnaire for Andrew Mitchell, 1997. 
124 A. R. Beavan. Friends of Oswald Mosley (F. O. M. ) taped interview, 1988; A. R. Beavan. Taped 
interview with Stephen Cullen, 1986; F. T.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1993; F. T.. Letter 
to Andrew Mitchell. 17 August 1993; R. W.. F. O. M. taped interview, 1988; RW.. Completed 
questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, 1985; Derrick Millington. Completed questionnaire for Stephen 
Cullen, 1985. 
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number left the movement in 1938-1939.125 Most of the latter departed either in 
protest against Hitler's actions over Czechoslovakia and Poland or because they felt 
Britain was drifting to an inevitable war. Consequently, the Epping District 
membership, totalling 70-80 active and non-active Blackshirts, remained largely static 
during 1938 and the first eight months of 193 9.126 The Lowestoft B. U. F. lost almost 
two-thirds of its membership in the aftermath of the Munich crisis, apparently because 
of a general feeling within the Branch that conflict with Germany was now 
unavoidable. 127 Fascist peace propaganda failed to enrol new recruits at the port to 
offset these losses. Several other Lowestoft Blackshirts resigned in the period after 
1938.128 
Webber's suggestion that the B. U. F. benefited from an influx of disaffected 
pro-appeasement middle class Conservatives from the end of 1938 is also partially 
substantiated by the pattern of Blackshirt recruitment in certain Districts in the region. 
In February 1939, the fascist press detected signs of a "swing-over of political opinion 
in the near future" at Epping because of a rift between Winston Churchill, the sitting 
M. P., and local Tory supporters. 129 Action claimed that the Conservative rank and file 
in the constituency were "intensely dissatisfied" with Churchill's attitude towards the 
National Government's foreign policy and reported that he had recently been censured 
by two local Tory Associations. 130 The last Epping District Leader confirmed that a 
number of disillusioned Conservatives either joined or supported the local movement in 
the late 1930s but felt that not all of them were won over by the B. U. F. 's anti-war line: 
"There were a few like that, yeah. It wasn't only the Peace Campaign though. 
Disaffected Tories came in because the government didn't govern although it had a 
125 L. B.. Telephone interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1997. 
126 Ibid.. 
127 Swan. Taped interview. 
128 Arthur Swan. Letter to Andrew Mitchell. 2 February 1993. 
129 AZIm 25 February 1939, p. 13. 
130 Ibid.. 
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large majority. Even if they weren't members, they were alarmed by the apathy of the 
government". 131 
Moreover, former members recalled that, as the Norwich and Walthamstow 
West B. U. F. expanded in 1938-1939, both formations attracted a more middle class 
following. 132 Disenchanted Conservatives also entered the Blackshirt ranks at Eye 
because of Mosley's anti-war platform. 133 Other local B. U. F. Districts, however, did 
not appear to recruit alienated Tories in appreciable numbers. For example, the District 
Treasurer at East Ham (193 8-1940) could remember only one former Tory becoming a 
member of his Branch after 1937.134 Furthermore, at Leytonstone, although erstwhile 
Conservatives had joined the local formation in 1934, from 1938 the Peace Campaign 
mostly mobilised dissident left-wingers. 135 The Leytonstone District Leader 
(1939-1940) pointed out that the last two Blackshirts recruited in the area had 
previously belonged to the Young Communist League. 136 
Nevertheless, despite the modest gains reportedly made by the B. U. F. in 
Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex as a result of its peace policy, official and popular 
responses during this period of mounting international tension from late 1938 made the 
creation of a sizeable Blackshirt anti-war constituency highly problematic. Three major 
obstacles stood in the way of a further fascist advance across the region. Firstly, 
government measures to meet the crisis had a debilitating effect on the B. U. F.. The 
introduction of the Military Training Act in May 1939, which established peacetime 
conscription, and the impact of the National Service (Armed Forces) Act four months 
later, drained the local movement of its activist core, as the District Leader at 
Leytonstone (1939-1940) recollected: "... those Branch officials who were Reservists of 
one sort or another began to be called up and the organisational gaps had to be plugged 
by inexperienced members. Nationally, by the outbreak of war, the services of several 
131 L. B.. Telephone interview. 
132 Pleasants. Interview; RW.. Completed questionnaire. 
133 Creasy. Completed questionnaire. 
134 T. M.. Completed questionnaire. 
135 E. G.. Completed questionnaire. 
136 Ibid.. 
319 
thousand of the most active and enthusiastic members were no longer available,. 137 A 
number of Eye Blackshirts enlisted during this period, but the District was able to 
sustain these losses without abandoning its political work. 138 Several of the most 
committed West Ham Mosleyites went into the armed services at this stage and lost 
contact with the local movement. 139 The call-up also affected the East Ham 
membership, and, at Epping, B. U. F. activists either joined the Territorial Army units 
attached to the Essex Regiment or entered other branches of the military. 140 About half 
the Blackshirts at Walthamstow West were also stated to be Territorials. 141 Once 
hostilities had commenced, the Norwich District Leader returned to his "old job" in the 
R. A. F., and the District Treasurer, after joining the army, obtained a Cadet 
Commission. 142 
Secondly, before and after September 1939, the B. U. F. 's Peace Campaign was 
also hampered by the persistent refusal of some local authorities to let halls to the 
Blackshirts. The Labour-controlled council at Walthamstow consistently opposed 
B. U. F. applications to hire municipal property for meetings. In December 1938, this 
body declined to supply the B. U. F. with a list of vacant dates for the Baths Hall "for 
fear of possible consequences", and, two months later, a suggestion by the leader of the 
Opposition on the council to rescind the decision denying the Blackshirts use of the 
venue was ruled "out of order" by the Mayor. 143 After a further approach in early 
1940, the B. U. F. was informed that "at the moment the Council are not prepared to let 
137 E. G.. Letter to Andrew Mitchell. 25 August 1997. 
138 Road N. Creasy. Letter to Andrew Mitchell. 27 August 1997. According to George Hoggarth, 
the Eye B. U. F. District Treasures the formation still had 21 members in May 1940. See Home Office 
Advisory Committee (HOAC) Report. George Frederick Hoggarth. 17 August 1940. This document 
was consulted on privileged access at the Home Office. 139 F. T.. Taped interview; F. T.. Letter. F. T. was called up in October 1939 and assigned to the 6th 
Battalion, Devonshire Regiment. 
140 T. M.. Completed questionnaire; D. T.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. D. T. joined 
the Essex Regiment in August 1939. 
141 RW.. F. O. M taped interview. 
142 public Records Office, Treasury Solicitor's Department (P. R. O. TS) 27/493. Home Office 
Advisory Committee to consider Appeals against Orders of Internment. Notes of a meeting held at 6, 
Burlington Gardens, W. I. on Tuesday 10th September 1940. John Smeaton-Stuart. 
143 W. L_C. G. _ 6 January 1939, p. 11,3 March 1939, p. 9. 
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the halls". 144 The Labour local authority at East Ham proved to be no more 
accommodating. In mid-1939, H. J. Howard, the East Ham District Leader, twice 
sought permission to hold a Blackshirt peace meeting in Plashet Park, but, on both 
occasions, the request was turned down. 145 
Finally, deteriorating Anglo-German relations served to erode the B. U. F. 's 
political credibility in East Anglia. For the vast majority of the population in the area, 
German military action against Czechoslovakia and Poland reinforced the perception 
that the Blackshirt peace policy was, in reality, nothing more than pro-Nazi 
propaganda. Several ex-B. U. F. interviewees conceded that the connection, forged in 
the public mind during the later 1930s, between Mosley's movement and Hitler's 
foreign policy aims was immensely damaging and hampered fascist growth in the 
eastern counties. In August 1939, a small group of Blackshirts enjoying a drink at a 
hotel in Eye were hustled out of the premises by a crowd of farmworkers and 
soldiers. 146 Eric Pleasants, then a Blackshirt at Norwich, had few illusions about the 
state of local feeling towards the B. U. F.: - 
By then [1938-1939] most Norwich folk saw us [the 
District B. U. F. ], I suppose, as Hitler's stooges because 
we were fascists and the Nazis were fascists. We wanted 
peace with them, and we excused what they did to the 
Czechs and Poland. No wonder local folk were suspicious! 
Hitler made us Blackshirts look like bloody puppets, and 
we went along with it! 147 
Adverse internal developments also contributed to the B. U. F. 's lack of political 
legitimacy. As war approached, many East Anglian Mosleyites decided that it would be 
prudent either to sever or loosen their links with the B. U. F. in order to distance 
themselves from an organisation which was widely regarded as pro-Nazi. A number of 
stalwarts retained their membership but became non-active, and others chose to drift 
away at this point. The exodus at Lowestoft after the Munich crisis stemmed from a 
144 W. L. C. G.. 8 March 1940, p. 10. 
145 9 June 1939, p. 7,14 July 1939, p. 7. 
146 HOAC Report. George Frederick Hoggarth. 17 August 1940. 
147 Pleasants. Interview. 
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general belief within the Branch that fascist affiliations in the prevailing international 
climate were untenable. 148 A Forest Gate activist also recalled that the West Ham 
District membership, which had increased in 1938 and 1939, "seemed to tail off when 
there was going to be trouble with Germany". 149 Eric Pleasants eventually left the 
Norwich B. U. F. in mid-1939 because, by that stage, he felt that the movement was 
simply a Nazi mouthpiece. He also remembered that other Blackshirts cut their ties 
with the local formation shortly before the war. 150 
Problems within the Norfolk B. U. F. impeded local Blackshirt efforts to increase 
support and pursue the anti-war campaign. After leaving the movement in July 1937, 
the former Area Organiser for the East Anglian B. U. F., John Smeaton-Stuart, joined 
the National Conservative Association at Thorpe St. Andrew, near Norwich, fifteen 
months later because he considered that the Tories had regained their patriotism. He 
also secured several sales positions from the autumn of 1937, eventually becoming a 
commercial representative for Trinidad Leaseholds ,a petroleum company. In July 
1939, he was one of four Thorpe St. Andrew Ratepayers' Association candidates 
elected to the Blofield and Flegg Rural District Council. According to Smeaton-Stuart, 
his departure induced a number of Norfolk Blackshirts and supporters to sever their 
links with the movement. 151 In retaliation, his replacement, Charles H. Hammond, the 
B. U. F. 's prospective parliamentary candidate for Norwich, reportedly instigated a 
divisive two year campaign of vilification against Smeaton-Stuart in an attempt to 
undermine the latter's personal standing with the surviving membership and to damage 
his local business reputation. 152 In June 1939, solicitors acting for the ex-East Anglian 
Organiser sent a letter to his successor demanding that all attempts to malign their 
148 Swan. Taped interview. 
149 F. T.. Taped interview. 
150 pleasants. Interview. 
151 p RO. HO 283/64/64-65. John Smeaton-Stuart, H. M. Prison, Liverpool. Letter to the Home 
Office Advisory Committee. 7 June 1940; P. R. O. HO 283/64/34-38. Home Office Advisory Committee 
to consider Appeals against Orders of Internment. Notes of a meeting held at 6 Burlington Gardens, 
W. I. on Tuesday 10th September 1940. John Smeaton-Stuart; E. ILP.. 1 August 1939, p. 5. 
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client should cease immediately, and steps should be taken to rectify any harm done. 153 
Smeaton-Stuart subsequently recalled that Hammond's uncompromising methods 
caused a certain amount of antagonism, particularly within the Norwich District 
B. U. F.: 
Members of the Organisation [B. U. F. ] in Norwich, who were 
personal friends of mine, came to see me and told me of a most 
disgraceful thing which happened, that this official of the organisation 
[Hammond] had come to East Anglia and had called meetings 
of members and had said to them that he realised that Smeaton- 
Stuart's influence still lived in East Anglia, and that the Organisation 
could not grow as long as that influence lasted, and he wanted 
them to realise that there was no just cause for that influence to 
last, because Smeaton-Stuart was this, that and the other thing, 
which was in fact libel and slander, and they who were by then 
my personal friends objected to those statements and came and 
reported it to me, and I openly wrote to the Organisation protesting, 
and instructed my lawyers to take action if necessary, as it was 
obviously going to affect my business. 154 
Hammond later also clashed with Desmond H. Rose, one of the Norwich 
Blackshirts who remained in contact with Smeaton-Stuart after 1937. In early 1939, at 
the age of eighteen, Rose was made District Treasurer for the local formation and, 
along with others, tried unsuccessfully to persuade Smeaton-Stuart to seek 
reappointment, since he was "the finest advocate of B. U. Policy in East Anglia". 155 At 
some point during May or June of that year, Hammond, by then the Norwich B. U. F. 
District Leader, suspended Rose over "a question of personal policy". 156 The former 
153 p RO. HO 283/64/57. Hill and Perks Solicitors, 36, Prince of Wales Road, Norwich. Letter to 
Charles Hammond, 17, Blackfriars Road, King's Lynn, Norfolk. 28 June 1939. 
154 p RO. TS 27/493. In the High Court of Justice King's Bench Division. Before Mr Justice Tucker. 
Stuart v. Anderson and Another. Royal Courts of Justice, Wednesday, 25th June 1941. Evidence First 
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155 p RO. TS 27/493. Statement of Case Against John Smeaton-Stuart. 20 August 1940; P. R. O. HO 
283/59/156-157. G. P. Churchill, Secretary of the Home Office Advisory Committee. Letter to the 
Under Secretary of State, Home Office. 9 January 1941. Rose was born on 21 April 1921 and, after 
attending Cambridge House School, he had a succession of jobs. Initially attracted by the Blackshirt 
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District Treasurer appealed to N. H. Q. against this decision, but B. D. E. Donovan, the 
B. U. F. 's Assistant Director-General (Administration), did not reply. 157 
4. Blackshirt Activity in the Three Counties during the `Phoney War', 1939-1940 
The Nazi invasion of Poland commenced on 1 September 1939. On that day, 
Mosley issued a message to all B. U. F. members instructing them "to do nothing to 
injure our country, or to help any other Power". 158 Despite denouncing the imminent 
war as a "quarrel of Jewish finance", which did not threaten Britain's vital interests, the 
B. U. F. 's founder told Blackshirts in the armed forces and civil defence to "obey their 
orders, and... the rules of their Service". 159 Those members who were able to continue 
with B. U. F. anti-war propaganda work were asked "to take every opportunity within 
your power to awaken the people and to demand peace". 160 At the same time, a 
circular sent from National Headquarters to all formations rejected war for "Jewish 
Finance" and called upon Blackshirts to get "Out for Britain with meetings - leaflets - 
sales of ACTION - Demonstrate for Peace". 161 
The response of B. U. F. Districts in the three counties to these exhortations 
from the leadership about the ongoing importance of the movement's Peace Campaign 
was far from uniform. At least one local formation decided to abandon propaganda 
work once war had been declared. From September 1939, contrary to the directives 
issued by N. H. Q., the Epping B. U. F. suspended all political activities because, as the 
District Leader (1938-1940) later explained, "the crisis had come,. 162 The remaining 
local activists gave up their official duties and waited to be called up. 163 Other 
Branches were clearly in no position to press ahead with anti-war agitation once 
157 Ibid.. 
158 0. Mosley, 'Mosley's Message To All British Union Members'. 1 September 1940. Saunders 
ps A4. Pa er 
159 Ibid.. 
160 Ibid.. 
161 'Keep Britain Out'. Circular from B. D. E. Donovan, Assistant Director-General (A), Department 
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hostilities had commenced. By the autumn of 1939, the Norwich B. U. F. had run out of 
funds and was about to fold. Most of the District's male Mosleyites had either left the 
area or enlisted, leaving only three or four `active' Blackshirts in the County 
Borough. 164 At this point, Desmond Rose returned to the local formation after being 
asked by those remaining to help them dispose of Branch property, because the 
Norwich B. U. F. was in the process of closing down. Rose also distributed a few copies 
of Action, since he believed he had a moral responsibility to subscribers who had paid 
in advance. 165 The Romford District and the Grays and Tilbury B. U. F. both appeared 
to be equally moribund. 166 
Elsewhere, Blackshirt activity continued into 1940. At Leytonstone, the 
resignation of the District Leader in September 1939, after both his mother and 
grandmother had committed suicide, did not unduly disrupt the dissemination of fascist 
propaganda as his successor, E. G., a former Epping B. U. F. Unit Leader, made 
promotion of the Peace Campaign the chief priority. 167 From late 1939, local 
Blackshirt activists, operating from Branch premises at 480, High Road, Leytonstone, 
conducted twice-weekly street meetings and delivered anti-war leaflets 
door-to-door. 168 Furthermore, the local press reported in January 1940 that the 
Leytonstone B. U. F. was hoping to distribute 5,000 pamphlets throughout the 
constituency within the next three months. 169 However, E. G. 's resignation from the 
executive post for business reasons in March 1940 meant that, from then on, organised 
Blackshirt political activity in the district was sharply curtailed. 170 The anti-war 
164 P. RO. TS 27/493. Home Office Advisory Committee to consider Appeals against Orders of 
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platform was also endorsed in the West Leyton Division from late 1939 at B. U. F. 
public gatherings held next to the Baker's Arms public house in the High Road. 171 
Walthamstow was also subjected to B. U. F. peace propaganda after the 
declaration of war. Regular street meetings were held in the area by Branch and outside 
speakers at various pitches, including Pretoria Avenue and Westbury Road. 172 Other 
forms of fascist anti-war protest were pursued in the locality as well. One of the 
Blackshirts involved, R. W., a former Propaganda Officer belonging to the 
Walthamstow West District, later recalled his own role in this political campaign: 
Well, I got a six months' deferment because of my father's 
business and that sort of thing. He was doing certain things, 
you know, and, owing to his bad health, I got a deferment... 
As a matter of fact we were more active in those six months 
while the war was on than we were before.. .1 painted at 
least 
30 to 40... slogans on walls where people could see them, 
in paint ... `Mosley For Peace' and `Stop The War' and different slogans like that with a circle and flash. 173 
Other formations continued to promote the Blackshirt Peace campaign after 
September 1939. During the `phoney war' period, the East Ham District attempted to 
publicise the Mosleyite message through meetings at open-air venues, such as Kempton 
Road, street newspaper sales and door-to-door canvassing. Social events were also 
arranged to raise funds for the local Peace Campaign. 174 Similar propaganda activities 
took place at Ilford and West Ham until May 1940.175 The Eye District B. U. F. 
continued to promote the Blackshirt peace policy as well. Under Ronald Creasy's 
departure, B. U. F. meetings were held in the area after March 1940. See Action, 11 April 1940, p. 8,2 
M 1940, p. 8. 
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uncompromising leadership, the local formation pursued a range of propaganda 
activities in Eye and other places, such as Stowmarket and Diss, to highlight the 
movement's anti-war stance. 176 Meetings, literature sales, leafleting and slogan 
painting were the principal methods employed by Eye Mosleyites in the period up to 
May 1940 "to point out to the public the dire consequences of war against our 
European counterparts". 177 In March 1940, Creasy also advertised Mosley's pamphlet 
The British Peace in the local press. 178 
Fascist activity was also evident at Lowestoft following the outbreak of 
hostilities. Blackshirt circulars, which were delivered to houses in the town on 25 
January 1940, gave the local District Leader's name and address as a contact for 
anyone interested. 179 Furthermore, information passed to the Home Office by the 
Conservative and Unionist Central Office in May 1940 alleged that B. U. F. leaflets were 
being distributed in parts of the town and that this propaganda operation was 
apparently being organised by the senior local Blackshirt, George Surtees. 180 
Other conventional methods were employed to disseminate fascist anti-war 
propaganda. In October 1939, the B. U. F. emphasised that, as part of the continuing 
`Peace Drive', Districts should concentrate on maximising the circulation of Action by 
increasing sales activities and extending their distribution networks. Evacuated 
Blackshirts, who had been unable to contact a local formation, were encouraged to 
establish their own "sales-nucleus". 181 The correspondence columns of the regional 
press also provided an obvious outlet which enabled B. U. F. members or sympathisers 
to express their opinions without revealing their identities. Letters explicitly or 
implicitly endorsing Mosley's position continued to appear in local newspapers after 
war had been declared. For -example, several correspondents, shielding themselves 
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181 Acfim 5 October 1939, p. 1. 
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under pseudonyms, such as `P. J. ', `B. U. ' `Empire First' and `Pacis Amatrix', wrote to 
The Braintree and Witham Times in late 1939 and early 1940 either to support the 
B. U. F. stance on peace or advance similar ideas. 182 Other local Blackshirts, including 
Oliver Hawksley, Brian Smith, William E. Fitt and Hugh J. Howard, were less coy 
when writing to the regional press during the phoney war period. 183 
Occasionally, other organisations provided a forum for the promotion of the 
B. U. F. 's policy. In December 1939, George Surtees, the Lowestoft District Leader, 
arranged for a Major Harris to deliver a pro-fascist lecture at a meeting of the local 
Rotary Club. 184 At the invitation of the Ipswich Branch of the Peace Pledge Union, 
Charles Hammond, formerly the Norwich District Leader, delivered an address in 
February. 1940 at the Friends House, Ipswich on the causes and possible consequences 
of the war. He also outlined the Blackshirts' proposals to prevent conflict. 185 
Since this type of wartime propaganda opportunity was rarely offered, the 
B. U. F. 's Peace Campaign in the three counties relied more heavily on Mosleyite street 
meetings, but these did not always pass off without incident. In May 1940, seventeen 
year old Walter Nichols, Assistant District Leader of the_Walthamstow West B. U. F., 
was sent to prison for one month for using insulting words likely to cause a breach of 
the peace at a Blackshirt meeting at Pretoria Avenue, Walthamstow. Nichols, who was 
addressing this open-air gathering, told his audience that they were fighting "for 
capitalists" and asked "are you going to let your lovely sons go out and shed their 
blood on the fields of Flanders for this dirty, stinking, rotten form of Government ? "186 
Between September 1939 and May 1940, B. U. F. claims that the war against 
Germany had been engineered by international Jewish financial interests were 
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accompanied by a host of other anti-Semitic allegations. 187 Blackshirt wartime 
propaganda sought to stigmatise the Jews as profiteers, speculators and 
regulation-breakers, who were determined to make money while Gentiles were sent to 
the front. 188 Another fascist charge was that many Jews were shirking their 
responsibilities by purposely evading military service and opting for positions in the 
A. R. P. and the auxiliary police instead. 189 Furthermore, according to the B. U. F., the 
entry of Jewish refugees into the labour market threatened soldiers' jobs and served as 
a potential method of depressing wage rates. 190 The Blackshirt solution was to 
"CONSCRIPT REFUJEWS TO FIGHT IN THEIR OWN WAR". 191 
Much of the street-level anti-Semitism which accompanied the B. U. F. 's 
vilification of the Jews during the phoney war was concentrated in the movement's east 
and north-east London heartland. 192 However, instances of anti-Jewish activity could 
also be observed in neighbouring Essex districts. Anti-Semitic themes permeated the 
B. U. F. 's Silvertown by-election campaign in February 1940 (discussed later). In the 
run-in to polling day, a Blackshirt propaganda sheet, entitled `The Silvertown Dawn', 
was distributed in the constituency. This alerted local residents to the danger of foreign 
refugees `stealing' jobs in West Ham and, more apocalyptically, warned that war would 
ruin western civilisation and leave it at the mercy of "the barbaric hordes of Judaic 
Communism". 193 B. U. F. activists, using indelible white paint, also covered parts of the 
division with anti-Semitic slogans, such as "Jew War", "Moran Could Stop The Jewish 
War" and "A Lovely Jewish War". 194 
187 For a useful general survey of organised British anti-Semitism and fascism between 1939 and 
1945 see T. Kushner, The Persistence of Prejudice nice i ism in British Society during the Second 
)\ r1d War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), Chapter One. 18 B. D. B. J. C6/2/1/6. The Jewish Defence Committee. A Survey Of Its Work From Nov. 1938; 
A QU 23 September 1939, p. 4,21 December 1939, p. 4,29 February 1940, p. 6. 
18 Actio 4 January 1940, p. 2. 
190 Ibid., 30 November 1939, p. 1,4 January 1940, p. 2,28 March 1940, p. 4. 
191 Ibid., 28 March 1940, p. 4. 
192 See T. P. Linehan, Fast London for Mosley: The British Union of Fascists in East London and 
th-West Essex 1933-40 (London: Frank Cass, 1996), Chapter Five. 
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Frederick A. Young, the B. U. F. District Leader at Walthamstow West 
(1939-1940), specialised in abusive anti-Jewish platform oratory in the early months of 
the war. The 40 year old fish curer delivered open-air addresses in the Borough and 
parts of east and north-east London during this period and frequently denounced the 
Jews in highly offensive language. 195 Eventually, in February 1940, Young was given a 
one month prison sentence for using insulting words at a B. U. F. public meeting at 
Ridley Road, Dalston. On this occasion, Young maintained that the Jews were "all 
tucked away in nice soft A. R. P. jobs" and referred to the Jewish community in Britain 
as "filthy Oriental vultures who have crawled into this country and are now living on 
our backs". 196 It would appear that he later resumed his duties as a B. U. F. speaker in 
the area. 197 
Blackshirt wartime meetings and literature sales outside industrial premises in 
Walthamstow and Labour Exchanges in Leyton were probably also designed to exploit 
the perceived growth in anti-Jewish feeling among sections of the working class after 
September 1939.198 The Board of Deputies noted with concern that wartime 
conditions had enabled anti-Semitism to gain a "certain foothold" in the trade unions, 
and another Jewish source reported that fascist activity within the trade union 
movement had "largely increased" in the first four weeks of hostilities. 199 In particular, 
the inconvenience caused by the evacuation, the official blackout, wartime shortages 
and bureaucratic procedures, made many workers more receptive to fascist propaganda 
which blamed the Jews for the conflict. 200 
195 Action, 12 October 1939, p. 8,9 November 1939, p. 8; B. D. B. J. C6/51111. Report. 28 October, 
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Although a number of Districts across the three counties continued with the 
Peace Campaign once war had been declared, the B. U. F. faced a range of additional 
restrictions after September 1939, which further undermined both the effectiveness of 
the Blackshirt anti-war platform and the political credibility of the movement. 
Conscription robbed many local formations of their most active members and disrupted 
propaganda work. In January 1940, in an effort to overcome this problem, the B. U. F. 
announced it was launching a Women's Peace Campaign and appealed for female 
members to come forward "to take up the burden of the work which the men are 
forced temporarily to lay down". 201 It was hoped that they would "shoulder the 
sternest tasks of District organisation and propaganda" and "mobilise the women of the 
country for Peace". 202 However, although a number of female Blackshirts in the region 
took a prominent activist role in the Peace Campaign, including the Leyton anti-Semite, 
Elsie S. C. Orrin, and the Eye District Treasurer's sister, Cecilia Hoggarth, their 
contribution could do little to offset the deleterious effects of the call-up. 203 
Encouraged by Mosley, attempts were also made to strengthen the movement 
by directing anti-war propaganda at industrial workers. 204 In November 1939, 
Blackshirt activists commenced "factory gate meetings" at Hooker Road, 
Walthamstow and were also reported to be holding "lunch hour sales" outside 
industrial premises in the Borough. 205 At Leyton, Mosleyite speakers utilised Labour 
Exchange meetings to propagate the B. U. F. 's peace platform. 206 The Lowestoft 
B. U. F. 's wartime activities also concentrated on working class districts at the port. 207 
This strategy apparently had some success in attracting left-wing elements to the 
201 Actio 18 January 1940, p. 8. See also P. RO. HO 45/24895/2-6. Special Branch Report on the 
B. U. F.. 1 February 1940; M. Durham, Women and Fascism (London: Routledge, 1998), Chapter 
Three. 
202 Ibid.. The Blackshirt leadership urged female members, and others unaffected by the call-up, to 
participate actively in an intensified spring and summer campaign in 1940. See Action, 28 March 
1940 p. 8. 
203 ACfi= 14 December 1939, p. 8; Mrs. O. W.. Completed questionnaire for Andrew Mitchell, 
1993. 
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movement in places, such as Leytonstone, but, once again, the efforts of a few 
remaining activists could not compensate for the decrease in the local membership after 
September 1939 brought about by conscription and resignations. 208 
These organisational deficiencies were compounded by N. H. Q. 's declining 
ability to provide the wider movement with propaganda materials after the outbreak of 
war, due to financial and supply problems. In turn, these difficulties placed greater 
emphasis on local initiative to sustain the Peace Campaign at a time when many 
formations in the three counties lacked the resources to discharge this task effectively. 
On 25 August 1939, the Assistant Director-General of the B. U. F., B. D. E. Donovan, 
issued a circular to all Branches which stated that, due to the "urgent necessity" to 
conserve central funds, National Headquarters could not keep Districts supplied with 
free leaflets. 209 The Blackshirt leadership "urgently requested" that, from now on, 
these were to be printed locally where possible, and Branches were instructed to 
acquire a duplicator so they would be able to produce copies of locally designed 
leaflets in response to changing circumstances and the possibility of an election being 
called. 210 In a subsequent circular of 13 September 1939, Donovan pointed out that if 
"probable future difficulties of transport" were encountered, National Headquarters 
would only be able to issue drafts or samples, via regional centres, to the Districts for 
duplication. 211 Furthermore, local Branches were encouraged to devise leaflets in line 
with official B. U. F. propaganda "on their own individual responsibility" and to build up 
reserves of duplicating paper, ink, and envelopes so that this "emergency distribution 
scheme" could function successfully even if faced with supply shortages. 
212 
These difficulties continued to hamper the movement during the early months 
of 1940. In January 1940, B. U. F. Branches were informed that initial supplies of 
208 E. G.. Completed questionnaire. 
209 Circular from B. D. E. Donovan, Assistant Director-General, Department of Organisation, 
Administration. 25 August 1939. Saunders Papers A4. 
210 Ibid.. 
211 Circular from B. D. E. Donovan, Assistant Director-General (A), Department of Organisation, 
Administration. 13 September 1939. Saunders Papers A4. 
212 Ibid.. 
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leaflets and posters for the `British Peace' Campaign had been "cut down considerably" 
because of "enormous printing costs". 213 District Leaders were also asked to help the 
organisation financially by printing copies of the leaflet locally and by persuading 
members to send donations to the Peace Fund "in order that we may make a gigantic 
effort in February for the `BRITISH PEACE"'. 214 On 30 April 1940, the B. U. F. 's 
Sanctuary Press announced that the supply of propaganda posters would be 
"curtailed". 215 Local formations were encouraged to produce their own `contents-bill' 
or `slogan poster' on the understanding that Sanctuary Press would accept no 
responsibility for any ensuing legal action. 216 
After the outbreak of hostilities, government restrictions and the authorities' 
response to the B. U. F. 's more covert activities deprived the Blackshirts of several 
potential channels of political influence. The official blackout, which started on 1 
September 1939, meant that the B. U. F. was obliged to rely primarily on weekend 
afternoon meetings in an attempt to attract an audience. The onset of war coincided 
with the closing of its traditional outdoor propaganda season, which lasted from April 
to September when the largest audiences could be attracted. The winter months 
inevitably meant smaller crowds. 217 This restriction, coupled with the ongoing 
difficulty of hiring halls, prompted the B. U. F. to develop clandestine publicity methods, 
involving slogan painting and the placing of adhesive propaganda labels or 
`stickybacks' on property, which could be carried on under the cover of darkness to 
advance the anti-war policy. These new techniques were used across the region to 
promote the Blackshirt Peace Campaign, raising official concern that the B. U. F. was 
crossing the boundary between legitimate civil protest and `fifth column' activity. 
213 'British Peace Campaign'. Circular to District Leaders from Ernest G. Clarke, Propaganda 
Administrator, British Union. 29 January 1940. Saunders Papers A4. 
214 Ibid.. 
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The Assistant District Leader at King's Lynn, Ivan F. Carlile, and another 
member of the same formation, Donald E. Ferlisi, were found to be in possession of 
`stickybacks' when they were arrested under Defence Regulation 18B (1A) in 
mid-1940.218 By that stage, T. M., the East Ham District Treasurer, was "still putting 
sticky propaganda things all over the place, like some fool". 219 Slogan painting formed 
an integral part of the B. U. F. anti-war campaign at Eye, and, in April 1940, a 
correspondent in the local press also noted that numerous fascist messages had been 
daubed in paint on walls in Walthamstow. 220 Occasionally, the perpetrators were 
caught and prosecuted. William Bird, a 45 year old unemployed decorator, who was a 
member of the B. U. F., appeared at Stratford police court in April 1940 after police had 
observed him painting "It's A Jews' War. Mosley For Peace" on a fence at Hainault 
Road, Leyton. A resident of Ramsay Road, Forest Gate, Bird was charged with writing 
on a fence without the consent of the owner and also with causing wilful damage to the 
property. Bird denied the charges but was fined 40 shillings plus twenty shillings costs 
or one month's imprisonment in default. 221 
Official anxiety about the B. U. F. 's more covert activities increased in 
September 1939 following a Special Branch report which noted that the Blackshirt 
leadership was unofficially encouraging members to become Air Raid Wardens, Special 
Constables and Nursing Reservists in order to publicise the B. U. F. 's "defeatist and 
pro-German" anti-war propaganda within the civil defence services. 222 Investigations 
by the Board of Deputies at the beginning of the war also revealed that Blackshirts 
attached to civil defence units were making "full use of the facilities these jobs give 
218 P. R. O. HO 45/25754/863027/3. Fascist Appeals To The Home Office Advisory Committee. 
Memorandum by E. B. Stamp. 22 August 1940. Cases in which Advisory Committee Recommend 
release but M15 Do Not Concur; HOAC Report. Donald Elijah Ferlisi. 22 October 1940. This - 
document was consulted on privileged access at the Home Office. Carlile was a 26 year old Catholic 
nurseryman with a disabled wife and two children. He joined the B. U. F. in 1936 and denied using the 
`stickyback' labels. Ferlisi, a 29 year old Anglo-Italian, worked as a bricklayer and became a 
Blackshirt in 1936-1937. He claimed that he had been asked to look after a quantity of `stickybacks' 
1219 the King's Lynn District Leader, Alfred Ilett, and agreed to do so. 
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220 Creasy. Taped interview; W-L. C. G.. 12 April 1940, p. 3 
221 W. L. C. G. 12 April 1940, p. 2. See also EHE., 8 December 1939, p. 1. 
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them to spread their doctrines" and preaching anti-Semitism during quiet periods on 
duty. 223 A number of Norfolk Blackshirts belonged to the county's A. R. P. services and 
at least two prominent Essex fascists, Francis Osborn, the former District Leader at 
East Ham, and John Garnett, the B. U. F. 's prospective parliamentary candidate for 
Harwich, held civil defence positions. 224 However, it is evident that the authorities 
were removing Mosleyites from these posts in 1940. By July, Sir Bartle Frere, 
chairman of the Norfolk County Council's A. R. P. Committee, reported that there were 
now no fascists in the wardens' service. 225 F. A. J. Osborn's appointment as a full time 
A. R. P. Warden in East Ham was also terminated. 226 
In fact, the process of `weeding out' local Mosleyites from potentially sensitive 
positions had actually begun before the war started. Shortly after the Munich crisis, the 
District Treasurer at Lowestoft, Arthur Swan, was instructed by the Home Office to 
resign from the local Observer Corp. Before complying, Swan informed the B. U. F. ' 
leader of this official action and received a sympathetic reply from Mosley, stating that 
this was "an instance among many of the injustices heaped upon us and must-be borne 
with fortitude in the present climate of opinion". 227 - 
The various internal and external constraints which marginalised the Blackshirts 
after September 1939 were powerfully reinforced by a hardening of public opinion 
against the B. U. F. Now that Britain and Germany were at war, and the prospect of a 
Nazi invasion became increasingly likely, most people regarded Mosley's fascists as 
little more than Hitler's apologists and potential `fifth columnists'. Thus, the state of 
public opinion in the national emergency of the phoney war period drastically curtailed 
the political space available for the Blackshirts' `patriotic' protest against British 
involvement in the conflict. By 1940, there was evidence of growing popular hostility 
223 B. D. B. J. C6/9/1/3. Survey of the Situation. c. October 1939. 224 P. R. O. HO 144/21429/16-20. Special Branch Report on the B. U. F.. 18 September 1939. Garnett 
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227 Oswald Mosley. Quoted in Arthur Swan, Memoir (Untitled unpublished, n. d. ), p. 3; Swan. Taped 
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to the B. U. F. 's anti-war propaganda. Blackshirt sales drives were abandoned at 
Leytonstone because of the antagonism they aroused in the Borough. 228 The Eye 
B. U. F. 's peace efforts provoked strong criticism in the East Anglian press during April 
and May 1940. Clearly referring to the Blackshirts, one correspondent asserted that 
those responsible for defacing walls and windows in the district with signs and 
"treasonable" leaflets should be punished. 229 Local resentment was also expressed in 
more sinister ways. During the later stages of the phoney war, George Hoggarth, the 
Eye District Treasurer, received an anonymous letter which stated darkly "1st Bombs 
on Eye, the 5th Column will die". 230 Indeed, the extent to which the B. U. F. and its 
continued political activities aroused deep public suspicion by late May 1940 was 
revealed by a Mass-Observation report concerning popular attitudes in East Suffolk, 
London and Lancashire to Mosley's internment. 231 The investigators found that the 
detention of the Blackshirt leader was "overwhelmingly" endorsed and commented that 
"very seldom have observers found such a high degree of approval for anything". 232 
In these distinctly unfavourable circumstances, Blackshirt propaganda exerted a 
negligible appeal, as the 1940 Silvertown by-election demonstrated. Aller September 
1939, the B. U. F. reversed its pre-war electoral strategy by announcing that it would 
now field candidates in parliamentary by-elections in order to give the British electorate 
an opportunity to vote for peace. 233 It was hoped that participation in such contests 
would provide the movement with valuable press publicity for its anti-war campaign, 
give the Blackshirts access to indoor venues under the control of hostile (mainly 
Labour) local authorities, and capitalise on the wartime pact amongst the major 
political parties not to stand for seats held by opponents which became vacant. The 
B. U. F. 's first parliamentary by-election contest took place in February 1940 when 
228 E. G.. Letter. 
229 N. S. 7. D. E. 12 April 1940, p. 5. Another correspondent referred to the local B. U. F. as the `fifth 
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Thomas Moran was put forward as the Mosleyite candidate for the West Ham 
constituency of Silvertown. However, Blackshirt intervention in this traditional Labour 
stronghold proved a fiasco. Possessing neither previous experience of parliamentary 
elections nor District organisation in the division, the B. U. F. had to mount a 
hastily-arranged campaign from central committee rooms located in the Upton 
constituency under conditions which made it difficult to answer credibly the anti-fascist 
charge that a vote for British Union was a vote for Hitler. 234 Dogged by these 
handicaps, Moran received only 151 votes, a figure completely eclipsed by the Labour 
candidate's winning total of 14,343. The Communists' nominee, Harry Pollitt, added 
insult to injury by securing 966 votes, more than six times the Blackshirt tally. 235 
In an attempt to put the best possible gloss on this electoral humiliation, the 
B. U. F. stressed that it had obtained 151 votes "AFTER ONLY TEN DAYS 
CAMPAIGN IN VIRGIN TERRITORY". 236 Furthermore, as Mosley revealed the 
following month, a B. U. F. District was in the process of formation at Silvertown due 
to the "many adherents gained during the election campaign". 237 Nonetheless, the 
movement's abysmal by-election performance in a constituency bordering the East End 
clearly exposed the fragile nature of fascist support in the area. Subsequently, the 
Blackshirts contested by-elections at North East Leeds (March) and Middleton and 
Prestwich (May), both safe Conservative seats. Again, the B. U. F. candidates made no 
impact, obtaining in each case under three per cent of the votes cast and losing their 
deposits. 
Moreover, after September 1939, the membership of the regional B. U. F. 
dwindled since the trickle of new recruits could not compensate for the loss of 
conscripted Mosleyites and those who thought it wise to end their association with the 
234 Action 22 February 1940, p. 3 and p. 8,29 February 1940, p. 1; SF,. 16 February 1940, p. 1 and 
11,23 February 1940, p. 1, p. 2 and p. 19. 35 ,1 March 1940, p. 1. 
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movement. Several District officials later recounted that Branch numbers fell away 
during the phoney war. 238 The result of the Silvertown by-election in February 1940 
also indicated that the B. U. F. Peace Campaign had little impact in the area once war 
had been declared. By May 1940, few of the remaining Blackshirts in Norfolk, Suffolk 
and Essex were undertaking open propaganda work. In order to mark May Day, 
N. H. Q. issued instructions for all Districts to mount an "intensive week end campaign" 
culminating in "an outdoor meeting on Sunday May 5th". 239 Local formations were 
asked to send in accounts of their events on the evening of 5 May "so that in Action of 
that week a complete picture of nation wide activity may be given" and were told "Do 
not regard your work on that day as done until it has been reported". 240 The urgings of 
the leadership appeared to meet with a poor response from Districts in the region, since 
subsequent B. U. F. press coverage of "British Union May Day" contained only brief 
references to a "Combined rally" at Blackthorne Road, Dagenham and unspecified 
241 Blackshirt activity at Eye. 
5. Internment under Defence Regulation 18B 
In mid-1940, the British authorities used emergency legislation to crush 
Mosley's movement because the Blackshirts were perceived to pose a threat to national 
security during wartime. Ultimately, therefore, the fate of the B. U. F. was decided by 
another vital contingent factor in the Griffin-Copsey model, namely the nature of the 
state's response to the fascist movement. On 23-24 May 1940, Mosley and 29 other 
prominent Blackshirt officials were arrested by the authorities under Defence 
Regulation 18B (1A). At the same time, Special Branch officers raided the B. U. F. 's 
N. H. Q. and inspected the files and records held there. These initial detentions were 
238 Various ex-Blackshirt officials mentioned this when interviewed by the author. 239 'May Day... Sunday 5th May 1940'. Circular from B. D. E. Donovan, Assistant Director-General 
(A), Department of Organisation, Administration to District Leaders. 11 April 1940. Saunders Papers 
A4. 
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Win, 2 May 1940, p. 8. 
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followed by a wider round-up in June and July 1940, which effectively destroyed the 
movement's organisational base by apprehending approximately 750 B. U. F. members 
and supporters. In late June 1940, the executive also assumed the power to ban the 
B. U. F. under Defence Regulation 18B (AA), and, on 10 July 1940, the movement was 
duly proscribed. 242 
Defence Regulation 18B (DR 18B) formed part of the British authorities' 
response to the deteriorating international situation immediately prior to the outbreak 
of war. On 24 August 1939, the government hastily steered the Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act through parliament in one day. This legislation enabled the executive to 
make defence regulations by Orders in Council to safeguard national security. Eight 
days later, armed with these extensive powers, the government promulgated DR 18B 
which permitted the Home Secretary to detain "any person" in order to prevent them 
from "acting in a manner prejudicial to the public safety, or the defence of the 
realm". 243 Under DR 18B, detainees were denied those basic civil rights afforded by 
the Habeas Corpus Acts but could appeal against detention orders to an Advisory 
Committee appointed by the Home Secretary. At its first meeting on 21 September 
1939, the Advisory Committee decided that detainees would have to conduct their 
appeals in person without their legal representatives being present at the hearing. 244 
Fears that the executive's newly-acquired powers could result in arbitrary 
action to erode civil liberties led to Liberal protests in the Commons, which were 
supported by many Labour M. P. s. The strength of parliamentary opposition compelled 
the government to amend DR 18B on 23 November 1939. In its revised form, the 
regulation stipulated that, before making a detention order, the Home Secretary had to 
242 On the history of Defence Regulation 18B, see A. W. Brian Simpson, In The Highest Deg= 
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have "reasonable cause to believe" that a person was of "hostile origin or associations" 
or had been "recently concerned in acts prejudicial" to national security. 245 
The early history of DR 18B was shaped by the Home Office's desire to 
preserve as many civil liberties as wartime conditions would allow without 
compromising the integrity of the state. Viewed primarily as a `last resort' measure to 
counter domestic subversion, DR 18B was used sparingly throughout the phoney war. 
The Home Secretary made 136 detention orders in the period up to 30 April 1940, by 
which time only 58 people, including approximately five with Blackshirt connections, 
were still in custody. 246 During the first months of the conflict, there were no plans to 
instigate a large scale round-up of aliens or British fascists. With regard to the latter, 
the authorities had no evidence to show that the B. U. F. was involved in subversive 
activity, and it was apparent that Mosley's pro-German Peace Campaign attracted little 
public support. However, the events of April and May 1940 were to transform 
government attitudes and lead to the internment of hundreds of British fascists. 
Several developments influenced the authorities' decision to strike against 
domestic fascism. The rapid Nazi military drive across Norway, Denmark, Holland, 
Belgium and Luxembourg in April-May 1940, together with the German offensive 
against France, brought the phoney war to a close. Furthermore, Quisling's 
collaborationist `coup' in the wake of Hitler's assault on Norway and diplomatic 
reports of extensive Nazi infiltration before the attack on Holland sparked a press-fed 
fifth column panic in Britain, which stigmatised aliens, British fascists and fellow 
travellers as the `enemy within'. 247 The prospect of an imminent German invasion 
increased government concern that ideological affinity and political self-interest might 
induce Mosley to conclude a negotiated peace settlement with the Nazi leadership if 
245 Defence Regulation 18B (23 November 1939). Quoted in Simpson, In The Highest Deg= 
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the British authorities capitulated. A series of clandestine meetings, involving key 
figures from British anti-Semitic and fascist anti-war organisations, which were held 
between October 1939 and May 1940, sharpened official suspicion. Mosley attended a 
number of these gatherings, along with other prominent devotees of the right-wing 
fringe, including Admiral Sir Barry Domvile, founder of the Link, and Archibald H. 
Maule Ramsay M. P., who had established the Right Club. Action against the B. U. F. 
was also prompted by the government's need to provide both scapegoats and the 
appearance of dynamism in order boost national morale, which had been severely 
shaken by the speed and extent of the German advance in the spring of 1940. In 
addition, the authorities wished to preserve public order by shielding the Blackshirts 
from growing popular hostility. 248 
The Tyler Kent affair sealed the fate of the B. U. F.. On 20 May 1940, the 
Security Service raided the flat of Tyler G. Kent, a 29 year old code and cipher clerk 
employed at the U. S. Embassy in London, and found copies of 1,500 classified 
documents, including secret correspondence conducted between President Roosevelt 
and Winston Churchill during the phoney war period. The membership ledger of the 
Right Club was also discovered on the premises. Before his arrest, Kent had revealed 
copies of the Churchill-Roosevelt telegrams to Anna Wolkoff, an anti-Semitic and 
anti-war member of the Right Club, who worked as Maule Ramsay's political 
secretary. Kent's links with Wolkoff ensured that a number of these sensitive cables 
were subsequently passed to the M. P.. This breach of security had direct repercussions 
for the B. U. F., since Mosley's tenuous connection with Maule Ramsay was now used 
by the authorities as one of the reasons to justify internment across the British fascist 
fringe. 249 
When the War Cabinet met on 22 May 1940, it was decided that the supposed 
contact between Mosley and Maule Ramsay, and the potential scope for fifth column 
248 Thurlow, Fascism In Briai _ pp. 178-194. 249 The Tyler Kent affair is discussed in detail in Simpson, In The Highest Degree Odic, Chapter 
Eight. See also Thurlow, The Secret State. pp. 237-243. 
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activity afforded by the grave military situation, required an immediate and drastic 
response. On the same day, DR 18B was amended by the inclusion of supplementary 
paragraph (1 A) promulgated by Order in Council. DR 18B (1 A) permitted the 
internment without trial of members of organisations which were subject to foreign 
influence or control or whose leaders had past or present associations with the leaders 
of enemy governments or who sympathised with the governmental system of enemy 
powers. This important amendment enabled the Home Secretary to achieve the 
authorities' principal aim of decimating the B. U. F. in the summer of 1940 by ordering 
the detention of Blackshirt personnel. A fascist could now be interned without the 
authorities having to demonstrate that subversive activity had either been planned or 
carried out. 250 
The implementation of DR 18B (1 A) effectively destroyed what remained of 
B. U. F. organisation in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex. Charles H. Hammond, formerly 
District Leader at Norwich and the B. U. F. 's prospective parliamentary candidate for 
the County Borough, was detained in Manchester on 24 May 1940.251 From early 
June, several other senior Norfolk Blackshirts were also arrested under DR 18B (1A). 
Oliver Hawksley, a former local District Leader in north Norfolk, was taken from his 
home at Cliff Road, Sheringham on 4 June 1940 shouting "Heil Mosley" by plain 
clothed police and a uniformed officer. Hawksley's residence was then searched. 252 
Brian Smith, the wealthy Sheringham Blackshirt, was similarly incarcerated under a 
detention order during the summer of 1940.253 The B. U. F. 's prospective parliamentary 
candidate and District Leader for the King's Lynn Division, Alfred Ilett, was also taken 
into custody at this juncture. 254 Another King's Lynn detainee was Ivan F. Carlile, 
250 Thurlow, Fascism In Britain_ pp. 194-198; Simpson, In The Highest Degree Odi= pp. 159-162. 
251 F-D. P. 25 May 1940, p. 5. 
252 HOAC Report. Oliver Hawksley. 7 November 1940. This document was consulted on privileged 
access at the Home Office; Norwich Mercury 8 June 1940, p. 2. 
253 HOAC Report. Brian Smith. 20 August 1940. This document was consulted on privileged access 
at the Home Othce; Richard Reynell Bellamy, `We Marched With Mosley' (Unpublished unabridged 
manuscript, 1958-1968), p. 1012; P. RO. HO 45/25714/840452/8. J. R Smeaton-Stuart, 'Report on the 
functioning of Regulation 18B of the Defence Regulations (1939)', p. 2. 
254 LN. C"p., 11 June 1940, p. 2; E. D. P. _ 5 June 1940, p. 
5. 
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who served the local formation as an Assistant District Leader. 255 Desmond H. Rose, 
the unofficial acting District Treasurer for the Norwich B. U. F., was picked up by the 
authorities on 6 July 1940 following a report from the local constabulary. 256 The 
Norwich City police first became aware of Rose in late May 1940, when an informant 
denounced him as a "red hot" fascist, who was an ardent admirer of Hitler and 
Germany. 257 They also ascertained that he had recently been dismissed from his job at 
the textile firm of Messrs. Hinde and Hardy because "he was a bad time-keeper; went 
to work without a gas mask and disseminated anti-British propaganda in the 
works". 258 Five days before his arrest, a police search of Rose's home found a large 
quantity of B. U. F. and German literature on various topics. 259 
The 18B round-up in mid-1940 accounted for virtually all the senior Mosleyites 
in Suffolk. 260 The Blackshirt County Inspector, William Edric Sherston, who was also 
District Leader for the Woodbridge B. U. F. and the movement's prospective 
parliamentary candidate for the same constituency, was detained on 16 July 1940.261 
Sherston had served as a Second Lieutenant in the British Army since the start of the 
war, and, although there was no evidence to suggest that he had used this position to 
promote Mosleyite views, he remained a Blackshirt enthusiast and maintained a number 
of B. U. F. contacts. 262 On the same day, the authorities also took his mother, Dorothy 
Eden Sherston, the Women's District Leader for the Woodbridge Division, into 
custody. 263 In early June 1940, the Eye District Leader, Ronald Creasy, was arrested 
255 P RO. HO45/25754/863027/3. Fascist Appeals To The Home Office Advisory Committee. 
Memorandum by E. B. Stamp. 22 August 1940. Cases in which Advisory Committee Recommend 
release but NO Do Not Concur. 
256 P RO. HO 283/59/55. Home Office Advisory Committee. Letter to Desmond H. Rose. 15 
December 1942. 
257 P. RO. HO 283/59/165. Statement of Case against Desmond Harvey Rose. 28 November 1940. 
258 P. R. O. HO 283/59/16. Home Office Advisory Committee Minute. 1 February 1943. 
259 p RO. HO 283/59/165-167. Statement of Case against Desmond Harvey Rose. 28 November 
1940. 
260 e only identified Suffolk official not detained in 1940 was Rita Creasy, Women's District 
Leader of the Eye B. U. F.. Ronald N. Creasy. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1995. 
261 p RO. TS 27/491; HOAC Supplementary Report. William Edric Sherston. 15 June 1942. This 
document was consulted on privileged access at the Home Office. 
262 Ibid.. 
263 Creasy. Taped interview, 1995; Simpson, In The Highest Degree Odious, p. 309. 
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at his home by two police officers. 264 Before departing, he was allowed to pick up 
some tobacco for his pipe but was refused permission to put his personal, financial and 
business affairs in order. 265 When Creasy arrived at the local police station, he found 
that George Hoggarth, the Eye District Treasurer, was already held in the cells under a 
DR 18B (1A) order. 266 Creasy and Hoggarth's B. U. F. counterparts at Bury St. 
Edmunds, Lawrence W. Harding and Raymond Smith, suffered the same fate. Both 
men were picked up at the beginning of June 1940 and "taken to a place of 
detention". 267 
At Lowestoft, Arthur Swan, the local District Treasurer, was apprehended on 3 
June 1940 by two plain clothed policemen armed with revolvers as he visited clients on 
his insurance agency round. He regarded both officers as friends and had been drinking 
with one of them the night before. 268 George Surtees, the Lowestoft B. U. F. District 
Leader, was also arrested at this time. 269 Looking back, Swan considered that the 
Blackshirt detentions of 1940 had been inevitable, although not necessarily for the most 
obvious reasons: 
I knew this was going to happen... When I got married [in 1938], 
I said to my wife "You know this is what's going to happen". 
So we just waited for it to happen and it did. Dunkirk took 
place, the country's in a state of panic... and they had to look 
as though they were doing something about it. We were the 
only sitting ducks there which they could pick off. So they 
made a bee-line for us, and the public was satisfied something 
was being done. That's the view I take. On the other hand... 
as the war developed and Dunkirk was the disaster it was, 
it is quite possible that a number of [B. U. F. ] members could 
have been killed off by vigilantes... So, you see, it may be 
that we were spared, lots of us, spared that attack in the 
heat of that terrible time... One doesn't know... But, anyway, 
264 EA D. T.: 6 June 1940, p. 5. 
265 Creasy. Taped interview, 1995. 
266 Ibid ; F. A. D_T"_ 6 June 1940, p. 5; HOAC Report. George Frederick Hoggarth. 17 August 1940. 
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the country was satisfied, and we were in. 270 
Swan's house was searched by the police, who took away his official records 
pertaining to the B. U. F. and the Oulton Broad Motor Boat Club (O. B. M. B. C. ). 271 
When interviewed by the police on 3 June 1940, Swan was questioned about 
allegations that local B. U. F. activists belonging to the O. B. M. B. C. were smuggling 
sensitive information to Germany in their boats when competing in races at 
Sternberger, near Munich. 272 Swan was suspected of supplying the Nazis with 
information about the local Observer Corp and the visits it had made to the R. A. F. base 
at Lower Heyford in Suffolk for calibration exercises. 273 In Swan's view, these 
rumours were being spread by left-wing trade unionists employed at a local 
ship-building yard. 274 
Surtees aroused official suspicion for a number of reasons. In December 1939, 
he had shown subversive printed material to "two reliable informants" and, five months 
later, gave two bank employees leaflets which advertised the New British Broadcasting 
Station. 275 His various German connections gave further cause for concern. A regular 
traveller to Germany in the late 1930s, Surtees also corresponded with Germans and, in 
July 1939, played host to a Hitler Youth group visiting England. In addition, his home 
contained a quantity of Nazi literature, flags and swastikas: Moreover, Surtees' 
collection of sensitive publications relating to the region and his association with a local 
railway guard fuelled speculation that he was compiling information which would help 
the Nazis in the event of an invasion. 276 
270 Swan. Taped interview. 
271 Swan, Memoir, p. 4. Swan was Secretary and Treasurer of the Oulton Broad Motor Boat Club 
from 1935 to 1940. 
272 Ibid.. 
273 Ibid.. 
274 Ibid.. 
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Within Essex, the government's use of DR 18B (1 A) during the summer of 
1940 also led to the seizure of several Blackshirts who occupied prominent positions in 
the local B. U. F.. F. R. East, the Witham-based County Propaganda Officer, was one of 
the key Mosleyites in the region interned by the authorities at this time. 277 The former 
Epping District Leader, Frederic Ball, who served the Essex B. U. F. from spring 1938 
as County Transport Organiser, was arrested by the police on 29 July 1940 at the 
Surrey bank where he then worked. 278 Ball's detention coincided with that of his 
closest friend and `landlord', Walter D. Wragg, a married Woodford resident in his late 
thirties, who was the B. U. F. Regional Inspector for Essex. 279 Wragg earned a living 
working locally as a travelling salesman for a paint company. 280 Francis A. J. Osborn, 
the B. U. F. 's District Inspector for the ninth London Area, which contained most of the 
Blackshirt formations in south-west Essex, was also taken into custody. 281 Another 
detainee was Miss Louise A. King, the Blackshirt prospective parliamentary candidate 
for the Ilford Division and the B. U. F. 's Woman Canvass Organiser for Essex. 282 
A number of other local Essex officials were detained as well. DR 18B (IA) 
accounted for a string of serving and recent District Leaders, including C. West 
(Silvertown), Hugh J. Howard (East Ham), and Leonard S. Fenn (West Leyton). 283 
The Blackshirt in charge of the West Ham Branch, Arthur Beavan, evaded detention 
"for a considerable period" by going on the run, but, eventually, he was also 
interned. 284 E. G., who had resigned as District leader of the Leytonstone B. U. F. in 
277 HOAC Supplementary Report. Frederick Robert East. 8 September 1941. This document was 
consulted on privileged access at the Home Office; F. Ball. Interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
East applied to join the Home Guard before being detained on 17 June 1940. 
278 Ball. Interview; P. R. O. HO 45/23767. Frederic Andre Ball. 
279 Ibid.. 
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March 1940 for business reasons, did not escape the attention of the authorities either. 
He was arrested on 30 July 1940 at his Forest Gate shop and taken to Plaistow police 
station. 285 Similarly, the former West Leyton District Leader, Ernie Forge, then 
serving as a Corporal in the Welsh Regiment, was also placed in detention under a DR 
18B (IA) order. 286 The B. U. F. official in charge at Epping, L. B., was arrested in June 
1940 following a political argument at his Bethnal Green workplace, in which he 
defended the King of Belgium against press accusations of betrayal. His opponent in 
this exchange subsequently informed the local police that L. B. was a `fifth columnist', 
and this, rather than his Mosleyite connections, led to L. B. 's internment. 287 In 
addition, the Epping B. U. F. 's last two District Treasurers, Thomas Swan, a 45 year old 
insurance assessor from Woodford, and Thomas Barneveld, a laundry clerk in his early 
twenties, were also detained. 288 
Rank and file Blackshirts, and B. U. F. sympathisers, also fell victim to the 18B 
dragnet in the three counties. Several ordinary members or supporters of the King's 
Lynn B. U. F. were picked up at the beginning of June 1940, including Albert Edward 
Gore and George William Gore, two brothers who lived in the town and worked as 
cinematograph transport contractors. 289 Donald Ferlisi, a 29 year old King's Lynn 
Blackshirt, who worked as a bricklayer, was another detainee. 290 At the nearby village 
of Middleton, two more members of the District formation, sub-postmaster Arthur 
Stannard and local shopkeeper George Wilkins, were taken into custody. 291 W. Butler, 
a Norfolk shopkeeper, who joined the B. U. F. as a non-active member because of the 
285 E. G.. Taped interview. 
286 F. O. M., `The Regulation 18B British Union Detainees List'; information provided by F. O. M.. 
287 L. B.. Telephone interview. 
288 Ibid.; E. G.. Taped interview; P. R. O. HO 45/23688/840647. Advisory Committee to consider 
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Monday, December 16th 1940. Thomas Harris Barneveld. At the time of his arrest in mid-June 1940, 
Barneveld was serving as an Aircralsman in the Medical Statistical Office of the RA. F. Station at 
Ruislip. 
289 P. R. O. HO 45/23681. Albert Edward Gore; N-N-W. P., 8 June 1940, p. 4; F. O. M., `The Regulation 
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290 HOAC Report. Donald Elijah Ferlisi. 22 October 1940. 
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Blackshirts' policy for the small trader, was also interned. 292 Another county case 
involved Albert Potter, a veteran of the Boer and First World Wars, who had spent 
time in the colonies. 293 After marrying a London secretary many years his junior, 
Potter bought a smallholding near Swaffham in Norfolk and opened a transport cafe. 
The latter, which was bedecked with Blackshirt posters and photographs, openly 
advertised the couple's membership of the B. U. F.. Both husband and wife were 
interned under DR 18B (IA) and separated from their infant son. In their absence, local 
"young `patriots"' vandalised the cafe and the smallholding. 294 
Walter E. Birch, a builder from Norwich, was detained under DR 18B (IA) on 
31 May 1940, by which time he was no longer a member of the local District 
B. U. F.. 295 His Wife, Josephine, was also arrested at the same time. 296 Another East 
Anglian interned under an 18B (IA) detention order was 64 year old George Sawyer, 
an associate of the Lowestoft B. U. F. District Leader, George Surtees. Sawyer, the 
owner of a local electric light business, lived at Wrentham in Suffolk and worked as a 
motor trader. His arrest took place on 4 June 1940.297 
In Essex, the authorities also apprehended a small number of rank and file 
members. At least four individuals in this category belonged to the Epping B. U. F., 
including the south Woodford Mosleyite, Kenneth T. Dutfield, Martha Swan, the wife 
292 P. R. O. HO 45/25714/840452/8. J. R. Smeaton-Stuart, `Report on the functioning of Regulation 
18B of the Defence Regulations (1939)', Appendix B, p. 2. 
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of the former local District Treasurer, and Jeffrey Custance. 298 A fourth Epping 
District detainee was 21 year old Donald S. Chambers, a trumpeter in the B. U. F. 's 
London Drum Corps, who also held a Speaker's Warrant for the movement. Chambers 
lived at Grove Hill, south Woodford prior to joining the R. A. F. at the start of the 
Second World War. He was arrested at Uxbridge R. A. F. Depot by Special Branch 
officers in June 1940.299 Rose Ford, of 166, Pall Mall, Leigh-on-Sea, and Frederick 
M. K. Lyall, a 21 year old architect's assistant from Thundersley attached to the 
Southend District B. U. F., were two more local Blackshirts who fell foul of DR 18B 
(1A)3°° 
Several prominent Blackshirts in the area were either questioned or briefly held 
by the authorities but managed to avoid internment. According to the `official' history 
of the B. U. F., public reaction to the evacuation at Dunkirk fuelled rumours that the 
B. U. F. 's prospective parliamentary candidate for the South-West Norfolk division, 
Miss L. M. Reeve, was a Nazi agent. Subsequently, she was taken into custody by 
soldiers but then released "after the usual search and interrogation". 301 When Lord 
Merton's Norfolk estate was taken over as part of a military training scheme, Reeve 
was required to leave her home, which was situated within the restricted zone. After 
taking over a new farm outside the designated area, she was informed that this property 
was also to be requisitioned for military purposes. Unable to bear the strain of local 
animosity and two evictions, Reeve committed suicide in one of her outbuildings in 
October 1950.302 
The novelist and writer Henry Williamson was another well-known Norfolk 
Blackshirt who slipped through the 18B net after a brush with the authorities. 
Williamson's local B. U. F. activities and highly publicised pro-Mosley views ensured 
298 Kenneth T. Dutfield. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, 1985. Dutfield was detained in 
January 1941; L. B.. Telephone interview; F. O. M., `The Regulation 18B British Union Detainees List'. 
299 L. B.. Telephone interview; information provided by F. O. M.. 
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that he was treated with considerable suspicion by the villagers at Stiflkey where he 
farmed. His diary entry for 12 May 1940 observed that "the local rag and bone 
merchant" had approached one of the author's farm employees for "information or 
`evidence' to have me put in prison". 303 Later in the month, he received a hostile 
reception at a meeting of the Stifikey British Legion. 304 Local rumours circulated that 
the concrete roads Williamson had put down on his farm were there to facilitate a 
German invasion and a light he had installed to illuminate a stairway on his property 
was merely a way of sending messages to the Nazis. Williamson hardly dampened such 
speculation by painting the B. U. F. 's flash-in-a-circle symbol on his cottage wall. 305 
Eventually, on Friday 14 June 1940, he was detained by the police: "Today at 2.45 
p. m. four plain clothed detectives, armed, came to the house and arrested me under the 
Defence Act, Section 18B. They took me to Wells whilst others searched through the 
cottages, the granary, and all my boxes. I was locked in a little white-washed cell... "306 
Williamson remained in custody at Wells police station until Monday 17 June, 
when he was taken by car to Norwich police station "where the Chief Constable, Capt. 
van Neck, said I was to be released, as nothing found against me". 307 Apparently, 
Williamson had been briefly incarcerated while police investigated a number of 
allegations made against him. 
Similar cases also occurred in Essex. In May 1940, the District Treasurer at 
East Ham (1938-1940), T. M., was visited at his home by two members of the Special 
Branch, who interviewed him about his fascist beliefs. One of the officers returned the 
next day and persuaded T. M. to sign a prepared document renouncing his B. U. F. 
views. Thereafter, the East Ham Mosleyite had no further contact with the 
authorities. 308 P. F., a speaker for the Epping B. U. F. and a former District Leader for 
303 Henry Williamson. Quoted in A. Williamson, HHenty Williamson: Tra and the Last Romantic 
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Walthamstow West, was dealt with in much the same vein. Following a Special Branch 
search of his Chingford residence, he was instructed to report every Monday to the 
local police station. A month later, however, this enforced weekly check-in was 
officially terminated, and the police informed P. F. that their investigation was now 
closed. 309 
A variety of factors help to explain why the 18B round-up of B. U. F. personnel 
and supporters in the three counties proceeded in such an inconsistent manner. Firstly, 
anomalies were always likely to occur because, as discussed earlier, much of the East 
Anglian movement was in a state of flux in 1939-1940. The B. U. F. 's temporary 
renewal of high-profile agricultural agitation in the region, the response to the 
Blackshirt Peace Campaign, coupled with reaction to the deteriorating international 
situation, and the impact of the military call-up, ensured that many local Mosleyite 
formations were locked into a process of constant change during this period. 
Consequently, the task of identifying and locating key B. U. F. officials and activists in 
the area became more difficult, which, in turn, widened the scope for indiscriminate 
action. Moreover, the atmosphere of alarm and suspicion generated by the Nazis' 
military advance across western Europe and the prospect of imminent invasion merely 
compounded the problem. A tragic illustration of the prevailing `fifth column' mentality 
in mid-1940 was the suicide of Walter Arthur Eves, a general labourer residing at 
Maldon in Essex. Eves took his own life at the end of May 1940 because he was afraid 
that a rumour he had helped to spread concerning the supposed Blackshirt connections. 
of two well-known local men would result in the loss of his job and legal action being 
taken against him. 310 
Secondly, government intelligence relating to the B. U. F. 's membership, 
particularly in the provinces, was far from comprehensive, and this deficiency 
prevented the authorities from compiling an accurate and current record of East 
Anglian Mosleyites. Certainly, the M15 lists of B. U. F. officials and active Blackshirts 
309 P . F.. 
Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1993. 
310 F. A"D"T"_ 7 June 1940, p. 5. 
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contained inaccuracies and omissions. Ironically, these security service sources were 
corroborated by the relevant Chief Constables in May 1940 in order to ensure that 
there was "no danger" of detention recommendations being based on "out of date" 
information. 311 The Norfolk list, for example, approved by Captain S. van Neck, the 
Chief Constable of Norwich, included John Smeaton-Stuart as a "Leading Official" of 
the county B. U. F., even though he had left the movement in July 1937 and had since 
rejoined the Conservative Party. 312 Consequently, despite having broken with Mosley 
almost three years before, the former East Anglian Organiser was arrested on 4 June 
1940 and then interned. 313 Special Branch was obliged to rely partly on information 
about the B. U. F. 's membership provided by the Board of Deputies in September 
1939.314 However, although the Board claimed that the list of Blackshirts passed on 
named many individuals who were "quite unknown to the authorities", this record was 
also neither up-to-date nor complete. 315 
Just over 500 of the 753 people detained under DR 18B (IA) were 
apprehended on the recommendation of the local Chief Constable concerned. 316 A 
proportion of these police requests appeared to be both arbitrary and indiscriminate, 
even though the Home Office issued a circular to Chief Constables in June 1940 urging 
restraint. 317 This document stressed that there was "no intention" of ordering a general 
round-up of B. U. F. members and pointed out that detention under DR 18B (1 A) was 
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reserved for "active leaders" and those Blackshirts who might be engaged in "specially 
mischievous activities". 318 In reality, these policy guidelines were not uniformly 
adhered to by local constabularies, and, ultimately, the fate of some B. U. F. members 
and Mosleyite sympathisers hinged on the attitude of the senior police officer involved. 
Such inconsistency may partly explain why the Wrentham motor trader George Sawyer 
was detained and Malcolm Humphery of Lowestoft avoided being taken into custody. 
Both men were B. U. F. sympathisers on personal terms with George Surtees, the 
Lowestoft District Leader, and both had participated in low-level Blackshirt activity, 
such as attending local propaganda events and selling copies of Action. Yet, whereas 
Sawyer was picked up by the Lowestoft police in June 1940, Humphery, who was also 
part of the Blackshirt coterie in the Oulton Broad Motor Boat Club, was merely 
questioned by local officers after the collapse of the Low Countries and told to desist 
from associating with Surtees and others. 319 
Thirdly, enlistment in the services, although no guarantee against detention, 
seems to have safeguarded certain Blackshirts from the area. The District Leader and 
District Treasurer at Norwich both joined up at the beginning of the war and were not 
arrested. 320 John Garnett, the B. U. F. 's prospective parliamentary candidate for the 
Harwich Division, was in the Merchant Navy by 1940 and was also apparently ignored 
by the authorities even though he had held senior positions at N. H. Q.. 321 Another 
former Essex District official, R. W., was similarly overlooked despite his active role in 
the B. U. F. 's Peace Campaign during the `phoney war' period, and the fact that, 
thereafter, he made no secret of his Mosleyite affiliations when serving as a gunner in 
the Royal Artillery. 322 Looking back, he fully expected to be part of the 18B round-up: 
318 Ibid.. 
319 Swan. Taped interview, P. R. O. TS 27/493. In the High Court of Justice King's Bench Division. 
Before Mr. Justice Tucker. Stuart v. Anderson and Another. Royal Courts of Justice, Wednesday, 25 
June 1941. Evidence First Day; P. R. O. HO 45/25714/840452/8. J. R. Smeaton-Stuart, `Report on the 
functioning of Regulation 18B of the Defence Regulations (1939)', Appendix B, p. 2. 
320 p RO. TS 27/493. Home Office Advisory Committee to consider appeals against Orders of 
Internment. Notes of a meeting held at 6, Burlington Gardens, W. I. on Tuesday 10th September 1940. 
John Smeaton-Stuart. 
321 Information provided by F. O. M.. 
322 RW.. F. O. M. taped interview; RW.. Completed questionnaire. R. W. served in the Royal Artillery 
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I was Propaganda Officer for Walthamstow [West] for a 
while. I was a Blackshirt since 1935... I'd just come back 
from Germany. I was carrying Tomorrow We Live in my 
kit bag. Everybody knew it. All the officers knew it... I'm 
allowed to go scot-free. Why? Is it because I'm so open 
and not being cagey, or what? Or do they think I'm a 
raving lunatic? Whatever it was, I certainly didn't get 
picked up and I'm still asking the same question today. 
What justice! I've never seen anything so ridiculous in 
my life. I think they must have got a big... list, a pin and 
just stuck it in and said "We'll have that one". And that 
was it. 323 
Fourthly, the extraordinary omission of Dorothy, Viscountess Downe, the 
B. U. F. 's prospective parliamentary candidate for North Norfolk, raises the distinct 
possibility that connections with the British Establishment could also afford a measure 
of protection. It is inconceivable that the authorities were unaware of her strong, 
publicly-stated attachment to the Mosleyite cause. Downe had been a Blackshirt 
activist since 1937, and her work for the B. U. F. locally attracted considerable interest 
in the Norfolk press. As a result, she became the most prominent Mosleyite in the 
county. Her apparent immunity from interrogation and arrest subsequently prompted 
one M. P. to make allegations of discrimination in the House of Commons. 324 In July 
1940, Downe told the Daily Express that Britain should continue the war, but also 
stated that she remained a fascist. 325 
Specific cases, involving the arrest of former and current rank and file B. U. F. 
members, indicate some of the criteria used by the authorities during the DR 18B 
operation. Walter Birch, the ex-Norwich Blackshirt, and his wife Josephine were 
arrested because the latter, although possessing British nationality by marriage, was 
German-born. 326 Martha Swan's German background also appeared to be the reason 
15th Scottish Division from 1940 to 1946. 
323 R W.. F. O. M. taped interview. 
324 Parliamentary bats (House of Commons), Vol. 367,1940: 839. The M. P. for Ipswich, Richard 
Stokes, referred to Downe as a "notorious Fascist" who "happens also to be a relation of a high 
member of the peerage". 
325 Viscountess Downe. Quoted in L. N C. P., 23 July 1940, p. 12. 
326 Suffer Little Children (The 18B Publicity Council, 15 Woburn Square, W. C. 1., n. d. ). Josephine 
Birch was detained for being of "hostile origin" and Walter Birch for "hostile association". 
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why she and her husband, the former Epping B. U. F. District Treasurer, Thomas Swan, 
were placed in detention. 327 Another interned Epping Blackshirt, Kenneth T. Dutfield, 
probably came to the attention of the authorities on account of the long letters he 
wrote to the local press in the late 1930s extolling the Nazi regime. 328 Advertising 
pro-fascist political views at such an unfavourable time may also have sealed the fate of 
Frederick M. K. Lyall, who appeared before a Conscientious Objectors Tribunal at 
Southwark in January 1940. At this hearing, the Southend District member confirmed 
his formal links with the B. U. F. and maintained that Britain should negotiate peace 
terms with Hitler to preserve the Empire. Lyall's application was refused, and he was 
placed on the Military Service register. 329 One of the most bizarre and apparently 
arbitrary detentions concerned W. Butler, the Norfolk shopkeeper and non-active 
Blackshirt, who was interested only in the B. U. F. 's policy for the small trader. 330 
Butler bore a physical resemblance to Goering and, according to Richard Stokes, then 
M. P. for Ipswich, "the chief reason for his arrest seems to be that old ladies in his 
neighbourhood every time they walked into his shop shouted `Heil Hermann!. -331 
These inconsistencies and anomalies help to explain the uneven pattern of 
arrests. At present, there is no evidence to suggest that any other B. U. F. official or 
member in the three counties was detained. This left several Districts, including 
Romford and Walthamstow West, apparently unscathed. Conversely, for reasons which 
are not entirely clear, the King's Lynn and Epping formations appeared to be the 
principal local victims of the DR 18B round-up. Eight members or supporters, 
including one woman, were detained at King's Lynn and a similar number of 
327 L. B.. Telephone interview; information provided by F. O. M.. 
328 See W. L. C"G. 29 July 1938, p. 5,12 August 1938, p. 12,16 September 1938, p. 11. The 
authorities regarded Dutfield as a very intelligent Nazi supporter who "would do anything against the 
interests of this country". See P. RO. HO 45/25752/863022/30. New Scotland Yard List of Isle of Man 
18B Detainees who "are thought to be likely to, and capable of, stirring up trouble against the 
Authorities". 26 September 1941. 
329 Essex Newsman and Maldon Express. 20 January 1940, p. 1. 
330 P. R. O. H045/25714/840452/8. J. R. Smeaton-Stuart, `Report on the functioning of Regulation 
18B of the Defence Regulations (1939)', Appendix B, p. 2. 
331 parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), Vol. 367,1940: 839. 
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Mosleyites were arrested at Epping. 332 In comparison, only five Blackshirts currently 
or previously attached to the Bethnal Green North East B. U. F., the largest District in 
the country, were incarcerated. 333 
The government's use of DR 18B against the B. U. F. and other organisations 
was based partly on the assumption that a pro-Nazi `Fifth Column' was operating in 
Britain, but little evidence of domestic fascist subversion was uncovered. The 
authorities were unable to demonstrate that the Blackshirt leadership had ever initiated, 
or indulged in, unlawful acts. Moreover, the movement's official statements in 
1939-1940 discouraged members from breaking the law and stressed the B. U. F. 's 
loyalty to the Crown. Similarly, although the promotion of the B. U. F. 's anti-war 
platform by local Blackshirt speakers and activists did not always stay within the law, 
neither the Peace Campaign itself nor the excesses and illegality associated with it 
constituted fifth column activity. Indeed, by November 1940, Churchill revealed that he 
regarded the existence of an internal threat with "increasing scepticism", and, in the 
second volume of his history of the Second World War, he maintained that no fifth 
column existed in Britain. 334 Churchill's assessment has-been endorsed more recently 
by several detailed academic studies, which conclude that "the whole idea of a fascist 
fifth column was a figment of the imagination -a ludicrous fantasy". 335 It is now clear 
that, when responding to international and domestic events during the crisis of 
mid-1940, the government greatly exaggerated the potential for such activity and 
resorted to drastic `safety first' measures against suspect groups to remove any 
possibility of a breach in national security and to bolster civilian morale. In the process, 
332 p RO. HO 45/25714/840452/8. J. R. Smeaton-Stuart, `Report on the functioning of Regulation 
18B of the Defence Regulations (1939)', Appendix B, p. 3. At Epping, L. B., Thomas Swan, Martha 
Swan, Thomas Barneveld, Kenneth T. Dutfield, Jeffrey Custance and Donald Chambers were 
detained. Two others attached to the Epping Branch, Frederic Ball and Walter Wragg, were also 
interned. 
333 Linehan, East London for Mosley. p. 181. In this connection it is interesting to note that eight 
members of the Lincoln B. U. F. were detained under DR 18B (1A); information provided by F. O. M.. 
334 parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), Vol. 365,1940: 1248; Winston S. Churchill, f 
10 Their Finest Hour (London: Cassell, 1955), p. 246. 
335 Thurlow, Fascism In Bri ain_ p. 198. See also Simpson, In The Highest Degree Odious and N. 
Longmate, If Britain Had Fallen (London: Hutchinson, 1972). 
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many entirely innocent Blackshirts were unjustly detained and stigmatised as 
unpatriotic liabilities. The shadow of DR 18B also obscured the honourable 
contribution loyal Mosleyites made to the British war effort. 
Nonetheless, although the vast majority of British fascists put their country 
first, a small number of Blackshirts from the region did indulge in illegal and subversive 
activity during the war. At least two former members of the local movement, Eric 
Pleasants and Roy Walter Purdy, committed treason. After leaving the Norwich B. U. F. 
in 1939, Pleasants, a pacifist, initially intended to register as a conscientious objector 
but eventually became a farm labourer in Jersey in May 1940 under a Peace Pledge 
Union Scheme to provide the Channel Islands with agricultural workers. 336 Once the 
Nazis had occupied the Channel Islands in July 1940, he survived for a time by going 
on the run and looting properties abandoned by evacuees. However, Pleasants' 
involvement in a three-man attempt to escape by boat to England led to his capture in 
late 1940. The German military authorities imprisoned the ex-Norfolk Blackshirt for six 
months at Dijon before sending him to the civilian internment camp at Kreuzberg. 
Eventually, in March 1944, he was accorded formal prisoner-of-war status and 
transferred to Marlag/Milag, where he joined the British Free Corps (B. F. C. ). This 
drastic course of action was not impelled by ideological motives but was driven instead 
by Pleasants' determination to avoid combat of any kind and to see out the war years 
as comfortably as possible: 
I thought that joining [the B. F. C. ] would get me out of a 
jam... I mean, I reckoned we'd never be made to fight, not 
against our own boys at least. We were good propaganda 
for the Germans and I figured that had got to be worth 
more food, better conditions and a few women! You 
never got that in the camp. All that rubbish about a National 
Socialist crusade against Bolshevism, I mean, it meant 
nothing to me. 337 
336 pleats. Interview; E. Chapman, I Killed To Live: The Story of Eric Pleasant (L)ndon: Cassell, 
1957). 
337 pleats. Interview. 
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Within the B. F. C., Pleasants' main duty was to organise physical training 
sessions for his fellow recruits. He was also selected to box for the S. S.. In February 
1945, the former Mosleyite bigamously married Annaliese Nietschner, who worked as 
secretary to the B. F. C. 's liaison officer, SS-Obersturmfuhrer Dr. Walther Kuhlich. As 
the Red Army closed in on Berlin, the newly-weds escaped through the city's 
underground tunnels and sewerage network, eventually reaching Annaliese's parents' 
home near Dresden, where they went into hiding for several months. Afterwards, 
Pleasants earned a modest income entertaining the Soviet forces stationed there with a 
strongman act. In 1947, he and Annaliese were taken into custody by the Russians and 
charged with espionage. After their arrest, the couple lost contact and were never to be 
reunited. Sentenced to 25 years hard labour by a Soviet military tribunal, Pleasants 
served a total of seven years at the Workuta and Inta camps in the Russian Arctic 
before being sent back to England in July 1954.338 On his return, the British authorities 
did not institute legal proceedings against him because of his wartime association with 
the B. F. C.. 
The region's other known renegade was Roy Walter Purdy, a resident of 24, 
Westrow Drive, Barking, who, apparently, belonged to the B. U. F. between 1932 and 
1935.339 According to Purdy's own account, this included an eighteen month period in 
1934-1935 as a member of the Ilford District. On 18 December 1945, the 27 year old 
former Essex Mosleyite was sentenced to death for high treason after being convicted 
of making pro-Nazi radio broadcasts and producing propaganda material for the 
Germans during his time as a prisoner-of-war in Germany. Prior to his capture by the 
Nazis in June 1940, Purdy had served as a naval engineering officer on board H. M. 
Armed Cruiser Van Dyck. M15 also reported that, once in German custody, Purdy met 
with William Joyce and may have joined the S. S.. An appeal against the death penalty 
was dismissed on 23 January 1946, but Purdy was later reprieved, and his sentence 
338 s. 9 July 1954, p. 8,10 July 1954, p. 5,12 July 1954, p. 4. 
339 p RO. HO 45/25798. MI5 Report Re: Roy Walter Purdy, alias Robert Wallace. 4 October 1945; 
P. R. O. HO 45/25798. Statement of Sub-Lieutenant (E) Walter Purdy. 29 May 1945; Daily Herald. 22 
December 1945. Press cutting in B. D. B. J. C61913/2. Walter Purdy. 
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commuted to life imprisonment. After his release in December 1954, he apparently 
settled in Germany. 340 
Several lesser cases of illegal or questionable wartime activity also involved 
current or former Blackshirts from the area. Charles Max Sakritz, a 30 year old 
Anglo-German living at 4, Margery Park Road, Forest Gate was one local fascist who 
fell foul of the Defence Regulations. Described as possessing "very strong pro-German 
sympathies", Sakritz, a home-based jobbing tailor by trade, had joined the B. U. F. for a 
brief period in 1939.341 At the end of April 1940, he was sentenced to one month's 
hard labour and fined ten pounds for defacing a government poster headed `Don't Help 
The Enemy', which had been attached to an empty commercial property in Upton 
Lane, West Ham. 342 
On 4 June 1940, Claude Francis Goddard Chead, a 45 year old Mosleyite who 
ran a drapery business in Mundesley, Norfolk, appeared before a special sitting of the 
Cromer Police Court. He was charged with being found the day before in possession of 
"a diary admitted to be in his own manuscript recording measures for the defence of 
certain places, contrary to the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, Regulation 3". 343 
Goddard Chead was remanded in custody for over a month until the Home Office had 
completed its inquiries into the matter. 344 Eventually, on 8 July 1940, the charge was 
dropped, and Goddard Chead, after being released from prison, was barred from the 
protected area in question and required to report each day at the police station nearest 
to his new place of residence. 345 
Later in July 1940, Phyllis Mary Bateman, a 30 year old Post Office accounts 
clerk residing at Old Road, Clacton, was sentenced to three months imprisonment for 
340 A. Wie, Renegades: Hitler's Englishmen (London: Warner Books, 1995), p. 195. 
341 Dai y Herald_ 30 April 1940, p. 5; $, E., 26 April 1940, p. 15,3 May 1940, p. 11. 
342 Ibid.. Sakritz, a British-born subject, was the son of a British mother and German father. He was 
raised in Germany between the ages of 7 and 22. After his arrest, police found fascist publications, 
anti-Semitic literature, pro-Nazi cartoons and cardboard swastikas covered in silver paper at his 
residence. 
343 F-D-P:. 5 June 1940, p. 5. 
344 Ibid., 18 June 1940, p. 5,2 July 1940, p. 3. 
345 Ibid., 9 July 1940, p. 2. 
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attempting to cause disaffection amongst armed service personnel likely to lead to a 
breach of duty. 346 Considered to be a follower of Oswald Mosley and Bernard Shaw, 
Bateman had engaged three soldiers in conversation at Clacton earlier in the summer 
on the subject of the war. During this discussion, she expressed her admiration for the 
B. U. F. 's peace policy and questioned the wisdom of continuing the military conflict 
with Germany. In September 1940, Essex Quarter Sessions Appeal Court upheld 
Bateman's conviction but varied the sentence to a fine of twenty pounds with fifteen 
guineas costs. 347 
In June 1941, Elsie Omn, the anti-Semitic Leyton Blackshirt, was sentenced to 
five years penal servitude at Hertfordshire Assizes for "endeavouring to cause among 
certain persons in His Majesty's services disaffection likely to lead to breaches of their 
duty". 348 Orrin was incarcerated following allegations that, during a conversation with 
two soldiers at a public house in Little Easton, Hertfordshire, she claimed that the 
British government was corrupt and controlled by Jewish financiers, described Hitler as 
"a good rulef a better man than Mr. Churchill" and told the servicemen that they 
349 should remove the present administration. 
346 Colchester Gazette 24 July 1940, p. 1. 
347 Ibid., 18 September 1940, p. 6. 
348 Unidentified report, 25 June 1941. Press cutting in B. D. B. J. C619/3/2. Elsie Orrin. 
349 Ibid.. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE EAST ANGLIAN B. U. F. 1933-1940 
1. Introduction 
Having examined the organisational and political development of the B. U. F. in 
Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex between 1933 and 1940, it is now necessary to investigate 
the local movement's support base. This chapter uses a wide range of written and oral 
sources to provide an extensive and detailed analysis of Mosley's following in the three 
counties. In the first section, Blackshirt recruitment levels are assessed in the light of 
Webber's suggestion that the East Anglian B. U. F. was in terminal decline after 1934. 
Subsequent sections consider the sociology of local fascism based on a regional sample 
of 230 members and other adherents. 
2. Levels of Blackshirt Recruitment in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex 1934-1938 
The extent and nature of Blackshirt membership during the 1930s constitute 
two of the most intriguing issues in the history of the B. U. F.. Several of the 
movement's officials provided contemporary or retrospective estimates of the B. U. F. 's 
strength. Mosley rarely discussed such matters, but, in November 1936, he informed 
the German magazine Lokelan=4= that the organisation had 500,000 members. I In 
later life, the ex-Blackshirt leader remained reticent, confining himself to the 
observation that the "rise of our movement continued throughout the full seven years 
until 1939 with only temporary fluctuations". 2 Looking back from the vantage point of 
the early 1960s, two former National Headquarters (N. H. Q. ) officials, Robert Forgan 
and A. K. Chesterton, offered more modest totals. Forgan recalled membership peaking 
at c. 40,000 in 1934 and maintained that, in the October of that year, the B. U. F. 
possessed an activist core of 5-10,000.3 By 1938, according to Chesterton, 100,000 
1 Manchester Mardian, 23 November 1936, p. 12. 
2 Oswald Mosley, My Life (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1970), p. 311. 
3 Colin Cross, The Fascists in Britain (London: Barrie and Rockcliffe, 1961), p. 131; R. Benewick, 
The Fascist Movement in Britain (London: Allen Lane, 1972), p. 110. 
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had passed through the organisation, and the membership then stood at 3,000 active 
and 15,000 inactive adherents. 4 More recently, these lower estimates have been 
broadly endorsed by an ex-B. U. F. Cadet Leader from Essex, who was based for a time 
at N. H. Q. 
I know more than most people because, while I was working 
in the Youth Movement, I was a sort of H. Q. official. Although 
I had a full-time job, I used to go to H. Q. in the evening, and 
I was able to use the office of the editor of the paper as my 
office. As a result of that, I think I've got a better idea than 
most people of what the membership was. I consider the figure 
... of 50,000 
in 1934 to be absolutely accurate...! think that 
throughout its existence it had about 9,000 active members, 
not the same people all the time... I think it had about 10,000 
non-active members, again people moving backwards and 
forwards between the two. I think it had a number of secret 
members -I couldn't guess how many ... 
for obvious reasons 
- but there was a substantial number of secret members. 5 
Outside the fascist ranks too, a diverse range of opinions circulated concerning 
the level of Blackshirt recruitment. In February 1934, the T. U. C. thought it "unlikely" 
that the number of paid-up Mosleyites totalled 40,000.6 Six months later, the Labour 
Party considered that the B. U. F. 's membership had never exceeded 20,000 and 
contended that "at the present time it is probably much less". 7 During the same year, 
parliamentary estimates put Mosley's support at the 200-250,000 mark. 8 Speculation 
in the national press in 1934 also produced a clutch of unsubstantiated figures. The 
News Chronicle contended that 17,700 belonged to the movement, the Daily Herald 
spoke of 35,000 Blackshirts, and the Observer gave limited credence to the B. U. F. 's 
`optimistic' claim that the movement had 500,000 recruits. 9 The Evening News went 
4 Ibid.. 
S E. G.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
6 T. U. C. General Council Research Department, `Fascism in Great Britain' (21 February 1934), p. 10. 
MSS 292/743/3. Modern Records Centre (M. RC. ), University of Warwick. 
7 National Council of Labour and the Co-operative Union, Statement on Fascism at Home and Abroad 
Vndon: National Council of Labour and the Co-operative Union, August 1934), p. 15. 
Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), Vol. 289,1934: 1770, Vol. 290,1934:: 
9 Cross, The Fascists in Britain. p. 131; Q)server, 21 January 1934, p. 17. The Observc 
noting that many experienced political commentators did not accept that there were 500 
Blackshirts, conceded that the B. U. F. 's membership was "large - far larger than many p 
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9 Cross, The Fascists in Briain_ p. 131; Q)server, 21 January 1934, p. 17. The Observer whilst 
noting that many experienced political commentators did not accept that there were 500,000 
Blackshirts, conceded that the B. U. F. 's membership was "large - far larger than many people believe". 
much further, arguing that, within a period of eighteen months, the B. U. F. had grown 
"from a handful to an organisation millions strong". 10 Another contemporary 
assessment suggested that the B. U. F. had attracted 17,500 members and an additional 
100,000 more loosely attached sympathisers. I l Writing in 1935, the left-wing 
commentator, W. A. Rudlin, noted that the B. U. F. appeared to be "gaining ground ... 
very slowly" and probably had a membership of "not much more than 100,000". 12 
This plethora of contemporary and eye-witness reports concerning Blackshirt 
numbers exhibited two striking features. Firstly, there was no general agreement on the 
extent of B. U. F. recruitment during the 1930s. Secondly, as none of these accounts 
based their conclusions on extensive empirical evidence, they remained exercises in 
conjecture. 
Colin Cross, author of the first `objective' history of British fascism, which was 
published in 1961, put forward an impressionistic interpretation of the B. U. F. 's 
development. 13 In his view, the movement was unable to sustain the level of support 
achieved in the period up to July 1934. After Rothermere had abandoned Mosley's 
cause, Cross argued, the B. U. F. went into irreversible decline as the membership ebbed 
away during the rest of the decade. From 1938, the rate of departure apparently 
gathered pace, leaving the organisation with just 1,000 or so active Blackshirts by 
1940. Following Cross, Robert Benewick's later study also concluded that the B. U. F. 
achieved its maximum support under Rothermere's patronage, before being locked into 
a downward spiral after 1934.14 
This broad consensus on the pattern of Blackshirt recruitment was broken in 
1975 when Robert Skidelsky challenged the view that the B. U. F. entered a period of 
terminal decline after 1934.15 Using a ratio of one active to three non-active 
10 Evening News. 26 May 1934, p. 4. 
11 J. Strachey, `Fascism in Great Britain', New Republic. LXXVIII, 2 May 1934, p. 331. Strachey's 
figures were allegedly based on information and internal documents sold by ex-Blackshirts. 
12 W. A. Rudlin, The Growth of Fascism in Great Britain (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1935), 
p 123. 
13 Cross, The Fascists in Britain, pp. 130-132. 
14 Benewick, The Fascist Movement In Britaim p. 110. 
15 R Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), pp. 331-332. 
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Blackshirts, Skidelsky estimated that Mosley's movement briefly attracted a national 
membership of 40,000 between January and July 1934, partly due to Rothermere's 
favourable newspaper coverage. 16 This level of support collapsed dramatically 
following the press lord's withdrawal and the hostile public reaction to the violence 
which marred the Olympia meeting. Contrary to Cross and Benewick though, 
Skidelsky contended that, after 1934, the movement, far from being a spent force, was 
able to recover and may have had 40,000 members once again by 1939. Skidelsky's 
revisionist interpretation was based on two developments apparently neglected by 
earlier studies, namely the success of the B. U. F. in east London from 1935 to 1938 and 
the mobilisation of anti-war sentiment during the 1939 Blackshirt Peace Campaign. Six 
years later, Skidelsky scaled down his membership estimate for 1939 to 20-25,000.17 
In 1984, Gerry Webber was able to take advantage of recently released 
government and Special Branch reports from the 1930s to produce the most 
sophisticated and comprehensive account of B. U. F. recruitment patterns to date. 18 
Basing his analysis on the assumption that the ratio of active to non-active members 
was 1: 1.5, Webber also concluded that the Blackshirt movement was regaining its 
strength after 1935, although his findings indicated a less pronounced recovery than 
Skidelsky originally suggested. 19 Webber estimated that during the first half of 1934 
the B. U. F. membership swelled from 15-20,000 to 40-50,000 before contracting 
sharply to a low point of 5,000 by October 1935. From then on, Blackshirt numbers 
steadily increased, reaching 10,000 by March 1936,15,500 by November 1936,16,500 
by December 1938, and 22,500 by c. September 1939. In a subsequent study, Richard 
Thurlow praised this more rigorous and nuanced account of Blackshirt recruitment but 
16 Skidelsky's ratio of 3: 1, drawing on statements made by Robert Forgan, assumes that the B. U. F. 
peaked at 40,000 members, and by October 1934 had between 5,000 and 10,000 activists. 
17 R. Skidelsky, 'Great Britain' in S. J. Woolf (ed. ), Fascism in Europe (London: Methuen, 1981), p. 
275. 
18 G. C. Webber, 'Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of Fascists', Journal of 
Vol. 19 (1984), pp. 575-606. 
19 Webber derived his 1: 1.5 ratio from an M15 Report of November 1936 which revealed that the 
B. U. F. then had 6,500 active and 9,000 passive members. See Public Records Office, Home Office 
series (P. RO. HO) 144/21062/403-407. The Fascist Movement in the United Kingdom, Excluding 
Northern Ireland. Report No. 9. Developments from August 1936 to November 1936. 
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considered that Webber's national membership figures required a "small downward 
revision". 20 
T. P. Linehan's pioneering research into the B. U. F. in east London and 
south-west Essex also relied on government and Special Branch reports which were 
declassified in the 1980s to sketch out the broad contours of the shifting Blackshirt 
membership base in London as a whole and the East End in particular between 1935 
and 1939.21 Using Webber's active-non-active ratio of 1: 1.5 and Special Branch data 
which reported that London Branches accounted for half the national membership, 
Linehan was able to chart the B. U. F. 's progress in the capital. According to his 
calculations, Blackshirt membership in London totalled 2,750 in late 1935,5,000 in 
early 1936, and 8,125 towards the end of the year. After slipping back slightly to 7,250 
by late 1937, the upward momentum was renewed as support climbed first to 9,000 
and then 11,250 in c. 1939. Linehan extended his analysis by deriving illustrative figures 
for the East End based on the "impressionistic assumption" that, between late 1935 and 
1938,70-80 per cent of the capital's Blackshirts were attached to east London 
formations. 22 
TABLE 1 
MEMBERSHIP OF THE B. U. F. IN THE EAST END, 
LATE 1935 - LATE 1938 
(Calculated on the basis of approximately 70-80 per cent of the London membership) 
Approximate date Active Non-active Combined 
Late 1935 1,925-2,200 
Early 1936 1,400-1,600 2,100-2,400 3,500-4,000 
Mid to late 1936 2,275-2,600 3,413-3,900 5,688-6,500 
Late 1937 2,100-2,400 3,045-3,480 5,075-5,800 
Late 1938 6,300-7,200 
(Adapted from T. P. Linehan, Fast London for Mosley, London: Frank Cass, 1996, Table 2, p. 
198) 
20 R Thurlow, Fascism In Britain A Iistorv, 1918-1985 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 124. 
21 T. P. Linehan, Fast London for Mosley The British Union of Fascists in East London and 
South-West Essex 1933-40 (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 197-199. 
22 Ibid., p. 199. 
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For a number of reasons, any attempt to provide corresponding totals for East 
Anglia is fraught with difficulty. The N. H. Q. national membership registers, which 
were based on Branch returns, have never been released. These records were almost 
certainly confiscated by the Security Services in May 1940 and, even if still in 
existence, probably relate exclusively to Division I or active members. 23 Consequently, 
this material would offer little insight into the movement's numerically more important 
non-active membership. Moreover, it is evident that many District officials in Norfolk, 
Suffolk and Essex either concealed or destroyed their Branch membership registers in 
order to prevent such sensitive documents from falling into the hands of the authorities 
during the DR 18B round-up. 24 Few of these valuable sources have since come to 
light. Investigations into the B. U. F. conducted by the Labour Party and the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews in the 1930s also reveal little about the overall development of 
the East Anglian movement. 25 
Furthermore, the contemporary Home Office and Special Branch records 
currently available to the historian do not contain much detailed information about the 
progress of the B. U. F. in the eastern counties from 1935.26 Indeed, having consulted 
these official sources, Webber concluded that the East Anglian B. U. F. attracted a peak 
membership of approximately 2,500 during the Rothermere interlude, but then "initial 
interest waned rapidly and probably permanently after 1934". 27 However, information 
gleaned from declassified government and police files, the contemporary regional press, 
Labour Party sources, B. U. F. newspapers and interviews with ex-Blackshirts, not only 
facilitates the calculation of tentative membership figures for the region between 1934 
23 On this point see Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, p. 332. 
24 Several ex-Blackshirt interviewees mentioned this in conversation with the author. During the 
phoney war period, the Eye B. U. F. District Leader buried his Branch records in a field, the East Ham 
District Treasurer destroyed the Blackshirt register in his possession, and the Epping District Leader 
gave a number of local membership cards to a non-active Mosleyite for safekeeping. 
ZS Replies to Labour Party Fascist Questionnaire of 12 June 1934. LP/FAS/34; Board of Deputies of 
British Jews (B. D. B. J. ) C6 series. 
26 Only a small amount of information relating to the B. U. F. in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex is to be 
found in the PRO. HO 45,144 and 283 series. 
27 Webber, `Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of Fascists', p. 583. See also p. 
589 and p. 599. 
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and 1938 but also suggests that Webber's picture of the inexorable decline of the 
B. U. F. in eastern England from 1935 needs to be revised. 
The formative stage of the B. U. F. 's development in East Anglia was 
characterised by a period of expansion. 28 Boosted, temporarily, by the Daily Mail's 
pro-Blackshirt campaign, Mosley's early agricultural speeches in the area, the B. U. F. 's 
intervention in the East Anglian `tithe war', and the efforts of local fascist pioneers, 
such as Douglas Gunson and Lieutenant-Colonel H. E. Crocker, the movement enjoyed 
several months of sustained, if geographically patchy, growth in eastern England until 
mid-1934. By then, numerous Branches had been established throughout Norfolk, 
Suffolk and provincial Essex, including sizeable formations at King's Lynn, Norwich, 
Brightlingsea and Maldon. 
During the latter part of 1934 and for most of 1935, the Blackshirt presence in 
the area was drastically curtailed as Rothermere withdrew the support of his press 
empire, economic conditions gradually improved, and the impact of fascist anti-tithe 
agitation faded. Arriving in East Anglia in 1935 to take over as the senior Blackshirt 
official in Norfolk, John Smeaton-Stuart discovered that B. U. F. organisation in the 
region had been reduced to "marks on a map". 29 Internal problems caused the King's 
Lynn B. U. F. to collapse towards the end of 1934, and there was little in the way of 
Blackshirt activity at Norwich for the first eight months of the following year. Several 
other Norfolk formations, such as those at Hunstanton, Attleborough, North Walsham 
and Diss, also appeared to languish after the initial surge of 1933-1934. A similar 
pattern could be observed in Suffolk, where early groupings at Ipswich, Beccles and 
Bury St. Edmunds seemed to lose impetus as well. Furthermore, in a survey of the 
B. U. F. between March and October 1935, the authorities reported that the Essex 
movement then possessed just 168 members and was "generally on the decline". 30 
28 See Chapters Two-Six for a detailed discussion of the B. U. F. 's organisational development and 
political progress in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex between 1933 and 1940. 
29 PRO. HO 283/64/33. Home Office Advisory Committee to consider Appeals against Orders of 
Internment. Notes of a meeting held at 6, Burlington Gardens, W. I. on Tuesday 10th September 1940. 
John Smeaton-Stuart. 
30 P. RO. HO 45/25385/47. The Fascist Movement in the United Kingdom, Excluding Northern 
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From this low point in late 1935, it seems plausible to suggest that the B. U. F. 
staged a modest recovery in parts of eastern England up to the end of 1938 or the 
beginning of 1939. The start of this process coincided with the general upturn in the 
movement's fortunes, which accompanied the B. U. F. 's 'Mind Britain's Business' 
campaign over the Abyssinian crisis. 
31 Fascist efforts to mobilise support in the 
South-West Norfolk constituency during 1935 culminated in the formation of an East 
Dereham Branch in the autumn and led to local press reports that the B. U. F. presence 
in the west of the county in particular was "stronger than generally supposed". 
32 
Mosley's address at Norwich market place before a crowd of 10,000 on 27 October 
1935 was claimed to be the largest provincial meeting the Blackshirt leader had so far 
held and was hailed as signalling the "beginning of the breakthrough". 
33 
Smeaton-Stuart's endeavours in 1936-1937, first as National Organising 
Officer for Norfolk and then as Area Organiser for East Anglia, consolidated this 
apparent upswing by galvanising the regional movement and 
bringing in new recruits. 34 
Moreover, it would be reasonable to assume that the publicity surrounding Viscountess 
Downe's conversion to the B. U. F. in 1937 and her subsequent political work for the 
Mosleyite cause in the locality also improved the Blackshirts' position in north 
Norfolk. Certainly, there was speculation within Conservative circles that her adoption 
as the B. U. F. prospective parliamentary candidate 
for the North Norfolk division could 
secure up to 3,000 votes for the fascists at the next election. 
35 In addition, the Norwich 
and King's Lynn Districts resumed propaganda activities on a regular basis from late 
1935 or early 1936. 
Ireland. Report No. VI. Developments from March 1935 to October 1935. 
31 Richard Reynell Bellamy, `We Marched With Mosley' (Unpublished unabridged manuscript, 
1958-1968), Chapter 25. 
32 Easlcm tai y, press (F D L), 24 October 1935, p. 8. 
33 Richard Reynell Bellamy. Taped interview with Stephen Cullen, 1985. Mosley made this remark to 
Bellamy at the Norwich meeting. 
34 P. RO. HO 283/64/31-46. Home Office Advisory Committee to consider Appeals against orders of 
Internment. Notes of a meeting held at 6, Burlington 
Gardens W. I. on Tuesday 10th September 1940. 
John Smeaton-Stuart. 
35 Norfolk News and Weekly Press ( Pi. 27 November 
1937, p. 4. 
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Webber's tentative notion of a progressive B. U. F. decline in East Anglia after 
1934 is also difficult to reconcile with the fact that the two largest and most active 
Suffolk formations were not established until c. 1936. Led by committed, affluent and 
locally-influential Blackshirts, the Eye and Woodbridge Districts continued to 
propagate the fascist message throughout the subsequent period. In this context, it is 
also worth noting that Ronald Creasy, District Leader at Eye, was elected to the Eye 
town council in November 1938 as a B. U. F. candidate. 36 Furthermore, from its 
inception in 1935 until the Munich crisis, the Lowestoft B. U. F. was able to retain its 
membership intact. 37 
Fascism did not die out in provincial Essex after 1934 either, despite an evident 
general downturn in the local movement's fortunes. Although almost certainly reliant 
on smaller numbers than before, several county formations, including the Maldon, 
Harwich, Colchester and Southend Districts, continued to hold meetings and other 
propaganda events in the later 1930s. In addition, from 1935, Blackshirt groups of 
indeterminate size and longevity were established in other outlying Essex areas such as 
Saffron Walden, Thundersley, and Grays to disseminate the Mosleyite message. 38 
Impressionistic evidence relating to the B. U. F. 's Peace Campaign and 
Blackshirt involvement in the East Anglian agricultural agitation of 1938-1939, 
indicates that the eastern counties movement probably benefited from another small 
influx of support towards the end of the decade. 39 Former Blackshirts recalled that the 
Eye and Norwich formations attracted new members at this stage because of the 
B. U. F. 's anti-war policy. Fascist attempts to recruit discontented elements of the East 
Anglian farming community between late 1938 and early 1939 also appeared to have a 
limited measure of success-Mosley's agricultural speeches in Norfolk and Suffolk 
during this period were well attended and favourably received. In December 1938, the 
first Suffolk Agricultural Dinner of the British Union, held it Ipswich and arranged 
36 Norfolk and Suffolk Journal and Disc Express (NSJ_D_E_), 
4 November 1938, p. 4. 
37 Arthur Swan. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 38 See Chapter Five. 
39 See Chapter Six. 
369 
locally, was attended by 200 farmers and associated businessmen. 40 During the same 
month, the B. U. F. claimed that the membership of the Woodbridge District had 
doubled in two weeks. 41 
This broad interpretation is supported by references to the size of individual 
District memberships contained in declassified government files, Labour Party sources, 
local newspapers and the recollections of former Blackshirts and anti-fascists. 
However, several important points need to be borne in mind when using this evidence 
to assess recruitment and support at Branch level in the three counties. Firstly, the 
obvious difficulty of quantifying the non-active and `secret' membership accurately 
makes it virtually impossible to gauge the extent of Blackshirt recruitment in the area 
with any real precision. Consequently, the most prudent approach is to regard the 
figures derived from these sources as illustrative estimates of fascist strength in 
particular localities. Since each District usually relied on a small number of activists to 
carry out political work for the movement, only a fraction of the total local membership 
was `visible' in the sense of being publicly associated with the B. U. R. The väst 
majority of Blackshirts in the area preferred the relative anonymity of non-active status 
in order to safeguard their businesses, protect their families, avoid social ostracism, and 
prevent victimisation by hostile employers and political opponents. 42 
Furthermore, a number of traders, business owners and other prominent people 
in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex, who, for similar reasons, were reluctant to advertise 
their Mosleyite allegiances, became `secret members'. Their identities were not 
normally revealed to the wider District membership. The King's Lynn B. U. F. claimed 
that much hidden backing existed within the local business community, and, at 
Leytonstone, the ex-District Leader (1939-1940) recalled that most of those who fell 
into the clandestine category at his Branch "were shopkeepers who were frightened to 
40 W ridge Recorder and Wie ham Market Gazette (W. RW. M_G., 15 December 1938, p. 4; East 
Ani ian Daily Times (F ADT. 1,13 December 1938, p. 12. 
Action, 17 December 1938, p. 11. 42 Most of the ex-Blackshirts interviewed by the author mentioned this particular feature of the local 
membership. 
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be openly associated with us". 43 Covert adherents, mostly with commercial 
backgrounds, also accounted for nearly one quarter of the Epping membership during 
the late 1930s, although the former District Leader (1938-1940) had reservations about 
this type of support: "You see, you never really know how you stand with that kind of 
support. You never know whether they're backing both horses, do you? I never knew 
quite. I mean, I wouldn't have expected them to put their commercial position in 
jeopardy, but, on the other hand, you just wonder how really sincere they are". ' 
Secondly, the problem of assessing fascist membership in the area is further 
compounded by a change in the B. U. F. 's recruitment strategy after January 1938. 
Previously, the movement had attempted to enrol sympathisers as non-active members, 
but now the policy was "to leave them free to join if they wish and to concentrate upon 
using them as nuclei within their own particular sphere of influence". 45 These new 
Blackshirt `penetration' tactics were designed to create "strong bodies of support" 
inside various trade and professional organisations. 46 
Thirdly, some District Leaders in the region did not attempt to maximise their 
numbers, preferring a smaller core of more ideologically committed fascists to a large 
paper membership. At Eye, for example, Ronald Creasy accepted only a proportion of 
those who applied to become Blackshirts: 
I would not allow `joining up'... I accepted support. Now that's 
a very different and important matter. Men joining up is a matter 
of quantity. Support is a matter of quality. Two entirely different 
things.. . Many were turned away, far more than I accepted. 
They 
had to come to see me for an interview to be accepted because 
I made it clear to them from the beginning that it was a great 
privilege, and I could only accept them if they answered my 
questions satisfactorily. 47 
43 Lynn News and County press (L, NC, 8 November 1938, p. 2; E. G.. Taped interview. 44 L. B.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. According to L. B., fifteen secret members 
belonged to the Epping District B. U. F. in the late 1930s. 
45 P. R. O. HO 144/21281/8-9. Special Branch Report on the B. U. F.. 20 January 1938. 46 Ibid.. 
47 Ronald N. Creasy. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
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Fourthly, when interviewed, several Mosleyites emphasised that a narrow 
preoccupation with registered District memberships makes no allowance for the 
material assistance and level of support given to the East Anglian B. U. F. by 
sympathisers who never actually joined the organisation. Apparently, a number of 
pro-Mosley industrialists residing in the county towns of Suffolk made financial 
donations to the local movement but did not enrol for business reasons 48 Even in 
those Districts with minimal formal support, there was often evidence of a broader 
acceptance of the Blackshirt programme. At Lowestoft, for instance, the B. U. F. 
formation attracted just seventeen members between 1935 and 1938 but also delivered 
Action to approximately 50 regular subscribers in the area. 49 
Official sources reported that by May 1934, the Norwich B. U. F. had 
approximately 40 members. 50 This figure was broadly endorsed by the former 
prominent East Anglian Mosleyite, Richard Bellamy, who later estimated the Branch to 
be 60-70 strong during its formative period. 51 A local left-wing opponent also 
subsequently recalled that there were about 70 Blackshirts in the County Borough in 
c. 1934.52 By early 1936, however, much of this early support had melted away, 
apparently leaving the Norwich B. U. F. with six active members. 53 Thereafter, 
according to an ex-Norwich Blackshirt, the District gradually recovered over the next 
three years and, by the beginning of 1939, could boast a "three figure membership". 54 
Fascist fortunes at King's Lynn mirrored this trend. An initial phase of rapid 
expansion was followed by disorganisation and collapse in late 1934 and early 1935. 
Fragmentary evidence indicates that, from then on, the King's Lynn B. U. F. was also 
able to re-establish a local membership base. In November 1938, Philip Vare, a 
Blackshirt motor engineer, contested the King's Lynn municipal elections as a B. U. F. 
48 Ronald N. Creasy. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1995. 49 Swan. Taped interview. 
50 p RO. HO 144/20141/315. The Fascist Movement in the United Kingdom, Excluding Northern 
Ireland. Report No. I. Developments up to the end of May 1934. 51 Bellamy. Taped interview. 
52 Wallace Pointer. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1994. 53 p RO. HO 144/20147/386. Special Branch Report on the B. U. F.. 23 March 1936. 
54 Eric Pleasants. Interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
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candidate for the Middle ward and obtained 107 votes. 55 Furthermore, after his arrest 
in 1940, John Smeaton-Stuart informed Earl Winterton M. P. that the police possessed 
a list of 153 registered B. U. F. members belonging to the King's Lynn District. 56 
Ronald Creasy remembered that the local B. U. F. formation "steadily advanced" 
and reached "its peak ... at the time of the 
declaration of war". 57 Although he declined 
to give any precise details on the grounds of confidentiality, Creasy recalled that local 
sympathisers outnumbered actual members by three to one and asserted that these two 
categories combined ran into four figures during the late 1930s. 58 His election, as an 
avowed Blackshirt, to the Eye town council in November 1938 with a tally of 179 
votes provides limited support for this extraordinary claim. 59 Creasy's close social and 
political links with William and Dorothy Sherston led him to conclude that the 
Woodbridge District B. U. F. made similar progress. 60 
Branch development at Lowestoft was far more modest and could not be 
sustained in the same way. According to the District Treasurer, Arthur Swan, between 
1935 and the autumn of 1938, there were seventeen B. U. F. members at the port, five 
of whom were active. In the weeks following the Munich crisis, approximately eleven 
Blackshirts resigned from the Branch and others drifted away during the first eight 
months of 1939. By the beginning of the war, only Swan and Surtees remained as 
members of the Lowestoft B. U. F.. 61 
Blackshirt growth was also discernible in provincial Essex during 1933-1934. 
In November 1933, a columnist in the Colchester Gazette reported that 150-200 copies 
of Blackshirt were being sold each week at Maldon, where fascism was said to be 
55 L-N. C. P. 8 November 1938, p. 11. 
56 p R0. HO 45/25714/840452/8. J. R. Smeaton-Stuart, `Report on the Functioning of Regulation 
18B of the Defence Regulations (1939)', Appendix B, p. 3. This report was sent to Earl Winterton in 
December 1940. 
57 Creasy. Taped interview, 1991. 
58 Ronald N. Creasy. Completed questionnaire for Andrew Mitchell, 1992; Ronald N. Creasy. Friends 
of Oswald Mosley (F. O. M. ) taped interview, n. d.. 
59 F. D. P. 2 November 1938, p. 14. 
60 Creasy. Taped interview, 1995. 
61 Swan. Taped interview; Arthur Swan. Completed questionnaire for Andrew Mitchell, 1993. 
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"very strong". 62 Six months later, the same columnist understood that the Colchester 
B. U. F. had about 30 members. 63 Labour Party sources estimated that, by mid-1934, 
the Brightlingsea, Clacton and Rayleigh Branches had approximately 150,70 and 33 
recruits respectively. 64 Although the B. U. F. was able to maintain an organisational 
presence in these localities after 1934, no evidence has so far been uncovered which 
can shed light on the corresponding District membership totals later in the decade. 
Recruitment patterns in other Essex B. U. F. formations can be traced in greater 
detail using information provided by former county Blackshirts. At Leytonstone, the 
ex-District Leader (1939-1940) recalled that the local Branch, assisted by the 
Rothermere press campaign, initially attracted almost 300 recruits. According to the 
same source, in the autumn of 1934, many of these early converts drifted away and, by 
1936, the Leytonstone B. U. F. possessed twenty active and 40 non-active adherents. 
Thereafter, the District membership increased to approximately 80 in 1938-1939 before 
dropping to half this figure by the spring of 1940.65 The rate and extent of Blackshirt 
growth at Ilford and Epping was broadly comparable. A former Assistant District 
Leader of the Ilford B. U. F. remembered that, after an early phase of rapid expansion in 
1934, which culminated in a registered membership of 200, the Branch experienced a 
large post-Rothermere exodus before mounting a partial recovery from 1936. By 
1938-1939, the District membership was thought to be 50-100 strong. 66 The oral 
testimonies of two ex-Blackshirt officials from Chingford indicate that, in numerical 
terms, the B. U. F. in the Epping division also peaked in 1934, when approximately 250 
recruits entered the local movement. This level of formal support could not be 
sustained for more than a few months, but, after a period of contraction, the Epping 
62 Colchester Gazette. 29 November 1933, p. 6. The columnist's report was based on information 
provided by a friend who had joined the Maldon B. U. F.. This recruit regarded Mosley's organisation 
as "a movement to watch". 
63 Ibid., 16 May 1934, p. 8. 
64 Labour Party Fascist Questionnaire. Reply of Harwich Divisional Labour Party. LP/FAS/34/497; 
Labour Party Fascist Questionnaire. Reply of South-East Essex Divisional Labour Party. 
LP/FAS/34/113.26 of the 33 Blackshirts at Rayleigh were stated to be under 21 years of age. 65 E. G.. Taped interview; E. G.. Completed questionnaires for Andrew Mitchell, 1993 and 1997; E. G.. 
Telephone interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1998. 
66 V. N.. Telephone interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1992. 
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District managed to establish a smaller, more stable membership of 70-80 Blackshirts 
towards the end of the decade. 67 
Although the B. U. F. 's early strength at Southend, Walthamstow, East Ham and 
West Ham cannot be gauged from the sources available, impressionistic evidence 
affords an insight into fascist recruitment in these localities in the later 1930s. A former 
Southend Blackshirt (1936-1938) recalled that the District formation had an activist 
core of 30 Mosleyites between 1936 and 1938, a total which would have been "at least 
doubled" by the inclusion of the non-active membership. 68 In April 1937, a Southend 
Times journalist, posing as a casual enquirer, visited the B. U. F. District Headquarters 
in London Road and ascertained that there were 120 active local Blackshirts, most of 
whom were young men in their early to mid-twenties. 69 Mosleyite accounts also stress 
that enrolments at Walthamstow West began to pick up during the late 1930s. From a 
modest base of 34 members at the beginning of P. F. 's brief stewardship in 1937, the 
District made steady, if unspectacular, progress in the period up to September 1939, by 
which time there were 60 active and 90 non-active Blackshirts attached to the 
Branch. 70 At East Ham, the former District Treasurer (1938-1940) recalled that the 
local B. U. F. membership hovered around the 60-70 mark between 1937 and 1939. Up 
to one-fifth of these adherents were said to be active in the Borough. 71 Other 
ex-Blackshirt interviewees revealed that, following the internal reorganisation of 1935, 
the West Ham District attracted an extensive non-active membership and gradually 
recruited 70 activists into its ranks. 72 
The interpretation outlined above suggests that, instead of collapsing 
permanently after 1934, the B. U. F. in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex staged a modest 
67 Frederic Andre Ball. Interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991; L. B.. Taped interview. 
68 M. G.. Letter to Andrew Mitchell. 30 March 1993; M. G.. F. O. M. taped interview, 1988. 
69, outhend Times (, 7 April 1937, p. 8. This was an unconfirmed figure. 
70 P. R. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1993; Derrick Millington. Completed questionnaire 
for Stephen Cullen, 1985; RW.. F. O. M. taped interview, 1988; RW.. Completed questionnaire for 
Stephen Cullen, 1985. 
71 T. M.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
72 AR Beavan. Taped interview with Stephen Cullen, 1986; F. T.. Taped interview with Andrew 
Mitchell, 1993. 
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recovery from the mid-1930s, in line with Webber's account of general recruitment 
trends. Webber's assumption that there were 2,500 Blackshirts in East Anglia in 
mid-1934 does not seem unreasonable, bearing in mind the Branch figures offered by 
contemporary sources and ex-Blackshirts for this early period. Furthermore, 
information obtained from the B. U. F. press, the 1934 Labour Party survey and 
government reports indicate that, at this stage, approximately 70 per cent of East 
Anglian Blackshirt recruits were concentrated in the three counties. 73 The available 
evidence also suggests that, from 1935 to 1938, B. U. F. membership in Norfolk, 
Suffolk and Essex fell and then rose again at approximately the national rate. These 
conclusions facilitate the calculation of useful membership figures for the three counties 
between 1934 and 1938, providing two important limitations are recognised. Firstly, 
the totals derived illustrate the broad levels of formal support given to the regional 
B. U. F. during this period and do not purport to represent the exact numbers involved. 
Secondly, these estimates do not include metropolitan Essex. 74 
73 Blackshirt, 1933-1934; Report on replies to Labour Party Fascist Questionnaire of 12 June 1934. 
LP/FAS/34/1; P. R. O. HO 144/20140/103-119. Special Branch Report on the B. U. F.. 1 May 1934; 
P. R. O. HO 144/20141/294-322. Report on the Fascist Movement in the United Kingdom, Excluding 
Northern Ireland. Report No. I. Developments up to the end of May 1934. This estimate is based on 
the number of B. U. F. Branches and level of Blackshirt activity reported in Cambridgeshire, Essex, 
Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, Norfolk and Suffolk. It would appear that, throughout the period up 
to 1939-1940, the bulk of the eastern England membership was concentrated in Essex, Norfolk and 
Suffolk. 
74 If the figures for metropolitan Essex are included, the number of B. U. F. members in the three 
counties exceeded 2,000 in mid-1934 and approached the 1,000 mark in late 1938. 
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TABLE 2 
ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP OF THE B. U. F. IN NORFOLK, 
SUFFOLK AND ESSEX, 1934-1938 
Active Members Non-active members Total 
Mid-1934 438 1312 1750 
Late 1935 70 105 175 
Early 1936 140 210 350 
Late 1936 217 326 543 
Late 1938 231 347 578 
(The above calculations for active and non-active membership use Skidelsky's active: non-active 
ratio of 1: 3 for 1934 to take into account the temporary impact of factors such as Rothermere's 
press support and B. U. F. involvement in the East Anglian tithe war. All other years are based on 
Webber's ratio of 1: 1.5. ) 
Academic researchers have also speculated that between one fifth and one third 
of the national Blackshirt membership was female. 75 Information provided by former 
Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex Blackshirts on the level of female involvement in the local 
movement tends to endorse these general estimates. Most ex-B. U. F. interviewees 
recalled that women constituted between ten and 30 per cent of the District 
memberships in the region. At Walthamstow West in 1937, one in ten local recruits 
were women, and, from 1937 to 1939, the East Ham B. U. F. possessed, at best, ten 
female adherents out of a total of 60-70 members. 76 During the mid- to late 1930s, 
women also accounted for approximately twenty per cent of the fascists belonging to 
the Southend and Epping B. U. F. formations. 77 Over the same period, up to one-third 
of the Mosleyites at Eye and West Ham, and about one-quarter of Norwich 
Blackshirts, were said to be female. 78 Other Districts in the area did not conform to the 
suggested national pattern of recruitment. Throughout its existence, the Leytonstone 
75 R. Thurlow, Fascism in Britain. caption to photograph of women fascists in Liverpool, opposite p. 
142; Stephen M. Cullen, `Four Women For Mosley: Women In The British Union Of Fascists, 
1932-1940' Oral History. Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 52; Martin Durham, Women and Fascism 
(London: Routledge, 1998), p. 49. 
76 P. F.. Taped interview; T. M.. Taped interview. P. F. recalled that four of the 40 Blackshirts at 
Walthamstow West in 1937 were women. 
77 M. G.. Completed questionnaire for Andrew Mitchell, 1991; Ball. Interview; L. B.. Taped interview. 
78 Creasy. Taped interview, 1991; Beavan. Taped interview; F. T.. Taped interview, Pleasants. 
Interview. 
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B. U. F. contained only slightly more men than women. By mid-1934, there were 120 
women Blackshirts attached to the Branch, but by the end of the year this figure had 
dwindled to between 40 and 50.79 In contrast, from its inception in 1935, the 
Lowestoft B. U. F. remained an all-male affair. 80 
3. Who Were the Blackshirts? The Social Composition of the East Anglian 
B. U. F. 
British Union ideology rejected the concept of class as divisive and, instead, 
called on all `decent' and `patriotic' Britons, irrespective of their social position, to 
forge a national consensus under fascism in order to eliminate class conflict and remedy 
the country's economic ills. 81 Hence, the B. U. F. uniform was meant to epitomise the 
`classless' ethos of an organisation which claimed to rely on the `finest' men and 
women from all walks of British life. Yet, in spite of the propaganda which extolled the 
B. U. F. as the authentic embodiment of the national will, Mosley and other senior 
Blackshirts offered contrasting views as to which sections of society responded 
positively to the fascist message. 
At various times, Mosley maintained that different groups, including dejected 
Tories, disaffected socialists and ex-servicemen, played an important role. 82 Arguably, 
though, the Blackshirt leader's clearest impressions of the B. U. F. 's bedrock support 
were contained in his memoirs, which noted that most of those who joined the 
organisation "were poor, some even being on the dole". 83 His description of the 
Birmingham Ladywood Labour Party in 1924 also pointed to the proletarian character 
of the B. U. F.: 
Our own organisation had a paying membership of some two 
hundred, but when we started the canvass only three elderly 
79 E. G.. Taped interview. 
80 Swan. Taped interview. 
81 See for example Oswald Mosley, Fascism: 100 Questions Asked And Answered (London: B. U. F. 
Publications, 1936), Question 8; 10 Points of Fascism (London: B. U. F. Publications, n. d. ). 
82 Oswald Mosley, The Greater Britain (London: B. U. F. Publications, 1932), p. 17; Oswald Mosley, 
fackshirt Policy (London: B. U. F. Publications, 1934), p. 15. 
83 Mosley, My Life p. 290. 
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women and two young men would accompany us. They were 
fine people, typical of the English workers, and closely resembling 
the other pioneers later attached to our new Movement before 
and after the Second World War. They were all manual workers ... 
84 
Other high-profile Mosleyites maintained that the B. U. F. was not dominated by 
working class adherents. In 1936, Alexander Raven Thomson stressed the movement's 
non-manual origins by claiming that fascism drew its "main strength and inspiration" 
from the farmers, shopkeepers and businessmen of the British `yeoman' class. 85 The 
former East Anglian Blackshirt and B. U. F. National Inspector, Richard Reynell 
Bellamy, later recalled that many ex-servicemen, war veterans, young males, 
landowners, farmers, small businessmen and shopkeepers were drawn to the 
movement. 86 His underlying conclusion was that: "All sorts and conditions of men and 
women joined". 87 Bellamy's depiction of the B. U. F. as a `catch-all' organisation has 
been endorsed more recently in the published autobiography of John Charnley, a 
prominent northern Blackshirt. 88 
Contemporary non- and anti-fascist accounts of the movement's social 
_ composition exhibited a similar 
lack of consensus. Some assessments emphasised the 
non-manual nature of the Blackshirts' constituency. An M. P., who attended the 
B. U. F. 's Albert Hall meeting in April 1934, reported that the uniformed Blackshirts 
present at the event were "obviously the products of the shop, the office, the bank and 
the `black-coated' unemployed", whereas the audience "consisted of minor 
businessmen, returned exiles from Empire outposts, disgruntled Conservative women 
and a good proportion of rather hard-faced beribboned ex-service men". 89 After 
completing a rather patchy `survey' of the B. U. F. in the summer of 1934, the Labour 
Party singled out ex-officers, small traders, middle-class people and fickle youngsters 
as those most likely to enrol. Interestingly, the same report mentioned that fascist 
84 Ibid., p. 176. 
85 
, 21 
May 1936, p. 7. 
86 Bellamy, `We Marched With Mosley', Chapters Fifteen and Nineteen. 
87 Ibid., p. 314. 
88 J. Charnley, Blackshirts and Roses (London: Brockingday Publications, 1990), p. 77. 
89 R. Bernays, `Fascism and the Answer', The S tor_ 27 April 1934, pp. 652-653. 
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efforts to nurture `blue collar' sympathisers had produced negligible results. 90 During 
the same year, the T. U. C. noted that small traders, former military officers and 
professionals were rallying to the B. U. F. 's banner, together with "Toughs" and 
elements of the "street corner" unemployed. 91 For the Communist Party of Great 
Britain (C. P. G. B. ), the B. U. F. existed to protect the interests of beleaguered 
finance-capital and recruited accordingly: "Fascism is the tool of CAPITAL. Every 
Blackshirt campaign in a British city starts with a luncheon and speech to the `Business 
Men', and all the local labour-sweaters and slave-drivers guzzle and listen to the tale of 
how Fascism will destroy `the uprising of the working class' and save their profit". 92 
Conversely, other commentators claimed that much of Mosley's support came 
from the working class. Phil Piratin, the Stepney Communist activist, did not share the 
C. P. G. B. 's complacent view that most manual workers were immune to the B. U. F. 's 
message. He later recalled that in east London "ordinary working-class folk", including 
trade union members, those in low-paid jobs and unemployed people, became 
Blackshirts. 93 Piratin's observations endorsed those of the left-wing academic, Harold 
Laski, who suggested in 1934 that the B. U. F. derived its numerical strength primarily 
from the working class-94 
In an unusual 1937 pamphlet, Lionel Birch dispensed with a class analysis of 
the B. U. F. 's membership in favour of four essential Blackshirt `types'. The first three - 
the self-confident, well-groomed ex-officer, the short, coarse-featured pugilist and the 
public school or university `hearty' - adopted a semi-defiant posture and regarded 
themselves as the "custodians of the manly tradition". 95 However, Birch argued that 
90 National Council of Labour and the Co-operative Union, Statement on Fascism at Home and 
pp. 15-16. 
91 T. U. C. General Council Research Department, `Fascism in Great Britain' (21 February 1934), p. 9. 92 J. L. Douglas, Spotlight On Fascism (London: Communist Party of Great Britain, 1934), p. 6. See 
also 10 Points Against Fascism (London: Young Communist League, 1934). For more detailed 
Communist expositions on the nature of fascism in the British context see R. P. Dutt, Fascism and 
Social Revolution (London: Martin Lawrence, 1934); J. Strachey, The Menace of Fascism (London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1933). 
93 Phil Piratin, Our Flag Staffed (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978), p. 18. 
91 S. Rawnsley, `Fascism and Fascists in Britain in the 1930s: A Case Study of Fascism in the North 
of England in a Period of Change' (Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Bradford, 1981), p. 223. 
95 L. Birch, Why Thcy Join The Fascists (London: People's Press, 1937), p. 9. 
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the "smart, healthy-looking and orderly" fascists of the fourth category, who often 
sold B. U. F. newspapers alone in London and the provincial towns, were sincere, 
altruistic and quietly courageous. 96 
Shortly after the Second World War, the left-wing journalist, Frederick 
Mullally, published a short study on Fascism Inside England, which also highlighted the 
disparate nature of Mosley's support in the 1930s: 
They flocked to him in their thousands - the frustrated, 
embittered little anti-semites, the soured intellectuals of 
the Right, the renegade Left-wing misfits, the flag-wagging 
middle-class matrons, the feather-headed, ham-fisted types 
of university and public school moron, the political Catholics, 
the ex-N. C. O. s and officers of the detention camp calibre - 
they rushed to don the black shirt, to sport the fascist `flash'... 97 
Owing to the difficulty of locating empirical evidence on the social composition 
of the B. U. F., most post-war writers and academic researchers investigating the British 
Union have relied heavily on either impressionistic accounts or the social characteristics 
of extremely small numbers of ex-Blackshirt respondents to identify those groups most 
susceptible to Mosleyite fascism in the 1930s. Consequently, much of the existing 
scholarly research into the B. U. F. 's social base, although illuminating, rests on 
informed guesswork and statistically insignificant samples drawn from the former 
membership. In the first `serious' study of the movement, published in 1961, Colin 
Cross used the reminiscences of former B. U. F. leaders, including Mosley, Robert 
Forgan and A. K. Chesterton, and information gleaned from Blackshirt literature and 
other sources, to construct an impressionistic profile of the dedicated ordinary 
member. 98 According to Cross, the typical Blackshirt loyalist was a lower middle class 
male, who, conscious of his-non-manual status, looked to the B. U. F. to protect him 
from "the capitalism he resented and the socialism he feared". 99 
96 Ibid.. 
97 F. Mullally, Fascism Inside England (London: Claud Morris Books, 1946), p. 25. 
98 Cross, the Fascists in Britain;. p. 70. 
99 Ibid.. 
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Five years later, W. F. Mandle published an interesting article, which dealt 
exclusively with the upper echelons of the organisation. 100 By combing British Union 
newspapers, service lists and the non-fascist press, he was able to probe the 
backgrounds of 103 major B. U. F. personalities, although several key figures were 
omitted and no female Blackshirts were included. On the basis of this work, Mandle 
defined the "composite fascist leader of 1935" as a widely-travelled, public 
school-educated middle-class man in his late 30s, who, after serving as an officer in the 
First World War, had struggled to find his niche in the post-1918 period. 101 
In The Fascist Movement in Britain, Robert Benewick had little to say about 
the B. U. F. 's wider membership. 102 After supplying pen portraits of a number of 
well-known Blackshirts and summarising the distinguishing traits of the `charmed 
circle' gathered around Mosley, Benewick declared that probably the most credible 
record pertaining to the rank and file was the report of the Advisory Committee on 
persons detained under Defence Regulation 18B, which had been sent to the Home 
Secretary in 1940. This indicated that the B. U. F. had attracted peripheral support 
across all class and age bands, and led Benewick to conclude: "... given the small 
numbers recruited and the rapid turnover, it seems in order to assume (short of more 
substantial data) a high degree of social and economic marginality distinct from the 
middle class bias of the leadership". 103 
Our knowledge of the bare outlines of the B. U. F. 's constituency was enhanced 
in 1975 by a shrewd "impressionistic survey" of the movement in Skidelsky's study of 
the Blackshirt leader. 104 Skidelsky synthesised the findings of Cross, Mandle and 
Benewick with material extracted from newspapers, pamphlets and trade journals of 
the 1930s to illustrate the heterogeneity of fascist support: 
100 W . F. Mandle, 
`The Leadership of the British Union of Fascists', The Australian Journal of 
Vol. XII (December 1966), pp. 360-383. 
110 - Ibid., p. 369. 
102 Benewick The Fascist Movement in Britain. p. 129. 
103 Ibid.. 
104 Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley, p. 317. 
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Who joined? There were university graduates and ex-public 
schoolboys; unemployed pugilists and unemployable professional 
men with useless classical educations. The `serious' ranged 
all the way from ex-communists to crackpot and obsessional 
anti-semites. With the exception of the young of all classes, the 
early B. U. F. was heavily middle-class. Its following in the 
industrial areas was middle-class. It picked up support in 
London and the southern coastal towns. Its headquarters in 
Chelsea seemed to symbolise its place in the political spectrum. 105 
Mosley's biographer added that fascism enticed the young, ex-soldiers, 
despondent professionals, athletic people, northern textile workers, farmers, 
agricultural workers and members of the petit bourgeoisie, such as shopkeepers and 
small traders. Service sector workers, such as barmaids, waiters, shop assistants and 
cinema usherettes, were likewise targeted because these occupations were weakly 
unionised, encouraged deferential attitudes and often had foreigners as employers or 
job rivals. 106 Apart from brief references to two regional studies, David Lewis's 
subsequent discussion of the membership in his 1987 general account of the B. U. F. 
merely reiterated themes already pursued by Skidelsky. His overall judgement was that 
the movement was essentially petit bourgeois with a small fringe of proletarian and 
middle class adherents. 107 
Stephen Cullen obtained interviews with, or completed questionnaires/memoir 
material from, 43 surviving ex-Blackshirts (39 men and four women) as part of a 
research project on the B. U. F., which was undertaken in the mid-1980s. 108 Most of 
these had been fascist activists, serving the B. U. F. in northern England, the Midlands, 
East Anglia, the East End of London and the southern counties. The respondents were 
analysed in terms of their family and political history, age, education, occupation, 
religion, B. U. F. career and their lives during and after the Second World War. Using 
105 Ibid.. 
106 Ibid., Chapter Sixteen. 
107 D. S. Lewis, illusions of Grandeur: Mosley, Fascism and British Society. 1931-81 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1987), pp. 71-75. 
108 Stephen M. Cullen, `The British Union of Fascists, 1932-1940: Ideology, Membership and 
Meetings' (Unpublished M. Litt. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987), Chapter Three. 
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information provided by this small `national' sample, Cullen put forward an 
impressionistic profile of the committed Blackshirt: 
He would be a young man, not long turned 20 when he 
joined the BUF, a lapsed Anglican from a Conservative 
shop-owning family who had some education beyond his 
14th birthday, probably at the local Grammar School, 
leading eventually to a clerical job. Soon after joining he 
would have become an active member, eventually being 
rewarded by a post, such as District Treasurer or District 
Leader, within the Branch. He would be a fairly well 
educated and ideologically committed member of the 
movement; indeed his belief in `Mosleyite' politics and 
policies would continue after the war when he would most 
probably join Union Movement. During the war itself he 
had a good chance of being detained without trial for his 
political beliefs, or if still under 30 and at liberty he would 
have in all likelihood volunteered for military service. Today 
the once-young Blackshirt would still be a fascist at heart, 
proud of his past association with the Mosley movement. 109 
During the 1980s, the release of selected Home Office files on the B. U. F. 
enabled Gerry Webber and Richard Thurlow to supplement existing sources and 
studies with government and police reports compiled in the 1930s. I10 This new 
material, which contained additional fragmentary evidence on the social background of 
the Blackshirt rank and file, led both Webber and Thurlow to conclude that support for 
the B. U. F. not only fluctuated numerically but also shifted socially and geographically 
throughout the decade. 
As the organisation expanded until mid-1934, Mosley cultivated a broad, 
mainly middle class coalition, which included ex-servicemen, disgruntled professionals, 
public school types, farmers, some small traders and alienated Tories, who were 
unhappy with the government's Indian policy. These Mosleyites tended to come from 
London (outside the East End), the south east, rural East Anglia, the Midlands and 
Yorkshire. The B. U. F. also tapped the unemployed in Manchester and Liverpool. 111 
109 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
110 See Webber, `Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of Fascists', pp. 575-606; 
Thurlow, Fascism in Britain pp. 122-127. 
111 Ibid.. 
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After Olympia and the Rothermere interlude, membership shrank drastically and 
the various sectional campaigns placed the organisation on a more working class 
footing. Textile and shipping policies mobilised working class northerners in 
Lancashire, Yorkshire and Liverpool for a time. Propaganda directed at small traders 
and businesses promising protection against larger competitors and `proletarianisation' 
gained petit bourgeois converts in northern England and the East End. Between 1935 
and 1938, the B. U. F. 's attitude to Jewry rallied sizeable east London support from 
working class, self employed and petit bourgeois groups, as well as from youths and 
anti-Semites. Mosley's greatest political success came in this locality, which could 
boast over 2,000 activists and extensive latent fascist strength. 112 
In 1938-1939, numerous Blackshirts in Bethnal Green, Limehouse and East 
Ham rejected the movement's pro-German line on patriotic grounds, but, this partial 
decline in the East End was more than offset by the B. U. F. 's Peace Campaign, which 
won an older, more bourgeois and right-wing following. Government intelligence 
noted that fascist support in 1939-1940 came chiefly from the upper and middle 
classes. The organisation became a sanctuary for many appeasers, disheartened 
Conservatives and anti-war protesters, stimulating fresh growth in London (outside the 
East End) and across southern England. 113 
Regional and local studies of the organisation have varied enormously in 
quality, not least on the question of Blackshirt support. Shorter works looking at the 
impact of fascism in Yorkshire, Aberdeen, Sussex, Glamorgan, Scotland, north-east 
England and Oxford have offered some useful insights into the B. U. F. 's provincial 
recruits. 114 However, due to a number of factors, including the lack of important 
112 Ibid.. 
113 Ibid.. 
114 'The British Union of Fascists in Yorkshire 1934-40' (Trevelyan Scholarship Project, 1960); L. 
Kibblewhite and A. Rigby, Fascism in Aberdeen: Street Politics in the 1930s (Aberdeen: Aberdeen 
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sources and the narrow approach adopted when consulting the material available, none 
of these accounts was able to analyse Mosley's local following in any detail. 115 
John Brewer and Stuart Rawnsley's regional histories of the B. U. F. were more 
incisive, partly because both scholars based their conclusions about Blackshirt support 
on small samples of the former local membership. 116 In his study of the B. U. F. in the 
west Midlands, Brewer used qualitative data from interviews with fifteen 
ex-Blackshirts (three of whom had no fascist links with that part of England) to 
comment tentatively on those who became `Mosley's men'. Brewer's work suggested 
that the B. U. F. tended to attract youthful adherents and members of the working and 
middle classes who were employed in occupations outside the heavily unionised and 
big business sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, the author conceded that, owing to 
the slender evidence upon which his findings were based, this research "should be 
treated as a prolegomenon rather than a final statement... " 117 
The oral testimonies of ten former local Blackshirts also formed an 
indispensable part of Stuart Rawnsley's perceptive account of some of the features of 
the B. U. F. 's membership in northern England. Once again though, this informative 
contribution was "essentially impressionistic", since the limited sources available 
apparently precluded a quantitative analysis. 118 Mindful of both the small number of 
Times: The People Against The Blackshirts (Newcastle upon Tyne: Bewick Press/Tyne and Wear 
Anti-Fascist Association, 1995); D. Renton, Red Shirts And Black: Fascists And Anti-Fascists in 
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Turner's work on the B. U. F. in Kent says virtually nothing about the local Blackshirt membership and 
fails to consult a number of key sources, including the fascist press. See D. Turner, Fascism and 
anti-Fascism in the Medway Towns 1927-1940 (Rochester: Kent Anti-Fascist Action Committee, 
1993). 
115 For example, the earlier studies appeared before selected government and police documents 
relating to the B. U. F. were released during the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, Todd and Turner 
appeared to be unaware that former local Blackshirts have produced accounts of B. U. F. activity in 
north-east England and Kent. Furthermore, none of the studies listed above used the Blackshirt and 
provincial press to assemble a B. U. F. membership sample for the area under investigation. 
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ex-B. U. F. interviewees involved in the project and the shortcomings of the 
documentary evidence inspected, Rawnsley cautiously stressed the heterogeneous 
nature of fascist support in the region during the 1930s. His central conclusion was that 
the Blackshirt movement "attracted all sorts of people". 119 
More recently, T. P. Linehan's sophisticated examination of the B. U. F. 's 
membership in east London and south-west Essex abandoned the purely qualitative 
approach of earlier studies. 120 By carefully combing and cross-checking located private 
B. U. F. documents, the fascist press, other Mosleyite publications, local newspapers, 
Home Office and Special Branch files, sources held by the Board of Deputies, and the 
oral testimonies of former Blackshirts from the area, Linehan was able to identify 311 
local members and active supporters (232 from the East End and 79 from south-west 
Essex). This sample was then analysed using the social class and occupational 
categories which were initially developed by Michael Kater and subsequently refined by 
Detlef Muhlberger to investigate N. S. D. A. P. recruitment patterns. 121 
Linehan found that 90.03 per cent of these 311 Mosleyites came from either the 
working class or the lower/intermediate levels of the middle class (51.44 per cent and 
38.59 per cent respectively). 122 In order of importance, the most prominent 
occupational sub-groups represented were unskilled/semi-skilled workers (112), skilled 
workers (48), self-employed merchants (44), junior and middle-ranking white collar 
employees (43), and independent master craftsmen (24). By way of contrast, only nine 
from the sample had elite or upper middle class backgrounds. The most significant 
finding was that 100 of the 232 East End adherents scrutinised had unskilled or 
semi-skilled manual jobs, which suggested that Mosleyites from these sections of the 
119 Raley, 'The Membership of the British Union of Fascists', p. 164. 
120 Linehan, East London for Mosley. Chapter Six. 
121 See M. H. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders 1919-1945 (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1983); D. Muhlberger, `Germany' in D. Muhlberger (ed. ), The Social Basis of 
European Fascist Movements (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 40-139; D. Muhlberger, Hitler's 
Aogy of the Nazi movement (London: Routledge, 1991). 
122 Linehan, Fast London for Mosley. pp. 211-230. 
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working class constituted the "social core" of Blackshirt support in the B. U. F. 's east 
London heartland. 123 
Although the lack of local Branch membership registers and the fragmentary 
nature of the sources hamper the task of probing the B. U. F. 's social foundations in 
Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex, enough accessible information on the Blackshirts' regional 
following exists to make a meaningful analysis possible. Three central considerations 
have prompted the adoption of Linehan's approach in this endeavour. Firstly, prior to 
the appearance of Linehan's work on the B. U. F. in east London, the present author 
had commenced compiling a sample of Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex Mosleyites from 
written and oral records as a prelude to investigating the social composition of the local 
movement. This reflected the writer's contention that the earlier academic assessments 
of the provincial membership provided by Brewer and Rawnsley relied too heavily on 
tiny samples of ex-B. U. F. interviewees and ignored biographical information in the 
Blackshirt and non-fascist press which would have broadened the scope of their 
research. 
Secondly, careful examination of the available sources has produced an `East 
Anglian' sample of 230 Mosleyites (members and supporters), which is extensive 
enough to offer an insight into the regional B. U. F. 's social base. This total represents 
the largest provincial sample so far assembled and compares very favourably with the 
232 East End adherents included in Linehan's study, bearing in mind the obvious 
disparity in Blackshirt strength between the two areas. 
Thirdly, by employing the same methodological procedures and the 
Kater/Muhlberger classification model, these 230 Blackshirt members and supporters 
can be discussed within the wider context of a comparative analytical framework. 124 In 
123 Ibid., p. 216. 
124 Ibid., pp. 207-211. In order to make comparisons meaningful, the `East Anglian' and Dorset 
samples were constructed in accordance with Linehan's selection criteria. It should be noted, however, 
that, unlike Linehan, who included Mosleyites writing to local newspapers only if they stated they 
were members of the B. U. F., the East Anglian sample contains a small number of pro-Blackshirt 
correspondents from the columns of the provincial press who neither confirmed nor denied that they 
had a formal link with the movement. These individuals were included because each demonstrated an 
unusual degree of commitment to the B. U. F. by ignoring the potentially damaging consequences of 
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this way, the East Anglian sample can be set against both Linehan's findings on the 
social roots of Mosleyite fascism in east London and the characteristics exhibited by a 
group of 41 members who were attached to the B. U. F. in the predominantly 
agricultural county of Dorset during the 1930s. These southern Blackshirts were listed 
in surviving official B. U. F. membership forms and documents covering the period from 
1934 to 1939.125 
Before commencing the analysis, it is necessary to review briefly the range of 
sources used to construct the B. U. F. sample and explain how individuals from Norfolk, 
Suffolk and Essex were selected for inclusion. A systematic trawl of the Blackshirt 
press revealed biographical information on a number of local activists, and uncovered 
letters, advertisements and announcements from members and sympathisers in the 
area. 126 Several important internal B. U. F. records relating to the regional membership 
were examined as well. These comprised a set of cards containing personal and 
membership details of a number of Blackshirts belonging to the Epping District, a 
selection of private B. U. F. `Official Gazettes' from the 1936-1938 period lisfing 
appointments, promotions and resignations at local level, and documents noting the 
names and addresses of District officials in certain parts of Essex. 127 A confidential list 
of prominent B. U. F. members or supporters in Norfolk, Suffolk and Lincolnshire, 
being linked publicly with the Blackshirt cause. Similarly, for the sake of uniformity, the author, in 
line with Linehan, has also adopted Muhlberger's criticisms of Kater's occupational sub-group and 
social class categories by (1) replacing Kater's `lower middle class' with a `lower middle and middle 
middle class' category, (2) including a `status unclear' category for those whose social class 
background could not be identified, (3) merging Kater's `skilled craft workers' and `other skilled 
workers' (occupational sub-groups two and three respectively) into one occupational sub-group 
covering all skilled workers. 
125 to sample of 41 Dorset Blackshirts was compiled from information contained in the Saunders 
papers which are held at the University of Sheffield. These B. U. F. records, formerly in the possession 
of Robert Saunders, the District Leader for Dorset West (1936-1940), indicate that the movement 
attracted a total county membership of approximately 110 between 1934 and 1939. This figure was 
confirmed by Robert Saunders in a taped interview with the author in 1992. Thus, the sample 
represents over one-third of all those who belonged to the Dorset B. U. F. at some stage after 1933. 
126 The main B. U. F. publications consulted were Actioon.. Blackshirt, Southern Blackshirt and Fast 
kshir4 
Epping B. U. F. Membership Cards (Supplied privately); The British Union of Fascists and 
ATnfinnal Socialists ( Clot 7ette_ 13 July 1936,21 September 1936,28 September 1936; 
British Union of Fascists and National Socialists Official Appointments List- 8 February 1937,3 May 
1937; The British Union 0115cial Appointments List, 10 October 1938; Essex B. U. F. District Official 
Cards (Supplied privately). The latter refer to East Ham, West Ham, Ilford and West Leyton. 
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which was used in the early 1940s to make personal appeals to East Anglian 
Mosleyites for financial contributions to the 18B Detainees Fund, has also been 
consulted. 128 In addition, the membership register for the King's Lynn formation of the 
post-war Union Movement provided a valuable corroborative source, since it made 
reference to the earlier B. U. F. affiliations of several recruits. 129 
Ex-Blackshirts and B. U. F. supporters from Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex, who 
were either interviewed by, or completed questionnaires for, the author, contributed by 
furnishing details about specific fascists attached to the local movement. Access was 
also obtained to the taped or written reminiscences of several former Blackshirts from 
the region, who, for various reasons, could not participate in this project. 130 This 
retrospective evidence was supplemented with biographical material on local B. U. F. 
activists, which was extracted from Mosleyite literature produced in the 1980s and 
1990s. 131 
A range of non-fascist sources was also consulted for the following membership 
analysis, the-most important being the local press. Close inspection of a large number 
of regional newspapers yielded additional information, chiefly in the form of articles on 
the activities of the B. U. F. 's local personnel, reports of magistrate court hearings, 
where fascists from the area appeared as defendants, witnesses or complainants, and 
published letters from pro-Blackshirt correspondents. 132 The material accumulated by 
the Board of Deputies of British Jews during the 1930s on individual Mosleyites 
128 Norfolk, Suffolk and Lincolnshire B. U. F. Membership List. This list was given to G. J., formerly 
District Leader of the Norwood B. U. F. in London, who served in the R. A. F. in Norfolk from 1941 to 
1946. G. J. visited those on the list to obtain money for the 18B Detainees Fund. Several well-known 
local Mosleyites, including Viscountess Downe and Henry Williamson, made donations. G. L. Taped 
interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1994. 
129 King's Lynn Union Movement Membership Book. This was supplied by G. J., who became 
Organiser of the King's Lynn Union Movement. 
139=, e taped or written reminiscences of several Blackshirts from Norfolk and Essex, who had either 
died or who were reluctant to discuss their Mosleyite affiliations with the author, were generously 
made available by Stephen Cullen and F. O. M. 
131 L. Wise (ed. ), Mosl 's Blackshirts: The Inside Stow of the British Union of Fascists 1932-40 
(London: Sanctuary Press, 1986); Comrade: Newsletter of the Friends of Oswald Mo ley. The latter 
first appeared in 1986 and is still published two or three times a year. 
132 Fifty-one local newspapers covering Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex were consulted. 
390 
residing in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex also assisted the data gathering process. 133 
Finally, a perusal of released Home Office and Special Branch reports on the 
movement disclosed a number of references to local Blackshirts, relating mainly to 
District officials in the area, fascists convicted of various offences, and B. U. F. 
adherents interned under Defence Regulation 18B (1A). 134 
In order to ensure both accuracy and consistency, only certain categories of 
identified Mosleyites were selected for the sample. Those described as Blackshirts in 
the non-fascist sources discussed above were included, as were the recruits listed in the 
B. U. F. membership records and internal documents. All Mosleyite interviewees and 
questionnaire respondents from the region, together with any other family members 
recalled as local Blackshirts, were also added to the total for analysis. Other adherents 
mentioned in the oral or written testimony of a former B. U. F. member or supporter 
were incorporated too, providing their occupations and Blackshirt allegiances could be 
confirmed by a second source. Local fascist personalities reported in the B. U. F. press 
were also accepted on the same basis. The final category contained individuals who 
were not explicitly described as Mosleyites, but whose actions were consistent with 
membership of, or support for, the B. U. F.. These were pro-Blackshirt correspondents 
writing in the local press, advertisers offering goods or services through the classified 
columns of Action and and proposers, seconders and assentors nominating 
B. U. F. candidates in local election contests. In each case, the fact that the person 
concerned had chosen to ignore the potentially damaging consequences of being linked 
publicly with the B. U. F. in some way, suggested a high degree of commitment to the 
Blackshirt cause. 
Several qualifying remarks need to be made about the resulting sample and the 
ensuing analysis at the outset. Firstly, it is important to recognise that the Blackshirt 
movement never managed to attract a majority from any particular social class or 
133 The most useful information compiled by the Board of Deputies on the local B. U. F. membership 
is to be found in B. D. B. J. C6/9/311 and C6/9/3/2. 
134 See the P. RO. HO 45,144 and 283 series. 
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occupational group, even in areas most receptive to the fascist creed such as east 
London. Thus, the regional B. U. F. 's social base comprised of minority elements drawn 
from these categories. Secondly, the findings discussed below should not be taken to 
imply that fascist allegiances were invariably related to an individual's position in the 
social hierarchy or their form of employment. As the case studies examined in the next 
chapter reveal, Blackshirt affiliations could stem from class or occupational concerns, 
but were also fostered by a variety of other factors. 
Thirdly, the 230 local Mosleyites assembled constitute only a fraction of the 
B. U. F. 's overall local strength and cannot claim to be perfectly representative of the 
wider movement in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex in terms of social composition, age 
distribution and the ratio of males to females. Therefore, only tentative conclusions 
about these features of the regional B. U. F. 's membership and support can be derived 
from this evidence. Lastly, the deficiencies of the source material not only prevent an 
examination of how the local movement's constituency developed during the 1930s, 
but also make it impossible to categorise every individual in the sample as either a 
B. U. F. member or a sympathiser, since the precise status of a small number of selected 
Mosleyites is unclear. 
Table 3 suggests that, although the B. U. F. was able to attract adherents from 
across the social spectrum in the three counties, the distribution of regional support for 
the Blackshirts was skewed. Four out of every five Mosleyites investigated (80.98 per 
cent) had either `lower middle and middle middle' or `lower' class backgrounds. Over 
half of the `East Anglian' sample (52.66 per cent) came from the lower and 
intermediate levels of the middle class and slightly more than one quarter (28.32 per 
cent) belonged to the working class. Conversely, only sixteen (6.94 per cent) of the 
230 identified were drawn from the `elite or upper-middle' echelons. 
In occupational terms, five sub-groups accounted for the bulk of the sample. 
Nearly one-fifth (19.18 per cent) earned a living as junior or middle-ranking white 
collar employees, and a slightly smaller proportion (17.83 per cent) were self-employed 
merchants. Farmers, on 7.83 per cent, constituted the other significant middle class 
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occupational sub-group. Manual workers were also well represented with the 65 lower 
class Mosleyites almost evenly divided between the unskilled/semi-skilled and skilled 
categories (15.28 and 13.04 per cent respectively). 
An examination of the sample at county level reinforces and refines this general 
analysis. The most striking discovery was the large percentage of lower middle and 
middle middle class fascists in Norfolk (66.14 per cent), Suffolk (68.96 per cent) and 
Essex (43.17 per cent), a finding which suggests that the B. U. F. depended greatly on 
non-manual support across the region. It is worth noting too that, for Suffolk and 
Essex, the three largest occupational sub-groups within this class category were 
lower/intermediate white collar workers, merchants and farmers. In Norfolk, the same 
three sub-groups were among the four largest in the lower middle and middle middle 
class band. At the very least, this raises the possibility that much of the middle class 
backing for Mosleyite fascism in eastern England came from adherents engaged in 
these specific types of employment. Furthermore, the proportion of elite or upper 
middle class fascists in each county sample was broadly similar, ranging from 5.76 per 
cent in Essex to 10.34 per cent in Norfolk. 
The distribution of manual support, however, was far from uniform. Indeed, 52 
of the 65 lower class Mosleyites identified were based in Essex. Interestingly, in view 
of Linehan's conclusions discussed below, almost half of the proletarian fascists from 
the county (23) were concentrated in the four Boroughs bordering east London which 
contained sizeable working class populations, namely Walthamstow, Leyton, West 
Ham and East Ham. If the Essex sample is divided into two groups, one covering the 
four Boroughs and the other the remainder of the county, a contrasting pattern 
emerges. Of the 48 Mosleyi-ttes from those districts in close proximity to the East End, 
47.92 per cent had lower class backgrounds and 35.42 per cent belonged to the lower 
middle and middle middle class. For the rest of Essex, the relative importance of the 
two class categories was reversed, with corresponding percentages of 31.87 and 47.26. 
To a certain extent, therefore, it would appear that the Essex B. U. F. 's social base 
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mirrored the local environment, becoming increasingly working class nearer to east 
London and more middle class in the suburban and provincial parts of the county. 
The social and occupational features exhibited by the `East Anglian' and East 
End samples tend to indicate that the Blackshirt movement relied on different 
constituencies for its core support in the two areas. Whereas 52.66 per cent of the 230 
Mosleyites from Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex had lower middle and middle middle class 
backgrounds, 57.75 per cent of the 232 east London adherents traced by Linehan came 
from the lower class. Thus, despite being able to appeal across the manual-non-manual 
divide, the East Anglian B. U. F. seemingly acquired a predominantly middle class 
following, and the East End movement assumed a distinctly proletarian character. In 
addition, elite and upper middle class Mosleyites accounted for 6.94 per cent of the 
`East Anglian' total but comprised only 1.29 per cent of the east London sample. This 
also suggests, as might be expected, that Blackshirt formations in Norfolk, Suffolk and 
Essex had proportionally more success than their east London counterparts in 
attracting recruits or sympathisers from the upper reaches of British society. 
Another interesting, though necessarily tentative, contrast concerns the nature 
of working class fascism in the two regions. Linehan's research indicates that 
unskilled/semi-skilled workers formed the mainstay of the East End B. U. F., with 
skilled workers playing a significant but clearly subordinate role. Yet, in the East 
Anglian sample, which revealed a notably lower level of manual representation, there 
was little disparity between occupational sub-groups one and two. These findings 
might indicate that such Mosleyites were drawn more evenly from these sections of the 
working class in the three counties than in east London. However, given the small 
number of fascist manual workers identified in Norfolk and Suffolk, this argument 
should not be pressed too far. 
Having noted these differences, it is important not to overlook the similarities 
that exist between the two samples. Firstly, even though the percentages varied, both 
were composed chiefly of individuals from the lower class and lower middle and middle 
middle class. Secondly, the same four occupational sub-groups (one, two, six and 
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eight) accounted for a majority of the 230 East Anglian and 232 East End Mosleyites. 
These findings lend weight to the argument that, as a national organisation, the B. U. F. 
relied heavily on working class and routine non-manual elements. They also suggest 
that, irrespective of locality, marginalised or alienated manual workers, shopkeepers, 
owners of small businesses and routine white collar employees formed key components 
of the Blackshirt constituency. 
An examination of the 41 B. U. F. members from Dorset supports much of the 
preceding analysis. The pronounced lower middle and middle middle class bias of the 
sample (68.30 per cent), coupled with the smaller but still significant percentage of 
working class recruits (17.08 per cent), broadly resembles the pattern for Norfolk, 
Suffolk, and suburban/provincial Essex. This further suggests that, in predominantly 
rural and agricultural areas, the B. U. F. appealed mainly, though not exclusively, to 
fringe elements from the lower and intermediate levels of the middle class. Moreover, 
most of the 28 Dorset fascists within this class category came from the same range of 
occupations as the majority of their East Anglian counterparts, since merchants (24.39 
per cent of the overall total), white collar employees (12.20 per cent) and farmers 
(12.20 per cent) comprised three of the four most prominent sub-groups. The only 
significant difference was the higher percentage share attained by non-academic 
professionals (14.63 per cent) in the southern sample. 
4. The Middle Classes and the B. U. F. 
One of the key reasons explaining the B. U. F. 's ability to attract lower middle 
and middle middle class adherents was the fact that, generally speaking, the institutions 
and organisations which existed to defend the occupational interests of groups such as 
independent traders, shopkeepers and those running small businesses lacked both the 
"cohesive core ideology" and uncompromising anti-fascism manifested by many of 
their working class counterparts. 135 This had three important consequences. Firstly, 
135 Linehan, Fast London for Mosley. p. 227. 
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compared with manual workers, there were fewer moral and institutional constraints to 
prevent members of the lower and intermediate middle class from abandoning their 
`natural' political affiliations and joining or supporting Mosley. Secondly, the B. U. F. 's 
political penetration of these middle class organisations was more successful than 
fascist efforts to infiltrate the Labour movement. 136 In addition, bodies representing 
non-manual interests were more likely to engage Blackshirts as guest speakers at their 
meetings. Thirdly, B. U. F. attempts to set up fascist-controlled associations to protect 
specific middle class occupations also appeared to reap greater rewards than those 
designed to mobilise sections of the working class. 
Several features of the B. U. F. 's development in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex 
support this general argument. Middle class audiences, drawn from the local business 
and farming community, attended a number of Blackshirt propaganda events designed 
to cultivate a non-manual following, notably three Norfolk luncheons and a Suffolk 
dinner, which were all addressed by Mosley himself. 137 There is also clear evidence 
that a group of Lowestoft fascists, led by George Surtees, were able to promote B. U. F. 
thinking on the importance of preserving small businesses by using their membership of 
the local Incorporated Chamber of Commerce to arrange and hold a trades fair for 
private enterprises in the town during March 1938.138 Furthermore, the Blackshirt 
movement was able to explain its programme to a variety of middle class forums in the 
region from late 1932. These included the Essex County Poultry Association and local 
Branches of the Round Table, Rotary Club, Junior Imperial League and India Defence 
League. 139 In October 1938, William Sherston, the B. U. F. prospective parliamentary 
136 During the late 1930s, the B. U. F. adopted `infiltration' tactics and encouraged non-active 
adherents to join private trading and professional organisations. By this stage, Mosleyites belonged to 
the Private Traders' Association and the Newsagents' Federation. See P. R. O. HO 144/21281/7-11. 
Special Branch Report on the B. U. F.. 20 January 1938. 
137 See, for example, E. D. P.. 21 December 1935, p. 3,14 December 1937, p. 13; N. N. W. P., 18 
December 1937, p. 7; E, A. D. T. . 
13 December 1938, p. 12; Suffolk Chronicle and Me=y (S. -J, 
16 December 1938, p. 1. 
138 Lowestoft Journal (L1, ), 12 March 1938, p. 11. See also Chapter Four. 
139 See for example F. A. D. T.. 23 July 1934, p. 8; Yarmouth Mercury (Y. _l, 17 
December 1932, p. 
15; IN"P 17 April 1934, p. 5; Saffron Walden Weekly News (S. )Y_ W_N. 1,28 June 1935, p. 12; 
LI. 3 December 1938, p. 6; The Boro' of West Ham, East Ham and Stratford Express (, 24 
March 1934, p. 9,14 July 1934, p. 2; Essex County Standard (E C. S. ), 16 February 1935, p. 9. Of 
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candidate for the Woodbridge division, explained the Blackshirt policy for agriculture 
at a special meeting of the County Executive of the Suffolk Branch of the National 
Farmers' Union (N. F. U. ). 140 Moreover, as Blackshirt involvement in the Oulton Broad 
Motor Boat Club illustrates, middle class organisations could also provide local 
Mosleyites with a conducive social and political environment in which to meet and 
spread the fascist message. 141 
Specific occupational groups from the lower and intermediate levels of the 
middle class were targeted by the B. U. F. One such category, which figured 
prominently in the East Anglian sample, was junior and middle-ranking white collar 
employees. Blackshirt propaganda maintained that, under financial democracy, the 
`blackcoated worker', although vital to the smooth running of the economy, was 
neglected by the major parties and ground "between the upper stone of the Banks and 
the lower stone of the Trade Unions". 142 In particular, clerks were said to be suffering 
due to poor wages, impotent unions and government indifference, with unemployed 
clerical workers being compelled to take `commission only' sales jobs. To improve 
their living standards, the B. U. F. advocated a national clerks' union within the future 
fascist Corporate State to secure higher wages and obtain legal safeguards against 
unscrupulous employers in the professions. 143 
Shopkeepers, independent traders and the owners of small businesses were also 
canvassed extensively for support in the B. U. F. 's literature. 144 Blackshirt pamphleteers 
contended that since financial interests controlled the democratic system to ensure 
course, not all of these local organisations were happy to provide the B. U. F. with a platform for its 
views. See for example Wal hamstow. Levton and Chingford Guardian (W. L. CLj, 1 July 1938, p. 
11 'The British Trader. No. 5, July 1939, p. 4. 
14O GC 462/1/1/6. National Farmers' Union Suffolk County Branch Minutes. Minutes of a special 
meeting of the County Executive held at Ipswich on 11 October 1938. Suffolk Record Office, Ipswich. 
This meeting was convened to hear the views of all the prospective parliamentary candidates for the 
division. 
141 Swan. Taped interview. 
142 'Blackcoats and Blackshirts' (B. U. F. Leaflet). MSS 292/743/5. M. R. C.. 
143 Djad r 17 January 1936, p. 6; Action, 21 August 1937, p. 3. See also Blackshirt, 17 August 
1934, p. 5. 
144 Action ran a regular column for shopkeepers, small traders and the owners of small businesses 
from 1936. Numerous articles devoted to this occupational group were also carried in the B. U. F. press. 
See for example Action, 6 March 1936, p. 13; Blackshirt, 11 April 1936, p. 2. 
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preferential treatment for their chain stores and multiples, small traders faced economic 
hardship and their organisations were unable to get effective protection from the 
government. The B. U. F. 's solution was to introduce a self-governing distributive 
corporation to preserve the small business community. Once established, this would 
prevent geographical saturation with its attendant cut-throat competition, limit 
discounts on bulk orders which favoured large concerns, and ban price-cutting. In 
addition, the B. U. F. planned to separate retailing, wholesaling and manufacturing to 
prevent the rise of monopolies and also aimed to outlaw the formation of new 
combines. Lastly, where possible, the fascists promised to dismantle multiple combines 
by selling off their existing shops to independent traders or by funding local managers 
to set up on their own. 145 
Although Blackshirt interest in the petit bourgeoisie had been apparent from the 
outset, the B. U. F. made its most concerted effort to attract the `small man' during the 
late 1930s. At the end of 1938, the movement established a British Union Traders' 
Group, but this was quickly superseded by the British Traders' Bureau, which was 
launched in February 1939.146 Led by Peter Heyward, the Bureau functioned as a 
vehicle for Blackshirt propaganda by publishing a journal entitled The British Trader 
and seeking to forge links with, and recruit members from, local traders' 
organisations. 147 Regional meetings were also staged to make small traders aware of 
B. U. F. policy and, on a grander scale, in February 1939, Mosley addressed over 1,000 
shopkeepers at London's Memorial Hall. 148 The aforementioned Blackshirt initiatives 
at Walthamstow and Ilford to recruit local traders, for example, formed an integral part 
of this ongoing fascist campaign. 149 
The B. U. F. also regarded farmers as another important potential source of 
support in this social class category. Blackshirt policy for agriculture, based on 
145 F. D. Hill, `S*ainst Trust and Monopoly! Shopkeepers Action (London: Abbey Supplies, n. d. ); P. 
ard, Menace of the Chain Stores (London: Greater Britain Publications, Abbey Supplies, n. d. ). He 
14 n, 29 October 1938, p. 6,4 February 1939, p. 6. 
147 The British Trader. No. 1, March 1939. 
148 Ibid., p. 2. 
149 See Chapter Five. 
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proposals to expand domestic production and develop a larger, more affluent home 
market within the protected framework of an imperial `autarchic' bloc, was regularly 
promoted in B. U. F. articles and pamphlets. 150 Blackshirt speaking tours were 
conducted in farming districts across England by Mosley and other officials. 151 An 
attempt was also made to induce rural sympathisers to join a body known as the British 
Union of Farmers. 152 In the eastern counties, of course, the fascists supplemented 
these propaganda techniques with high profile tactics to woo the agricultural 
community. Mosleyites actively intervened in the East Anglian `tithe war' during 
1933-1934, mounted a campaign to establish a Blackshirt constituency organisation in 
the South-West Norfolk division in 1935, and made well-publicised efforts to extract 
political capital from the local rural discontent which was generated by depressed 
barley prices in 1938-1939.153 
Many of the leading Blackshirt officials in the area belonged to sub-group six, 
the largest single occupational category in the sample, which encompassed clerks, sales 
representatives, commercial travellers and supervisory staff. Frederic Ball (Epping), 
Harold Scott-Turner (Leytonstone and Walthamstow West) and Walter Nichols 
(Walthamstow West) all had clerical jobs. 154 Junior and middle managers also joined 
the movement and took an active role. Alfred Dett, District Leader and B. U. F. 
prospective parliamentary candidate for the King's Lynn division, was employed as a 
local works manager for General Refractories, a company specialising in the 
manufacture of foundry moulding sands. 155 Richard Bullivant, who briefly headed the 
West Ham B. U. F. formation in 1935, was a shop manager in Ilford. 156 Another Essex 
150 See for example Fascism and Agriculture (London: B. U. F. Publications, n. d. ); J. Jenks, The Land 
and the People: British Union Policy for Agriculture (London: Greater Britain Publications, n. d. ); 
Bj , 21-27 
October 1933, p. 3,6 July 1934, p. 3,10 May 1935, p. 6,10 April 1937, p. 8,22 
January 1938, p. 5; Action. 5 December 1936, p. 16,17 April 1937, p. 6,11 June 1938, p. 6,20 May 
1939, p. 6. 
151 See for example Blackshirt 7-13 October 1933, p. 3,4-10 May 1934, pp. 2-3. 
152 Fascist Week 16-22 March 1934, p. 5; B. D. B. J. ACC/3121/E03/096. The Development of the 
British Union of Fascists (confidential memorandum, n. d. ), p. 4. 
153 See Chapters Two, Three and Six. 
154 Ball. Interview; W-L. C-G.. 28 October 1938, p. 4,24 May 1940, p. 4. 
155 22 January 1937, p. 11. 
156 V. K.. Telephone interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1998; F. T.. Letter to Andrew Mitchell. 17 
401 
Blackshirt official engaged as a store manager was Reginald Mace, an Assistant 
District Leader at Epping. 157 Commercial travellers and sales representatives also 
figured prominently in the local B. U. F. hierarchy, notably Ralph Ratcliffe, a one-time 
District Leader at King's Lynn, and Walter D. Wragg, a County Inspector for 
Essex. 158 
A number of the Mosleyites in this sub-group have not been mentioned in the 
previous chapters. These include C. W. Luker, a waterworks manager from Mundesley 
in Norfolk and Albert Osborne, a Blackshirt speaker residing in Ilford, who was 
employed as a receiving clerk. 159 Another hitherto unmentioned B. U. F. recruit was 
Arthur Watkiss, a 42 year old ex-serviceman from Chelmsford. Watkiss had lost a leg 
serving in the Middlesex Regiment during the First World War and worked as a 
secretary for a local garage firm. 160 
Adherents from this occupational category appeared to dominate certain 
Branches in the region. At Epping, for instance, much of the District membership was 
composed of lower and intermediate white collar employees. 161 Indeed, local 
Blackshirts jokingly referred to the Epping formation as the `British Union of Bank 
Clerks'. 162 Information provided by contemporary sources and a former member 
indicate that the Southend B. U. F. similarly depended on this type of recruit. 163 
Conversely, the Mosleyite affiliations of the Felixstowe clerk, Edward Frost, suggest 
August 1993. 
157 D. T.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991; L. B.. Telephone interview with Andrew 
Mitchell, 1997. Mace was employed by the Home and Colonial Grocery store in George Lane, 
Woodford. 
158 R. W. Ratcliffe. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, 1985; Ball. Interview, E. G.. Taped 
interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1997. 
159 Action 22 July 1937, p. 18; Kelly's Directory of Norfolk 1937 (London: Kelly's Directories, 
1937), p. 288; East Ham Echo (ELL. ), 17 March 1939, p. 1. 
160 24 July 1937, p. 5; Essex Weekly News. 14 July 1937, p. 2. 
161 Epping B. U. F. Membership Cards. 
162 L . B.. 
Taped interview. 
163 Labour Party Fascist Questionnaire. Reply of Southend Trades Council and Labour Party. 
LP/FAS/34/109; S. L 7 April 1937, p. 8; M. G.. Letter to Andrew Mitchell. 30 March 1993; M. G.. 
Letter to Andrew Mitchell. 8 April 1993. 
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that limited white collar support for the B. U. F. could also be detected in areas where 
no formal Blackshirt organisation existed. 164 
- Merchants, shopkeepers and owners of small businesses (sub-group eight) 
formed another central component of the B. U. F. 's regional support base. Several 
well-known local Blackshirts were drawn from this occupational category, such as 
George F. Surtees, the District Leader at Lowestoft, and Shirley Herbert Potter, the 
Norfolk cafe owner and B. U. F. Assistant District Leader. 165 The Brightlingsea couple, 
Mr. and Mrs. A. Rickman, who ran a cafe and guest house respectively in the town, 
were also prominently associated with the local B. U. F.. 166 
Other small business owners were attracted to the regional movement as well. 
Donald H. Steed, an agricultural contractor from Great Cornard, near Sudbury, was 
known to be one of the region's most steadfast Blackshirts. 167 Two more Suffolk 
Mosleyites in this category owned a stationery, printing and chemist's outlet in Eye. 168 
The local District Leader later recalled that this brother and sister partnership 
supported the B. U. F. "in a quiet way" in order to protect their business. 169 A small 
number of East Anglian drapers also had formal connections with the movement, 
notably Claude Goddard Chead, an ex-socialist Blackshirt speaker from Mundesley in 
Norfolk, Eric D. Rivett, a King's Lynn resident, and Vincent Smith of Lowestoft. 170 In 
addition, several merchants, shopkeepers and small traders belonged to the Epping 
District B. U. F., including a tripe shop owner, a grocer, and a furniture dealer. 171 
One interesting feature of this occupational sub-group is the regular appearance 
of Mosleyites who ran small businesses associated with the automobile and radio 
164 wes 27 February 1934, p. 11,27 March 1934, p. 11. 
165 p. RO. HO 45/23683. George Frederick Surtees; Bellamy, `We Marched With Mosley', pp. 
1013-1014; P. R. O. HO 45/23681/840457/C. Statement of Case Against Albert Edward Gore. 19 
August 1940; Norfolk Chronicle, 1 March 1935, p. 4; Kelly's Directory of Norfolk 1933 (London: 
Kelly's Directories, 1933), p. 279. 
166 Bja&shjjL 21 September 1934, p. 10,26 October 1934, p. 9; information provided by F. O. M.. 
167 Norfolk, Suffolk and Lincolnshire B. U. F. Membership List. 
168 N S. J. D. E. _ 27 January 
1939, p. 8. 
169 Ronald N. Creasy. Letter to Andrew Mitchell. 20 October 1995. 
170 Norfolk Chronicle. 1 March 1935, p. 4; Kelly's Directory of Norfolk 1933, p. 279; LNC. P 25 
October 1938, p. 12; G. J.. Taped interview; Action, 26 March 1938, p. 17; Swan. Taped interview. 
171 Ball. Interview; L. B.. Taped interview, Epping B. U. F. Membership Cards. 
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trades. Most of those identified were King's Lynn Blackshirts. Ernest and Frederick 
Sillett jointly owned a small motor engineers business at the port, as did two other 
Blackshirt brothers named Giles. 172 The King's Lynn B. U. F. local election candidate, 
Philip A. E. Vare, operated as a radio and motor engineer from commercial premises in 
the town. 173 Another local adherent was Peter L., a radio dealer. 174 George Surtees 
also owned an automobile engineer and radio business at Lowestoft, and the Wrentham 
Blackshirt sympathiser, George Sawyer, was similarly engaged in the motor trade. 175 
In Essex, Mosley's following included William Syrett, the proprietor of a motor works 
and garage at Weeley, who advertised a filling station job in Blackshirt in October 
1934, a radio dealer from Kirby-le-Soken, and the owner of a car and omnibus business 
at Kelvedon. 176 
The agricultural community (sub-group nine) provided another important 
source of recruits and supporters for the eastern England movement. A number of local 
farmers assumed official Blackshirt positions in the region during the 1930s. The most 
senior were Douglas Gunson, the East Anglian Area Administrative Officer, and 
William Sherston, the B. U. F. County Inspector for Suffolk. 177 Several others already 
encountered, namely R. S. Banyard (Hornchurch), A. J. MacPherson (Chelmsford and 
Maldon), William Chapman (Hunstanton), and George Hoggarth (Eye), served as 
Branch Organisers or District officials in the area. 178 The Blackshirt movement in the 
three counties could also rely on the support of other `fascist farmers'. Clement Rolfe 
172 King's Lynn Union Movement Membership Book; G. J.. Taped interview; information provided by 
F. O. M.. 
173 LN"P 16 April 1935, p. 6. Vare's business was located at 19-20, Railway Road, King's Lynn. 
1741" C. P 25 October 1938, p. 12; Kelly's Directory of Norfolk 1937, p. 251. 
175 P. R. O. HO 45/23683; Swan. Taped interview; P. R. O. HO 45/25714/840452/8. 
176 BjadL4dM 5 October 1934, p. 11; Kelly's Directory of Essex 1937 ( London: Kelly's Directories, 
1937), p. 556. Clacton Times and East Essex Gazette (C. T. E. E. G. ), 1 February 1936, p. 6; Harwich 
and Dovercourt Standard (H. ). SJ, 1 February 1936, p. 4; RW.. F. O. M. taped interview, P. R. Taped 
interview. 
177 E, D. P, 28 October 1933, p. 9; Action, 5 March 1938, p. 17; Creasy. Taped interview, 1995. W. E. 
Sherston was classified as a farmer because his mother was the owner of Otley Hall during this period, 
and, owing to a later family rift over his choice of bride, Dorothy Sherston disinherited her son. 
178 Romford Recorder (B, R), 27 September 1935, p. 4,28 October 1938, p. 10; Essex Chronicle 
(F 1,8 June 1934, p. 6; Blackshirt, 23 August 1935, p. 7; Times, 27 February 1934, p. 11,27 March 
1934, p. 11; Wise (ed. ), Mosley's Blackshirts, p. 42; Creasy. Completed questionnaire. 
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Ingelby, a pig breeder residing at Snettisham in Norfolk, was known to be a staunch 
supporter of the movement, as was Charles Ellis of Glaven Farm, Letheringsett, near 
Holt. 179 An early Essex Mosleyite was Major William Frederick Cosens, who farmed 
over 150 acres at Tillingham. 180 One of the last recruits to join the Eye B. U. F. in 1940 
was Y. C., a poultry farmer, who lived near Diss in Norfolk. 181 
One of the most prominent, and unusual, recruits in this category was the 
Norfolk agriculturist Captain Jocelyn Lee Hardy. In March 1934, as a recent fascist 
convert, Hardy gave a talk to the King's Lynn B. U. F. on his wartime experiences, 
which included escape attempts from a German prisoner-of-war camp. 182 Hardy, who 
now cultivated 600 acres at Washpit Farm, Rougham, near King's Lynn, had been born 
in London in 1894. After attending Berkhampsted School and the Royal Military 
College at Sandhurst, he served in the Connaught Rangers during the First World War 
when, at the age of twenty, he was taken prisoner by the Germans. During the next 
three years, Hardy made six unsuccessful escape attempts before finally eluding his 
captors in 1918, events that were subsequently recalled in his 1927 book, I Escape. He 
returned to the front where he was wounded twice and lost a leg. After the war he 
served briefly in Dublin and co-authored a play with Robert Gore-Brown entitled `The 
Key' based on his experiences therd. Hardy's bravery gained him the Distinguished 
Service Order, the Military Cross and an audience with the King. During the 1930s, the 
rights to some of his adventure novels were bought by film companies. For example, 
Hardy sold the film rights to his 1935 novel, Eve hing is Thunder, to the 
Gaumont-British Picture Corporation, who turned it into a feature film starring 
Constance Bennett. 183 
179 GJ. Taped interview; information provided by F. O. M.; ED. P- 17 November 1938, p. 5. 
180 Maldon Express (MLJ, 2 June 1934, p. 1. 
181 Y . C.. 
Letter to Andrew Mitchell. 8 May 1991; Ronald N. Creasy. Letter to Andrew Mitchell. 8 
March 1994. Y. C. declined to be interviewed. 
BjacjjsWM 23-29 March 1934, p. 3. 
183 
--p. 18 February 
1936, p. 10,25 February 1936, p. 11; The Author's and Writer's Who's 
Who 1934 (London: Shaw Publishing, 1934), p. 274. 
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Despite having some success in attracting local lower middle and middle middle 
class adherents, the B. U. F. was unable to create a sizeable non-manual constituency in 
the region. The 121 Mosleyites from the sample in this social class band were spread 
across twelve occupational categories. 184 Such diversity, coupled with the small 
numbers involved, indicates that the B. U. F. attracted only alienated and peripheral 
elements from the intermediate strata of society. Again, this accords with the 
Griffin-Copsey model, since the Blackshirts' failure to move beyond the political 
margins inevitably placed `mainstream' support out of reach. 
Blackshirt efforts were thwarted by a range of factors, which denied the 
movement the political space in which to appeal effectively to middle class groups in 
the area. The latter, generally speaking, were not badly affected by the depression and 
enjoyed improving economic conditions from 1933-1934. Discontent did surface within 
the East Anglian farming community, principally over financial returns and tithe 
payments, but the potential for fascist growth here was largely checked by the patchy 
impact of the economic downturn, the subsequent modest recovery, government 
measures to assist agriculture, and the existence of established grass root farmers' 
organisations, such as the tithepayers' associations and the county Branches of the 
N. F. U., which distanced themselves from the B. U. F. and provided more credible 
outlets for protest. Furthermore, Conservative and Liberal local party organisations in 
the three counties were in a much healthier state than their east London counterparts. 
In turn, this offered little scope for the B. U. F. to pose convincingly as the only political 
movement in the area able to defend middle class interests. 185 
184 42 were in commercial, financial or insurance occupations, 24 were employed as clerks, 
draughtsmen or typists, twenty worked in agriculture, eight had professional jobs, seven were engaged 
in personal service, four were employed in entertainment and sports, two worked in skins, one was 
engaged in quarrying, one made food, one was a photographer, and one ran a building company. 
These occupational categories are based on Census of England and Wales 1931 . Occupation Tables 
(London: H. M. S. O., 1934), Table 16, pp. 202-297. 
185 Linehan found that the decline of Liberalism in Bethnal Green and the weakness of Conservative 
party political organisation in the East End enabled the B. U. F. to attract many local small business 
owners, traders and middle class residents who felt they had been effectively disfranchised. See 
Linehan, East London for Mosley. Chapter Three. 
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S. The Working Classes and the B. U. F. 
Blackshirt propaganda also repeatedly stressed that the B. U. F. was pro-labour. 
Indeed, Mosleyite literature argued that fascism was "inspired by the century old 
struggle of the workers towards unity", represented the "logical outcome of the Trade 
Union movement's fight for fair conditions" and embodied "the next stage in the 
evolution of industrial structure". 186 According to the fascist viewpoint, the British 
working class faced the prospect of mounting unemployment and declining living 
standards because the liberal democratic `old gang' (including the Labour Party with its 
espousal of `evolutionary socialism') and the free trade system were incapable of 
solving the fundamental economic problems of the post-war period - 
underconsumption in an age of plenty, the loss of overseas markets and the adoption of 
mass production techniques by foreign competitors. '87 Moreover, from the B. U. F. 's 
perspective, the existing trade union movement operated in a manner which neither 
articulated nor safeguarded workers' interests. It was alleged that the present system of 
industrial representation fostered a culture of careerism and cronyism among union 
leaders, diverted much-needed funds into official salaries, political contributions, and 
other inappropriate donations, and promoted an international left-wing agenda, rather 
than the cause of the British worker. 188 
Mosley argued that only the establishment of the Corporate State, based on an 
insulated home market and an autarchic system of imperial trade, could protect the 
working class by guaranteeing the market for domestic industries, creating a high wage 
economy, and excluding goods produced by cheap foreign labour. Within this 
framework, the B. U. F. pledged, necessary schemes of industrial rationalisation and 
modernisation would be implemented in a controlled way to facilitate the transfer and 
training of the workforce. Displaced workers, who could not be provided with 
186 Fascism for the Million- The New Movement Simplified (London: B. U. F. Publications, 1936), pp. 
57-58. 
187 See Mosley, The Greater Britain. 
188 J. Beckett, Fascism and Trade Unionism (Extract supplied privately), pp. 2-6; Trade Unions 
(Speakers' Notes No. 20, B. U. F. Policy Propaganda Department, November 1936). 
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alternative employment, would receive maintenance and be eligible for additional 
financial assistance from a Labour Reserve Fund. Another Blackshirt undertaking was 
to ban the practice, common in some lower class jobs, of working abnormally long 
hours without extra remuneration. 189 
Furthermore, under a future B. U. F. government, the working class were to be 
represented as industrial co-partners in the Corporate State by `national' trade unions, 
which were to be given exclusive legal status as employees' organisations. 190 All 
workers would be required by law to join the appropriate union, and each membership 
would elect rank and file representatives, via free internal ballots, to sit on the relevant 
corporate decision-making bodies. As union leaders, those elected remained 
accountable to their members and were expected to show "a completely disinterested 
devotion to the service of workers and the nation". 191 Each union was to be concerned 
solely with issues relating to the functioning of its own industry, such as working 
arrangements, production levels and employees' rights. All forms of `political' 
involvement, including contributions to the Labour Party and grants to "subversive 
foreign movements", were to be prohibited on the grounds that this type of activity had 
corrupted and perverted the unions' original purpose. 192 Finally, the B. U. F. maintained 
that, since their protectionist and corporate remedies would provide lasting prosperity 
for manual workers and thus remove the economic justification for industrial action, 
the right to strike would also be withdrawn. 
This general analysis underpinned B. U. F. propaganda which was directed 
towards specific working class occupations. Numerous Blackshirt pamphlets and 
articles criticised the conditions under which various manual groups were currently 
employed and recommended the implementation of the fascist proposals outlined above 
within each sector to defend workers' interests. In this way, a diverse range of lower 
class employees, including miners, textile operatives, agricultural labourers, transport 
189 Fascism for the Millim pp. 57-64. 
190 W Risdon, Strike Action Or Power Action (London: Abbey Supplies, n. d.. ). 
191 Fascism for the Miillion, p. 63. 
192 Trade Unions (Speakers' Notes), p. 4. 
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workers, shop assistants, laundry staff, and taxi drivers, were urged to embrace the 
Blackshirt creed. 193 
The presence of 65 lower class Mosleyites in the regional sample suggests that, 
in terms of overall numbers, manual converts provided the Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex 
B. U. F. formations with an important secondary source of recruits and sympathisers. 
Several of these working class fascists served as local District Leaders. Richard 
Bellamy, then a casual labourer in Norfolk, founded the B. U. F. Branch at Downham 
Market in 1933 and became its first Organiser. 194 At various times, workers also 
headed Blackshirt groupings in Essex. Among the most prominent were Frederick 
Ralph, a baker's roundsman (Ilford), Aubrey Hunt, a sheet metal worker (Ilford), 
Frank Osborn, a stock-keeper (East Ham), Arthur Beavan, a painter (West Ham), John 
Aldrich, a tobacco worker (Walthamstow West), Frederick Young, a fish curer 
(Walthamstow West), L. B., a cabinet maker (Epping), and Leonard Hidden, a 
carpenter (Harwich). 195 Other local B. U. F. officials were also drawn from the working 
class, including Roy Hockin, a Brightlingsea printer, V. N., an Assistant District Leader 
at Ilford employed as a shoe repairer, and the East Ham District Treasurer, T. M., who 
worked as an upholsterer. 196 
The working class Mosleyites identified were drawn from a wide range of 
occupations, a feature which reinforces the general impression that the B. U. F. was 
unable penetrate any particular industry in the three counties and relied instead on small 
numbers of marginalised and disaffected manual workers employed in various sectors 
of the local economy. This pattern of support, which resembled the peripheral nature of 
193 See for example A. Raven Thomson, Cotton! Communist. and Socialists Exposed (London: 
B. U. F. Publications, n. d. ); Yorkshire Betrayed: British Union Textile Policy (Wool) (London: Abbey 
Supplies, n. d. ); Blackshirt 4 April 1936, p. 2,18 April 1936, p. 3,4 July 1936, p. 3,24 April 1937, 
8 
B04. Bcllamy. Taped interview. 
195 V. N.. Telephone interview; Linehan, East London for Mosley_ p. 115; Ilford Recorder (I, $), 28 
October 1937, p. 9; E. HE. 29 October 1937, p. 1; £E., 21 May 1938, p. 11; W. L. C. G. 27 May 1938, 
p. 19,23 February 1940, p. 2; E. C. S. _ 28 
September 1935, p. 13. The East Ham B. U. F. 's first Branch 
Organiser, Thomas Sullivan, worked as a labourer. See E. H E.. 2 August 1933, p. 2. 
19(1 F-C-S. 13 April 1935, p. 10,28 September 1935, p. 13; V. N.. Telephone interview; T. M.. Taped 
interview. 
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non-manual backing for the regional movement, further emphasised that the critical 
conditions for fascist growth did not exist in the three counties. Sub-group one 
contained 35 unskilled or semi-skilled adherents who between them were engaged in 
29 different jobs. 197 Within this occupational category were to be found such diverse 
types as Frederick Burton, a 22 year old seaman belonging to the King's Lynn Branch, 
Wilfred Slegg, a Downham Market labourer in his late twenties, a Leyton Blackshirt 
named John Dean, who worked as a bartender, E. Godfrey, a garment cleaner and 
presser from West Ham, and E. G. Hodgson, a chauffeur attached to the Epping 
B. U. F.. 198 
Sub-group two offered a similarly heterogeneous collection with 30 Mosleyites 
employed in twenty occupations. 199 A variety of local skilled workers were attracted 
to the B. U. F., including G. Green, a specialist willow worker from Woodbridge, James 
Hudson, a King's Lynn Blackshirt, who earned his living as a bootmaker, and G. 
Hammond, a Romford-based clothes cutter. 200 At Epping, a typewriter mechanic, a 
telephone fitter and a piano tuner were among those from this category who joined the 
District formation. 201 
Ten of the lower class Mosleyite sample (15.4 per cent) were classified as 
wood or furniture workers. 202 These included Alfred S. Hatton, an elderly woodcarver 
197 Sub-group one was comprised of three painter/decorators, two labourers, two nurserymen, two 
shop assistants, two storekeepers, an agricultural labourer, a baker's assistant, a baker's roundsman, a 
bartender, a bus conductor, a casual worker, a chauffeur, a domestic servant, a factory worker, a fish 
curer, a fisherman, a fitter, a footman, a garment cleaner, a general handyman, a grocery roundsman, 
a railway worker, a seaman, a shoe repairer, a soap boiler, a sprayer, a taxi cab driver, a tobacco 
worker, and a woodworker. 198 Jj= 27 February 1934, p. 11,27 March 1934, p. 11; $, E., 16 June 1939, p. 6; Blackshirt 11 
October 1935, p. 6; Epping B. U. F. Membership Cards. 
199 Sub-group two was comprised of four printers, three cabinet makers, three carpenters, two 
blacksmiths, two bricklayers, two welders, a baker, a bootmaker, a clothes cutter, an electrician, a 
hairdresser, a piano tuner, a sheet metal worker, a tailor, a telephone fitter, a typewriter mechanic, an 
u holsterer, a willow worker, a wireless engineer, and a woodcarver. 
20 B]ackeh* t, 2 August 1935, p. 7; Times, 27 February 1934, p. 11,27 March 1934, p. 11; Action, 
17 September 1938, p. 19. 
201 Epping B. U. F. Membership Cards. 
202 The lower class sample was divided into sixteen occupational categories. Ten were workers in 
wood and furniture, six were employed in transport and communication, five were engaged in 
personal service, five were metal workers, four had commercial occupations, four were printers, four 
were engaged in the production of food and tobacco, four made textile goods and articles of dress, 
three were painters and decorators, three had agricultural occupations, two were storekeepers, two 
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belonging to the Epping District, and Thomas Edgar Hilton, a carpenter and joiner who 
contested the Endlebury ward for the movement during the 1938 Chingford local 
elections. 203 Half of the individuals in this category either lived or worked in the 
vicinity of east London. This finding supports Linehan's argument that Jewish-Gentile 
economic tensions in the East End wood and furniture trades provided the B. U. F. with 
fertile ground for its anti-Semitic propaganda and attracted numerous recruits from this 
sector of the local economy. 204 Three of these workers have not appeared in earlier 
chapters, namely Albert John Lipscombe, a Walthamstow woodworker, and the 
brothers Horace and Sidney M., cabinet makers who both joined the East Ham B. U. F. 
in the late 1930s. 205 
An anti-Semitic connection can also be detected in the second largest manual 
group, transport and communication workers, which contained six working class 
Mosleyites. During the second half of the 1930s, fascist efforts to mobilise taxidrivers, 
particularly in the East End, were stepped up. The Blackshirt press argued that 
Gentiles engaged in this occupation faced unfair Jewish competition, and a B. U. F. Cab 
Trade Group was established to recruit sympathetic taximen. 206 Furthermore, in June 
1938, before an audience of 900-1,000 cab drivers at the Memorial Hall, London, 
Mosley promised that the B. U. F. would not only abolish private car hire services 
because they undercut the ordinary taxi man but also ban the "largely non-British" 
part-time cabbies, since they took custom away from their full-time British 
counterparts. 207 
Information passed to the Board of Deputies in 1938-1939 documented some 
of the B. U. F. 's anti-Jewish activities amongst taxi drivers in east London. According to 
the Board's sources, from mid-to-late 1938, Blackshirt activists in the trade were 
were bricklayers, two installed and repaired electrical items, one worked in undefined materials, and 
one was a fisherman. The remaining nine were classified as other and undefined workers. Census 
ion Tables, Table 16, pp. 202-297. 
Epping B. U. F. Membership Cards; W. LC. G. _ 28 October 1938, p. 3. 204 Linehan, Fast London for Mosley pp. 217-222. 
205 W. L. C. G., 11 February 1938, p. 2; T. M.. Taped interview. 
206 BWýshjjL 4 July 1936, p. 3. 
207 Acid 2 July 1938, p. 16; Blackshirt, July 1938, p. 4. 
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disseminating propaganda in the East End which alleged that Jewish drivers were 
flooding into this type of work, stealing fares from ranks and putting Gentile cabmen 
out of business. 208 This campaign strained relations between local Jewish and Gentile 
taxi operators and induced "hundreds" of cabbies to join the B. U. F.. 209 Interestingly, it 
was reported that, as far as could be ascertained, the majority of these recruits "live in 
the Ilford and Forest Gate Area". 210 The same informant noted that "many BUF 
cabmen" had joined the London Cabdrivers' Cooperative Society and pointed out that 
Blackshirts also sat on the latter's management committee. 211 By March-April 1939, 
however, there were signs that this B. U. F. initiative was no longer reaping many 
rewards. Another Mosley meeting for taximen, held at the Memorial Hall on 27 March 
1939, apparently attracted only 32 cabmen. The audience was hurriedly made up to 
about 160 by drafting in a number of young people, none of whom had any connection 
with the taxi business. At this juncture, the number of cab driving Blackshirts was also 
said to be on the decline. 212 
One of the working class Mosleyites identified as being involved in this 
agitation was A. Phelps, a taxi driver residing at Ley Street, Ilford. Phelps worked for a 
Jewish-owned cab firm in Three Colts Lane, Bethnal Green and was "very prominent" 
in the B. U. F. Cab Trade Group. 213 Described as an official of the movement, he was 
observed on a Blackshirt march from Stratford to Wanstead wearing a B. U. F. armlet 
and tie. He was also thought to be the source of the anti-Semitic and pro-fascist 
`stickyback' labels which were being attached to local taxis. 214 
208 B. D. B. J. C6/9/1/7. J. C.. Letter to S. Saloman. 9 October 1938. J. C. was active in the East London 
Cab Branch of the Cab Section of the Transport and General Workers' Union. He reported that many 
of the B. U. F. activists in the trade were past or present employees of east London Jewish-owned taxi 
firms. 
209 Ibid.. See also B. D. B. J. C6/9/1/7. M. E. Waldman, General Secretary, Order Achei Ameth, 
Brethren of Truth Friendly Society. Letter to A. G. Brotman, Secretary, Jewish Board of Deputies. 9 
June 1938. 
210 Ibid.. 
211 B. D. B. J. C6/9/1/7. J. C.. Letter to S. Saloman. 2 April 1939. 
212 Ibid.. 
213 BDB. J. C619/1/7. Untitled Report. 
214 B. D. B. J. C6/9/1/7. J. C.. Letter to L. A. C. (? ). 11 September 1938; B. D. B. J. C6/91117. J. C.. Letter 
to S. Saloman. 9 October 1938. 
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Bus company employees, another group of transport workers represented in the 
sample, were also courted by the B. U. F.. 215 At the end of September 1934, the Agent 
of the East Ham North Labour Party sent a copy of a B. U. F. leaflet on `Busmen And 
Fascism', which had been circulated in a local Branch of the Transport and General 
Workers' Union, to the T. U. C.. 216 In December 1936, a Blackshirt representative 
named O. Auton visited the Ipswich depot of the Eastern Counties Omnibus Company 
to consult with drivers and conductors, who were demanding better wages and 
conditions for the firm's 1000-strong workforce. Convinced that these employees had a 
"just case" and had been badly served by their union, Auton suggested that B. U. F. 
members, acting in a private capacity, would be prepared to assist them. 217 Seven 
months later, Mosley spoke at a N. H. Q. meeting for London busmen, who either 
belonged or were sympathetic to the movement. Only 49 bus workers attended this 
event, including an unspecified number from the Forest Gate garage. 218 The East Ham 
District B. U. F. also arranged a meeting for 25 January 1939 to enable Blackshirt and 
fascist-inclined bus company employees "to hear the British Union attitude towards the 
problems of transport workers". 219 Shortly before the scheduled date, permission to 
use the booked venue, a room in a local public house, was withdrawn. 220 
The inclusion of a small number of lower class adherents engaged in 
agricultural occupations supports Blackshirt claims that the movement was able to 
recruit this type of worker in places such as King's Lynn, Downham Market, Eye and 
Woodbridge. 221 Interestingly, the three fascists in question - I. F. Carlile, Thomas 
Hingley and William Smith - all held official positions within the Norfolk B. U. F.. 222 
215 The sample included George William Barrick of Chingford, a bus conductor and member of the 
Transport and General Workers' Union, who joined the Epping District B. U. F. as a non-active 
member on 13 January 1939. Epping B. U. F. Membership Cards. 
216 Stewart Rainbird, Agent and Secretary, East Ham North Labour Party. Letter to the Secretary, 
Trades Union Congress. 28 September 1934. MSS 292/743/4. M. RC.. 
217 Blackshirt. 19 December 1936, p. 4. 
218 P. R. O. HO 144/21064/189. Special Branch Report on the B. U. R. 8 July 1937. 
219 Acg= 11 February 1939, p. 16. 
220 Ibid.. 
221 E. D-P-- 13 September 1934, p. 7; Bellamy. Taped interview, Creasy. Taped interview, 1991. 
222 PRO. HO 45/25754/863027/3. Fascist Appeals To The Home Office Advisory Committee. 
Memorandum by E. B. Stamp. 22 August 1940; Y. M 18 November 1933, p. 11; L. N. C, E, 23 March 
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Nonetheless, the fact that this trio accounted for less than two per cent of the sample 
reinforces the argument that the B. U. F. failed to penetrate the ranks of the agricultural 
working class to any significant extent. Confronted by a host of obstacles, including a 
geographically scattered labour force, the fragmented nature of farm work, the 
`paternalistic' farmer-employee relationship, the anti-Blackshirt stand taken by the 
National Union of Agricultural Workers (N. U. A. W. ), improving economic conditions 
from the mid-1930s, and the continuing flight of rural labourers to the towns in search 
of better jobs, fascist efforts to mobilise agricultural workers in the eastern counties 
made little impact. 
Blackshirt propagandists also targeted the east coast fishing industry. The 
B. U. F. press and fascist speakers maintained that British fishermen, in places such as 
Brightlingsea, Lowestoft and Yarmouth, would enjoy greater economic security and 
protection under the Corporate State. 223 This was to be achieved by implementing a 
number of measures, including a complete ban on foreign-caught fish to create an 
assured domestic market and offset the threat of unemployment, the introduction of 
stable fish prices for those landing the catch, the removal of unnecessary `middle' 
agencies, and the provision of credit to enable fishermen to acquire new boats and 
upgrade their equipment. 224 
Mosleyite sources indicate that the movement attracted members of the East 
Anglian fishing community. In 1934, the Blackshirt noted that support for the B. U. F. at 
Brightlingsea "seems particularly strong.. . among the workers in the fishing industry", 
and anecdotal evidence suggests that, at some stage, the local Branch was run by a 
family engaged in this type of work. 225 The fascists press also reported that Lowestoft 
fishermen were attending Blackshirt meetings at the Suffolk port and claimed that some 
1934, p. 7; Lynn Advertiser. 13 April 1934, p. 6. Carlile and Hingley were nurserymen and Smith was 
an agricultural labourer. 
223 See for example Blackshirt 17 August 1934, p. 3,14 September 1934, p. 9,16 November 1934, 
Fj, 18 January 1935, p. 2. 
Ibid.. The B. U. F. also proposed to establish a Central Fish Office in London to reduce wastage, 
coordinate efficient distribution to centres of consumption, lower transport costs and minimise the 
volume of freight. See Blackshirt, 7 September 1934, p. 5. 
225 Ibid., 7 September 1934, p. 11; information provided by F. O. M.. 
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of these had enrolled. 226 Nevertheless, the fact that the sample contains only one 
Blackshirt with this occupation tends to suggest that, in reality, few workers employed 
in the fishing industry were tempted by the B. U. F. 's programme. 227 
Blackshirt attempts to mobilise working class support in the three counties 
made little impact. With local economic conditions improving from 1933-1934, the 
overwhelming majority of manual workers in the region regarded Mosley's drastic 
remedies as irrelevant and unattractive. Furthermore, most of the radicalised minority 
put their faith in organisations on the extreme left, particularly the Communist Party 
and the National Unemployed Workers' Movement, which disrupted B. U. F. activity in 
places such as Norwich, Yarmouth, Eye, Braintree and West Ham. 228 The Labour 
Party and the trade unions also exerted moral and ideological pressures to preserve 
working class political loyalties and thus prevent the Blackshirts creating a sizeable 
manual constituency in the area. Local labour movement figures warned of the dangers 
fascism posed for the working class, and urged their members and supporters to stay 
away from B. U. F. events. 229 In addition, Blackshirt speakers were rarely permitted to 
address left-wing bodies, and Labour-controlled local authorities regularly prevented 
the B. U. F. hiring council halls for political meetings. 230 
6. Elites and the B. U. F. 
The sample also shows that the movement was able to recruit members of the 
upper middle and elite classes, albeit on an even more modest scale. A handful fell into 
the managerial category, such as R. W., who worked as a trainee manager in his 
226 Bjadishirt 10 July 1937, p. 6. 
227 The sample includes A. R. Pawle, a Brightlingsea fisherman who joined the movement in 1934. 
He subsequently advertised fishing trips on a trawler in the B. U. F. press. See E. . 
S., 3 November 
1934, p. 12; Blackshirt, 3 July 1937, p. 7. 
228 N. N. WP. - 12 
September 1936, p. 1,19 September 1936, p. 1; Y M 17 June 1933, p. 11,1 July 
1933, p. 16; Creasy. Taped interview, 1991; P. R. O. HO 144/20141/312. Report on the Fascist 
Movement in the United Kingdom, Excluding Northern Ireland. Report No. I. Developments up to the 
end of May 1934; Beavan. Taped interview; F. T.. Taped interview. 
229 E-D. P. 2 July 1934, p. 16,4 June 1935, p. 14; Diss Express (DXJ, 13 July 1934, p. 2; Labour 
Party Fascist Questionnaire. Reply of Ilford Trades Council and Labour Party. LP/FAS/34/107. 
230 The B. U. F. seldom addressed left-wing or working class forums in the region. For rare exceptions 
see $, E 7 September 1935, p. 5; I. B., 5 November 1936, p. 19. 
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family's manufacturing firm at Walthamstow, and Brian Smith, the prominent 
Sheringham Blackshirt employed as a director of Stapley and Smith, the London-based 
textile house. 231 The most notorious senior manager in the region with known 
Mosleyite connections was Edgar Gargett, a director of several East Anglian shipping 
companies, who served briefly as the King's Lynn B. U. F. Branch Organiser in 
1933-1934. Gargett was in his early fifties and was a well known figure in the King's 
Lynn business community, having been a former President of the local Chamber of 
Trade. During the First World War, he had served as a lieutenant in the Royal 
Engineers. 232 
Gargett's resignation from the executive post of the local Blackshirt formation 
was followed by a dramatic and sharp fall from grace. In January 1935, at King's Lynn 
petty sessions, he was convicted of tobacco smuggling through the port and was given 
the option of either a fine of £2,227 10s. (with 50 guineas costs) or six months in 
prison. 233 It would appear that he served a sentence at Wakefield Prison. 234 Early in 
February 1935, Grimston petty sessions fined Gargett a further £50 for being found in 
possession of an unlicensed spirits sti11.235 Just over a year later, Gargett appeared 
before Grimston justices to account for his failure to pay the latter fine. Gargett's 
explanation was that, after serving his prison sentence for tobacco smuggling, his 
reduced income of two pounds per week prevented him from paying off the fine at the 
stipulated rate of ten pounds per month. The justices accepted Gargett's offer of 
monthly repayments of ten shillings and adjourned the case for six months to allow him 
to pursue a position in a dam construction project in Egypt. 236 
231 RW.. Completed questionnaire; RW.. F. O. M. taped interview; Home Office Advisory Committee 
(HOAC) Report. Brian Smith. 20 August 1940; E. D. P"_ 10 December 1935, p. 14. Smith became 
chairman of the company on 20 November 1935. 
232 LNP5 December 1933, p. 7,21 April 1936, p. 12; E-D-P., 2 January 1934, p. 6; Blackshirt 
263 2 March 1934, p. 4. 
1, N"P 29 January 1935, p. 1. 
234 Ibid., 21 April 1936, p. 12. 
235 Ibid., 5 February 1935, p. 1. 
236 Ibid., 21 April 1936, p. 12. 
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Representatives from the higher professions joined the regional B. U. F. too. 
Information sent to the Board of Deputies in 1939 revealed that an Ilford resident 
named Michael Frederick Cahill, a solicitor practising in the City of London, was 
"prominently connected with the Fascist Party". 237 Cahill was also thought to act as an 
official conduit for channelling financial donations from abroad into the B. U. F.. 
Another recruit from the upper occupational ranks was Dr. F. N. Bray, a medical 
practitioner, who lived at Woodford Green in Essex. A latecomer to the B. U. F., Bray 
joined the Epping District as a non-active member on 14 September 1939.238 From 
time to time, professionals also advertised their services in the B. U. F. press. In 1938, 
for example, "G", an unemployed Leytonstone accountant, and a dentist based in 
Forest Gate, both appealed for work in the classified columns of Action. 239 
A number of Mosleyite entrepreneurs provided further elite backing for the 
Blackshirt movement in the three counties. Most of those identified were prominent 
local landowners with a strong public commitment to the B. U. F. cause, such as 
Dorothy, Viscountess Downe, Dorothy Sherston, and Ronald Creasy. The Norfolk J. P. 
and Deputy Lieutenant, Colonel Henry Albert Barclay, was another landed fascist. 
Barclay, the owner of Hanworth Hall, which was situated in the north of the county, 
joined the B. U. F. in May 1934.240 Furthermore, George Baerselman, proprietor of the 
Mount Liell Hotel at Westcliff-on-Sea in Essex, advertised his establishment in the 
Blackshirt press as a "STRICTLY NON-JEWISH" concern. 241 
237 B. D. B. J. C6/10/32. F. Austin, General Cabinet Manufacturer (Leyton ), Argall Avenue, Lea 
Bridge Estate, London, E. 10. Letter and enclosure to Cyril Picciotto, 3, Elm Court, London, E. C. 4.24 
February 1939. Cahill had offices at 89, Charterhouse in the City of London and lived at 8, Beaufort 
Gardens, Ilford. He was understood to have been previously employed as a solicitor for the London 
Cooperative Society. 
238 Epping B. U. F. Membership Cards. According to the last District Leader at Epping, three medical 
doctors belonged to the local formation. L. B.. Completed questionnaire for Andrew Mitchell, 1993. 
239 Action, 23 July 1938, p. 19,6 August 1938, p. 19. In June 1934, the Norwich Labour Party 
reported that a former member of the Board of Guardians, who worked as an accountant in the city, 
was associated with the local B. U. F.. See Labour Party Fascist Questionnaire. Reply of Norwich 
Labour Party. LP/FAS/34/191. Henry Mole, the District Treasurer at Leytonstone, was also believed to 
be an accountant. E. G.. Telephone interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1993. 
240 Norfolk Chronicle _ 27 July 
1934, p. 7; Kelly's Directory of Norfolk 1929 (London: Kelly's 
Directories, 1929), p. 173; Kelly's Directory of Norfolk 193 ; p. 176. 24lActio 29 July 1939, p. 15. According to Baerselman, the Mount Liell Hotel was "entirely 
gentile" and offered the most modern accommodation in Westcliff. See Kelly's Directory of Essex 
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7. Women and the B. U. F. 
Although the B. U. F. was identified with `masculine' values, such as struggle, 
action and heroism, from its inception the movement made a concerted effort to recruit 
female members. The Blackshirt appeal to women was an uneasy amalgam of 
conservative and progressive ideas, ranging from "an unashamed `traditionalism' to a 
form of `fascist feminism"'. 242 However, the central thrust of B. U. F. thinking posited 
the `natural' affinity between women and the domestic sphere. Mosleyite propaganda 
claimed that liberal democracy had failed women in a number of ways. Parliament, it 
was alleged, gave no effective representation to recently-enfranchised housewives and 
mothers, mainly because the legislature had little interest in `female issues', such as 
childcare, education and health. Furthermore, the B. U. F. asserted that male 
unemployment or low wages had driven many women and children onto the labour 
market to supplement meagre household incomes. 243 
Under a future Blackshirt government, wives, women housekeepers and female 
domestic servants were to be given their own Corporation, which would not only 
facilitate consultation with the executive on matters of concern but also protect and 
promote the important `female' roles of childrearing and home-making. In addition, 
B. U. F. literature declared that fascist economic policy, by eradicating low wages and 
job shortages, would give more women the option to choose married life at home. 
With better paid and more plentiful work, male breadwinners could support their 
families on one income, and their spouses would not be pressured into employment to 
help make ends meet. At the same time, the Blackshirt movement attempted to counter 
opponents' claims that fascism wished to shackle women to motherhood and the home 
by pointing to more radical proposals. The B. U. F. insisted that, under fascist rule, 
women would be free to pursue the career of their choice on the basis of `equal pay for 
equal work', subject only to talent, physical capacity and national need. Moreover, 
1937. p. 782. 
242 Martin Durham, `Gender and the British Union of Fascists', Journal of Contemporary History. 
Vol. 27, No. 3 (1992), p. 517. See also M. Durham, Women and Fascism, Chapter Two. 
243 Mosley, The Greater Britain pp. 40-42; A. Brock Griggs. Women and Fascism (L)ndon: B. U. F. 
Publications, n. d. ), p. 2. 
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working women would be entitled to the occupational franchise and would receive 
more effective representation through the Corporate State. The obstacles faced by 
employed females were to be overcome by fascist initiatives to end sexual 
discrimination, introduce `equal pay for equal work' and ban the practice of sacking 
women once they were married. A B. U. F. `Charter of Labour' also called for maternity 
leave on full pay, provisionally for four months. 244 
Blackshirt writers argued that these changes, in conjunction with B. U. F. 
economic reforms, would increase national prosperity and protect working women. 
The male unemployment and wage undercutting attributed to the existence of a 
growing female labour force were to be removed by raising pay, expanding job 
opportunities and remunerating women at the same rates as men. Finally, the Corporate 
State would give female employees a meaningful voice and establish the machinery to 
improve their pay and conditions. 
However, this progressive strand in Blackshirt policy has to be kept in 
perspective. B. U. F. pamphlets explicitly stated that, although there would be jobs for 
all those wishing to work, "we regard the home as the best place for women". 245 The 
national leadership was a male bastion which encouraged the preservation of 
`appropriate' gender roles, and influential members of the fascist elite, such as A. K. 
Chesterton and Raven Thomson, endorsed Mosley's call for "men who are men and 
women who are women". 246 Furthermore, female Blackshirts held a variety of 
opinions across the traditional-feminist spectrum and were, in any event, outnumbered 
approximately three or four to one by their male counterparts, who usually subscribed 
to a patriarchal ordering of society. 
The small number of female Mosleyites in the sample precludes a conclusive 
investigation into the social characteristics of women associated with the regional 
244 A. Raven Thomson, The Corporate State (London: B. U. F. Publications, n. d. ), pp. 43-44; A. 
Raven Thomson, The Coming Corporate State (London: Action Press, 1937), p. 29 and p. 32; Griggs, 
scism. pp. 2-8. 
A. Freeman, We Fight For Freedom (London: B. U. F. Publications, 1936), p. 32. 
246 Mosley, The Greater Britain pp. 40-41; Durham, `Gender and the British Union of Fascists', pp. 
522-523. 
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B. U. F.. 247 Nonetheless, an examination of the 30 individuals concerned reveals several 
interesting features. Firstly, as a number of previously unmentioned examples illustrate, 
the B. U. F. was able to attract women across the social and occupational range in the 
eastern counties. Lady Esther Makgill (nee Bromley), who resided at Yaxley Hall near 
Eye in Suffolk, was another local fascist drawn from the upper middle or elite ranks of 
society. 248 The wife of baronet Sir Donald Makgill, she apparently launched the 
B. U. F. 's Women's Section in March 1933 and became its Chief Organiser. She also 
organised agricultural meetings for Mosley during the movement's formative 
period. 249 After being suspended from her post because of reported financial 
irregularities within the Section, Makgill severed her connection with the B. U. F. in 
May 1934.250 Several other identified women belonged to the lower middle and middle 
middle class category, including Edna M., a seventeen year old Epping Blackshirt 
employed as a shop manageress, Mrs G., a laundry office supervisor in her mid-thirties 
from Leytonstone, and Miss Walker, a Suffolk typist who advertised for work in the 
B. U. F. press. 251 The most unusual lower class female recruit encountered was a 23 
year old German woman named Maria Gleixner, a dedicated member of the N. S. D. A. P. 
and ardent admirer of Hitler. Having travelled to England in 1936, Gleixner became a 
247 30 female Mosleyites were identified. This group was comprised of a shop assistant, a domestic 
servant, a private foreign language teacher, an estate manager, a laundry office supervisor, a shop 
manageress, a shopkeeper, a telephonist, a secretary, a typist, the Controller of the Daily Mail's 
Women's Canvass Staff, a Post Office clerk, the co-owner of a stationery, printing and chemist's 
business, a guest house proprietor, two landowners, two retired spinsters, ten married 
women/housewives, the sister of a fanner, and the Leader of the B. U. F. 's Women's Section 
(1933-1934). 
248 T. U. C. General Council Research Department, `Fascism in Great Britain' (21 February 1934), p. 
9. Born in February 1905, Esther Lilian Bromley was the younger daughter of the 6th Baronet Sir 
Robert Bromley. He had served as Assistant Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
(Joseph Chamberlain) between 1901 and 1903. She married Sir Donald Makgill, the 12th Baronet of 
Makgill, on 5 July 1927. See Burke's Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Peerage Baronetage 
-A V-1, fn (London: Burke's Peerage, 1970), p. 365 and p. 1727. 
249 David Pryce-Jones, Unity Mitford: A Quest (London: Phoenix Giants, 1995), p. 72. 
250 Lady Makgill, `Women, Home, And Country', The Age of Plen :A Journal of the New Politics, 
Vol. II, No. 1 (1934), p. 13; P. R. O. HO 144/20140/112. Special Branch Report on the B. U. F.. 1 May 
1934. 
251 D. T.. Taped interview; L. B.. Taped interview; E. G.. Taped interview, 1991; Action 11 September 
1937, p. 19. 
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domestic servant at Southend, where she joined the B. U. F.. Eighteen months later, she 
married M. G., a local Blackshirt activist. 252 
Secondly, in line with the overall findings, twelve of the seventeen women 
engaged in paid work were drawn from occupational sub-groups within the lower 
middle and middle middle class category. Two were non-academic professionals, six 
had lower/intermediate white collar jobs, one was a lower grade civil servant, and the 
remaining three were self-employed merchants. Finally, in view of the B. U. F. 's 
patriarchal pronouncements on women and the domestic sphere, it is also interesting to 
note that one-third of the female Mosleyites in the sample were described as 
housewives. In total, seventeen women were married, and, of these, fifteen had 
husbands who were either members or supporters of the B. U. F.. However, a much 
larger female sample would be required in order to determine with any degree of 
precision whether these biases towards lower middle and middle middle class 
occupations, home-making, marriage, and pro-fascist partners were in fact typical. 
8. Youth and the B. U. F. 
Mosley's movement also deliberately appealed to the young. The Blackshirts 
maintained that national resurgence could only be achieved by emulating the selfless 
example of the `war generation' and by ousting their discredited elders from political 
power. 253 It was hoped that this would encourage British youth to identify with the 
sacrifices made by the servicemen of 1914-1918 and join the struggle for the latter's 
`new society'. Mosleyite propaganda created the image of an organisation which 
faithfully reflected the spirit and hopes of the fallen in order to bind surviving 
ex-servicemen and the young closer together in their quest to fulfil the peacetime 
mission of the war dead. According to the B. U. F., the country could only be restored 
by an ex-service-youth alliance that would sweep the `old gang' aside. B. U. F. 
252 M. G.. Telephone interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1993; SI. 15 December 1937, p. 3. 
253 See for example Mosley, The Greater Britain; A. K. Chesterton, Portrait of a Leader (London: 
Action Press, 1937). 
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publications proclaimed that the new `fascist men', drawn from the war generation and 
the young, were imbued with the Blackshirt tenets of discipline, loyalty, vigour, 
patriotism, determination and spartan morality to combat the enervating forces of 
conservatism, the dead-weight of orthodoxy, and the `decadence' of bourgeois society. 
Unsullied by the mistakes and thinking of the past, the B. U. F. aimed to produce "not 
only a new system of government but also a new type of man who differs from the 
politicians from the old world as men from another planet". 254 
Certain other features of the movement accentuated its youth orientation. Of 
the 84 senior Blackshirts in Mandle's sample with recorded ages, 57 were under 40 in 
1935, including Mosley, Francis Hawkins, Raven Thomson and William Joyce. Just 
under twenty per cent of all 103 had not yet reached 30.255 A similar pattern emerged 
from an investigation of the movement's prospective parliamentary candidates. The 
ages of 55 would-be Blackshirt M. P. s were ascertained and, of these, 37 were under 40 
in 1937 and fourteen were in their twenties. 256 Young adherents were to be catered for 
by the establishment of a B. U. F. Youth Movement in July 1936. This was divided into 
a Fascist Youth Division for nine to fourteen year olds and a Blackshirt Cadet Division 
for the fourteen to eighteen age range. 257 The emphasis placed on uniforms, activism, 
marches, rallies, athleticism and the like was also designed to attract the young and set 
the B. U. F. apart from the `lacklustre' and `lethargic' world of mainstream 
parliamentary politics. 
Two earlier studies of the B. U. F. 's membership, based on small samples of 
surviving ex-Blackshirts, reinforce the impression that Mosley's recruits tended to be 
young. Eighty per cent of Brewer's fifteen former members had joined by the time they 
were 30, and Cullen's survey of 43 ex-fascists found that the average entry age was 
just under 21, with only five per cent enrolling after their 30th birthday. 258 However, 
254 Oswald Mosley. Quoted in Cross, The Fascists in Britain p. 57. 
255 modle, 'The Leadership of the British Union of Fascists', p. 361. 
256 Ibid., pp. 370-383. 
257 Bam, 18 July 1936, p. 3,28 November 1936, p. 7. 
258 Brewer, Mosley's Men, p. 7; Cullen, `The British Union of Fascists', pp. 48-50. Neither Rawnsley 
nor Linehan analysed the age distribution of their samples. 
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these findings need to be treated with caution. Both Brewer and Cullen's samples were 
extremely small and thus could not be considered representative of either the west 
Midlands B. U. F. or the national movement. Furthermore, since only younger 
Blackshirts could still come forward to participate in these projects, the youthful fascist 
element was probably overrepresented in relation to the actual age distribution of the 
membership. 
In order to produce a more extensive analysis for the `East Anglian' B. U. F., the 
ages of 104 members of the Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex sample were ascertained by 
consulting the previously discussed oral and documentary sources. The results, given in 
Table 4, suggest that, although the regional movement was composed primarily of 
adherents under 30, Mosley's appeal spanned the generations and a significant minority 
developed fascist leanings after, rather than during, their formative years. This 
highlights yet another pitfall of relying exclusively on tiny samples of surviving 
ex-Blackshirts to draw conclusions about the social characteristics of B. U. F. members 
or supporters. 
TABLE 4 
AGE OF 104 B. U. F. MEMBERS OR SUPPORTERS IN NORFOLK, 
SUFFOLK AND ESSEX, 1933-1940 
Age 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ 
Number 21 44 17 12 46 
Just under two-thirds of the `East Anglian' Mosleyites from the sample with 
identifiable ages (65) had ya to reach 30. Most of these (44) were in their twenties, the 
remainder (21) falling into the ten-nineteen age band. Some were extremely young. 
A. D. and B. M. became B. U. F sympathisers at Epping aged eleven and fifteen 
respectively, and Donald P. joined the same District as a fourteen year old. 259 Another 
259 A. D.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991; B. M.. Taped interview with Andrew 
Mitchell, 1993; L. B.. Taped interview, N. B.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
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youthful recruit was Denis Horst, a seventeen year old Walthamstow Blackshirt 
employed as a clerk. 260 A number of those who enrolled in their twenties have not 
been mentioned previously in this study. These include Francis Jermy, a 22 year old 
footman attached to the Norwich District, 27 year old Hilda Bellamy, the wife of 
Richard Bellamy, Ivy Futter, a 24 year old married woman from Great Yarmouth, and 
Francis Holland, a teacher from West Ham in his late twenties. 261 
Despite the obvious emphasis on youth, almost 40 per cent of the 104 
Mosleyites under scrutiny were aged 30 or over. A few of these have not appeared in 
earlier chapters, such as Mrs. O. W., a 31 year old farmer's wife, who joined the Eye 
B. U. F. as an activist in 1939, and the Leytonstone member Richard Boughton, a hire 
purchase debt tracer in his early thirties. 262 Another in this category was Reginald 
Swift, a street market trader with a history of mental instability, who undertook 
political work for the B. U. F. in West Ham. In 1938, at the age of 36, Swift committed 
suicide by jumping from an upstairs window of his Forest Gate home. 263 The senior 
age bands also include the Woodford carpenter George M., a trade union organiser and 
former Labour Party supporter. He became a Blackshirt in c. 1936 at the age of 48.2M 
Among the region's oldest B. U. F. stalwarts were the Cross sisters, two retired 
spinsters in their sixties from south-west Essex. Both women were disillusioned 
Conservatives who joined the movement because of its patriotic and dynamic image. 265 
260 £E.. 15 September 1939, p. 14. 
261 Francis Jermy. F. O. M. taped interview, 1989; Hilda Bellamy. F. O. M. taped interview, n. d.; 
Y_, 1 12 May 1934, p. 5; ýy Herald 13 March 1941, P. 3. 
262 Q. W.. Completed questionnaire for Andrew Mitchell, 1993; D. T.. Taped interview. 
263 SXL. 23 September 1938, p. 11. 
264 D. T.. Taped interview. 
265 LB. Taped interview; N. B.. Taped interview. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
`WE MARCHED WITH MOSLEY': INVESTIGATING THE MOTIVATIONS 
OF LOCAL B. U. F. MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS IN ESSEX, NORFOLK 
AND SUFFOLK, 1933-1940 
1. Introduction 
Any serious study of the regional B. U. F. has to address the contentious issue of 
motivation, and it is in this context that recorded interviews with surviving participants 
have the potential to illustrate why many were drawn to the Blackshirt movement. 
However, mindful of A. J. P. Taylor's caustic dismissal of oral history as little more than 
"Old men drooling about their youth", from the outset, it must be recognised that there 
are a number of problems associated with this approach. 1 Oral sources lack 
contemporaneity and rely, to a greater or lesser degree, on hindsight. These limitations 
can present a number of difficulties. Recollections may be flawed due to memory loss, 
particularly with regard to dates, names and sequences of events. Moreover, the act of 
remembering a specific period of one's life is influenced by, and percolates through, a 
person's subsequent experience. Thus, the end result is not a direct encounter with the 
past but rather a distillation of the past and the present. Furthermore, interviewees may 
give an inaccurate or partial account when discussing a sensitive subject, either to 
rationalise decisions made or to justify actions taken. The interviewer's role in this 
process is not without its pitfalls too. Selection of an unrepresentative sample of 
informants can seriously distort the picture that emerges. The mere presence of an 
outsider may affect how an interviewee recalls the past and talks about it. Oral 
historians also need to guard against `leading' an eyewitness in a specific direction 
through poorly constructed or narrowly focused questions, which tap no more than a 
fraction of that individual's relevant knowledge. 2" 
Having noted these drawbacks, careful examination of oral sources can still 
furnish the historian with a valuable insight into the appeal of Mosleyite fascism. Paul 
1 A. J. P. Taylor. Quoted in B. Harrison, 'Oral History and Recent Political History', Oral History. Vol. 
1, No. 3 (1972), p. 46. 
2 J. Tosh, The Pursuit of History (London: Longman, 1991), Chapter Ten. 
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Thompson, a leading advocate of `history by word of mouth', states that oral testimony 
has the indispensable capacity to reveal the subjective perceptions of the respondent, 
because an individual's memory of the past is filtered through a complex web of private 
attitudes, hopes and beliefs. 3 Consequently, the process of recollection invests 
`external' reality with highly personal interpretations to produce history which "is not 
just about events, or structures, or patterns of behaviour but also about how these are 
experienced and remembered in the imagination". 4 Hence, even allowing for the fact 
that public revulsion and the failure of fascism must have coloured the views of 
Blackshirts who lived through the post-war decades, personal reminiscences help to 
identify not only an individual's values and opinions but also how they interact with the 
outside world, thereby divulging the links between the private and public spheres. 5 
In addition, other arguments made in defence of oral history can be used to 
support the recording and analysis of testimony from former Blackshirts or B. U. F. 
sympathisers. Firstly, many of the social constraints and pressures preventing the open 
disclosure of information weaken with the passage of time, which can often make old 
age a period of candid reflection. 6 Secondly, any memory loss tends to occur during 
and immediately after the experience in question, rather than later on in life. In any 
case, this deterioration is usually marginal if the interviewee regards an event as 
significant. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the oral history method often 
provides the only means of recreating an aspect of the past which has been overlooked 
by conventional written sources.? 
Students working in the late twentieth century face obvious obstacles when 
trying to locate the Mosleyites of the 1930s, due to the years that have elapsed and the 
3 P. Thompson, The Voice of the Past: Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 
101-149. 
4 Ibid., p. 139. 
5 J. D. Brewer, `Looking Back at Fascism: A Phenomenological Analysis of B. U. F. Membership', The. 
Sl Revi Vol. 32, No. 4 (1984), pp. 742-760. 
See for example J. Steinhoff, P. Pechel and D. Showalter, Voices from the Third Reich: An Oral 
Histm (London: Grafton Books, 1991). 
1 Thompson, The Voice of the Past_ pp. 101-149. See also P. Thompson, The Edwardian: The 
RC, y, aking of British SocjM (London: Routledge, 1992). 
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near-universal opprobrium attached to fascism since 1945. In spite of these difficulties, 
21 individuals formally or informally connected with the British Union in Norfolk, 
Suffolk and Essex were contacted. Of these, thirteen consented to be interviewed. 8 The 
resulting taped conversations were supplemented by recordings of five deceased former 
Blackshirts, which were generously made available by Stephen Cullen and the 
Mosleyite veterans' association, Friends of Oswald Mosley (F. O. M. ). 9 This oral 
material clearly indicates how respondents' perceptions and experiences contributed to 
their fascist outlook and, therefore, forms the basis of the present investigation. 
Moreover, these eye-witness accounts were used in conjunction with a range of 
relevant written primary sources, such as memoirs, letters and questionnaires, detailing 
an additional four B. U. F. careers. 10 In total, the sample contained twenty-two 
Mosleyites - three from Norfolk, three from Suffolk and sixteen from Essex. 
The stated grounds for joining or supporting the `East Anglian' movement can 
be set in perspective in two ways. Firstly, they may be measured against the 
impressionistic views of contemporary B. U. F. and non-fascist commentators to see if 
common themes emerge. Secondly, the justifications of the Essex, Norfolk and Suffolk 
group may be compared with those of a further 75 ex-Blackshirts or sympathisers from 
other regions in England. I I This `national' collection of B. U. F. life histories, the largest 
ever assembled, provides another valuable yardstick by which to gauge the motives of 
the fascists from the eastern counties. Nevertheless, since the scattered evidence 
8 Thirteen `East Anglian' Mosleyites were interviewed by the author. Two of these, Frederic Ball and 
Eric Pleasants, consented on condition that their reminiscences were not tape recorded. Eight of those 
approached declined to participate in this study. 9 It should be noted that Friends of Oswald Mosley (F. O. M. ), although extremely helpful to academic 
researchers, has an obvious revisionist agenda. For this reason, the four oral testimonies supplied by 
this organisation were checked for consistency against other taped or written accounts produced by the 
same `East Anglian' Mosleyites, either for the author or Stephen Cullen. 
10 This written material included detailed questionnaires completed for Stephen Cullen by Kenneth T. 
Dutfield, Derrick Millington and R. W. Ratcliffe. George Hoggarth's short memoir `The Essex 
Farmworker' in L. Wise (ed. ), Mosley's Blackshirts: The Inside Story of the British Union of Fascists 
1932- (London: Sanctuary Press, 1986) was also consulted. 
1 This `national' sample was compiled with the help of Stephen Cullen, Stuart Rawnsley, Martin 
Durham and F. O. M., who all generously made available taped or written memoirs of former B. U. F. 
members or supporters. 
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available precludes an analysis of truly representative provincial or national membership 
samples, the findings in this chapter have to be seen as illustrative rather than definitive. 
2. Contemporary Views on Fascist Motivation 
From the outset, Mosley and his lieutenants put forward a variety of opinions to 
explain why some people responded positively to the fascist message. A chief aide, 
W. E. D. Allen, emphasised the B. U. F. 's ability to attract both patriots and radicals: 
... 
Fascism appeals alike to those elements among the younger 
minded middle class who are conservative by temperament 
and strongly nationalist in spirit, and to those rarer and more 
dynamic individuals who, naturally revolutionary in their 
outlook, have been disappointed and exasperated by the 
failure of all leadership from the Left to approach any 
fulfilment of their aspirations. 12 
Other senior B. U. F. figures preferred to concentrate on the legacy of World 
War One. A. K. Chesterton, the editor of Blackshirt and then Action in 1937-1938, 
regarded the B. U. F. as the natural refuge of the survivors of the `war generation'. In 
his estimation, ex-servicemen recognised that only the Blackshirts, by championing 
their cause and railing against the post-war parliamentary `betrayal' of the 1914-18 
veterans, were capable of reviving the `classless' social model of the battlefield, with its 
emphasis on duty, self-sacrifice and a collective sense of purpose. Chesterton 
concluded that fascism was the purest expression of the war generation's hopes for 
lasting peace and economic security: "... those of the war-generations who believed that 
they fought for some other purpose than to make Britain a paradise for financial wolves 
and political jackals feel that they owe Mosley a debt of gratitude which not even the 
staunchest service can ever quite repay". 
13 
Mosley concurred with the views expressed above, but envisaged fascism 
principally as a movement of generational revolt against an outdated and bankrupt 
12 James Drennan (pseud. ), R U_F.. Oswald Mosley and British Fascism (London: John Murray, 
1934), p. 22. 
13 A. K. Chesterton, Portrait of a Leader (London: Action Press, 1937), p. 167. 
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party system. 14 The ageing political establishment, he contended, had drifted into war, 
failed to build a `land fit for heroes' after 1918 and, finally, had stumbled into 
depression. For the B. U. F. 's founder, the `old gangs' lacked both the will and the 
imagination to tackle Britain's post-war economic problems. Mosley endeavoured to 
persuade a disillusioned and frustrated younger generation to join the B. U. F., since he 
was convinced that only a fascist youth-ex-service alliance would possess the vision 
and tenacity needed to sweep away discredited institutions and create the elusive `new 
society': "... the enemy is the old gang of our present political system. No matter what 
their political label, the old parliamentarians have proved themselves to be all the same. 
The real political division of the present decade is not a division of parties but a 
division of generations". 15 
However, in his memoirs, Mosley appeared to suggest that the trappings and 
spectacle of fascism also garnered support: 
Most of them were very like members of the Labour Party 
in the days when I was first a member, when it still suffered 
ostracism and persecution. They liked dressing up and 
having bands and banners, just as the miners did at the 
Durham gala; symbols which were then anathema to the 
shy middle-class with its public school inhibitions, though 
recruits from their ranks were soon infected with the gay 
panache of which, in England, East London is the spiritual 
home. 16 
Outside the B. U. F. ranks too, a diverse range of contemporary ideas circulated 
on the issue of fascist motivation. In 1934, the right-wing Saturday Review explained 
that many youthful Tories were becoming Blackshirts because they had lost faith in 
both Baldwin's staid Conservatism and the National Government's policies relating to 
defence and imperial affairs. Consequently, the "wholesome and manly reaction of 
young Conservatives from official Conservatism is sweeping our youth into this form 
of protest". 17 Labour presumed that young people in particular were being deceived 
14 See for example Oswald Mosley, The Greater Britain (London: B. U. F. Publications, 1932). 
15 Ibid., p. 15. 
16 Oswald Mosley, My Life (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1970), p. 306. 
17 `Portent of the Blackshirts', Saturday Review_ 5 May 1934, p. 499. 
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"by the assurances of the Fascists that they were aiming to obtain power by 
constitutional means, and by the concern they expressed for decisive measures to 
combat economic depression". 18 
Several left-wing commentators of the 1930s also sought to locate the 
attractions of fascism in an economic context. Writing for The New Statesman and 
Nation in 1933, Kingsley Martin identified the failure of capitalism to create 
employment and distribute goods as vital preconditions for fascist success. In his view, 
fascism served a middle class agenda by resorting to crude nationalism, 
authoritarianism and violence in defence of propertied interests. 19 W. A. Rudlin in TM 
Growth of Fascism in Great Britain speculated that, as the crisis of capitalism 
deepened, different social groups would go over to the B. U. F.. 20 One by one, 
unorganised labour, skilled workers, the petit bourgeoisie and the professional middle 
class would succumb due to economic vulnerability and disenchantment with the 
faltering political system. In the final phase, according to Rudlin, industrialists, 
financiers and landowners would seek to use the Blackshirt movement to prop up the 
capitalist system, defend their privileged position and combat the `menace' of 
socialism. 
H. N. Brailsford's analysis indicated that three trends favoured the growth of 
fascism in England. 21 Firstly, he sensed that, as the young were losing their Puritan 
inhibitions, they might embrace "the externalism, the drama, the pageantry, the shoddy 
emotionalism of fascism". 22 Moreover, the present generation, raised under coalition 
and minority governments, had no experience of, nor any respect for, the tradition of 
stable two party parliamentary government. Finally, the capitalist middle class had 
abandoned its free trade beliefs and was now demanding firm state action to secure 
18 National Council of Labour and the Co-operative Union, Statement on Fascism at Home and 
Abroad (London: National Council of Labour and the Co-operative Union, August 1934), p. 16. 
K. Martin, `Can England Escape? ', The New Statesman and Nation_ 13 May 1933, pp. 592-593. 
20 W. A. Rudlin, The Growth of Fascism in Great Britain (London: Allen and Unwin, 1935), pp. 
116-136. 
21 H. N. Brailsford, `Fascism in England', New Republic . 22 August 1934, pp. 42-43. 22 Ibid., p. 42. 
430 
profits, prices and debt repayments. Taken together, Brailsford thought that these 
changes were encouraging a fascist atmosphere in the country. 
Some contemporary observers singled out a perceived link between the young 
and the B. U. F.. In January 1934, a Spectator article entitled `Youth and the Politicians' 
propounded that a key aspect of Mosley's appeal derived from his ability to tap the 
support of the frustrated young in a society dominated by the old and middle-aged. 23 
The B. U. F. offered a disciplined corporate lifestyle at a time of contracting job 
opportunities for school-leavers and university graduates and held out the `exciting' 
prospect of physical confrontation with communists and socialists. It was also claimed 
that Mosley's determined bid to mobilise British youth stood in stark contrast to the 
indifference exhibited by the mainstream parties. Neglected by the political 
establishment, younger people were prepared "to lend a ready ear to any leader who 
shows himself conscious of youth's existence and proclaims that it has a part to play in 
the construction of a better world than the one it was born in". 24 Three months later, 
an eye-witness account of Mosley's April 1934 meeting at the Albert Hall, noted how 
younger males, who may not have clearly understood the fascist programme, were fired 
by the B. U. F. 's stirring call to action. 25 Such devotees joined Mosley's organisation 
because "they saw in it something to which they could dedicate themselves and which, 
above all, would redeem life for them from its terrible tedium". 26 
Journalistic surveys which appeared in the mid-1930s often focused on the 
relationship between fascism and anti-Semitism. An article on this subject in The New 
Statesman and Nation in 1936 maintained that the B. U. F. 's hostility to Jews could win 
over "politically uneducated and unaffiliated people in the East End [of London], 
including a large body of Catholics, who are particularly easy victims of anti-Semitic 
propaganda... "27 A month later, the same publication aired the views of Harry Roberts, 
23 `Youth and the Politicians', The S tor_ 26 January 1934, pp. 108-109. 
24 Ibid., p. 108. 
25 R Bernays, `Fascism and the Answer', The Spectator, 27 April 1934, pp. 652-653. 
26 Ibid., p. 652. 
27 K. Martin, `Fascism and the Jews', The New Statesman and Nation , 10 October 1936, pp. 496-497. 
431 
a doctor living in the Mile End. Roberts discerned that, in east London, both the Jew's 
determination to preserve a distinct `code of etiquette' and their links with the region's 
communist movement gave the Blackshirts the chance to exploit the prejudices of local 
Gentiles. 28 
Another approach was to stress the heterogeneous nature of the B. U. F. 's 
appeal. Round Table's assessment of the Blackshirt movement commented that 
"Something had been included for every palate, however jaded" to ensure that 
members "should be drawn from all parties and from none". 29 Thus, recruits included 
small shopkeepers and pensioners, who saw fascism as a means of holding socialism in 
check, young people seduced by the B. U. F. 's novelty, admirers of Mosley's leadership, 
who were disgusted by the corruption and lethargy of the party politicians, and those 
wishing to protest against the radical left-wing plans advocated by Sir Stafford Cripps. 
From the vantage point of 1936, Robert Bernays also portrayed the B. U. F. as a 
`catch-all' organisation. 30 Lacking parliamentary constraints, Mosley was able to gain 
adherents because he effectively articulated the concerns of various discontented 
groups including tithe-payers, east London Gentiles and those living in distressed areas. 
One source of the Blackshirt leader's success, Bernays alleged, was his tactic of 
personalising problems in terms of "the sweating Jewish employer, the international 
banker, or the crafty politician on the make". 31 
According to Lionel Birch's 1937 analysis, most Mosleyites fell into one of 
four categories - the ex-officer, the pugilist, the public school/university `hearty' or the 
altruist. 32 Given this broad range of recruits, it followed that the attraction of the 
B. U. F. operated at several levels: 
The Fascist movement... starts by appealing to young men 
and women to give, to serve, to sacrifice, to dedicate 
28 H. Roberts, `Jew and Blackshirt in the East End', The New Statesman and Nation_ 7 November 
1936, pp. 698-699. 
29 `The Blackshirts', Round Table_ September 1934, pp. 717-731. 
30 R. Bernays, `The Future of British Fascism', The Spectator, 18 December 1936, pp. 1075-1076. 
31 Ibid., p. 1075. 
32 L. Birch, Why They Join the Fascists (London: People's Press, 1937), pp. 9-10. 
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themselves to the duty of restoring the honour of their country. 
In return it offers them a uniform plus the feeling of unity and 
strength, the opportunity to be disciplined, and the right to 
discipline, the licence to boss others, the privilege of living 
close to the Holy of Holies of a new God. It offers to women 
riddance from the advice of feminists and intellectuals, and 
to men it promises removal from them of all tedious responsibility 
so that they may devote their whole time to the business of 
looking virile. To its non-uniformed supporters the Fascist 
movement offers a simplified solution for the bewildering 
problems of the present day, i. e. love, honour and obey 
Mosley. Be strong. Get rid of Jews. 33 
In 1946, Frederick Mullally, an anti-fascist journalist, created the fictional 
character of `Peter Fletcher' to personify a stereotypical Blackshirt. 34 Fletcher, the 
seventeen year old middle class son of a Catholic civil servant, was educated at 
Clapham Academy and now had a job at the Britannia Electric Works. He opted for the 
B. U. F. because of the uniform, the gang mentality and the romantic lure of belonging 
to a political movement which challenged many British traditions. Fletcher's parents 
and friends had also contributed to his decision by passing on their negative attitudes 
towards the Jews and the working class. Nevertheless, Mullally conceded that Fletcher 
epitomised only one kind of young fascist and that disparate groups were drawn to 
Mosley's organisation. 35 
3. The Motivations of the Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex Sample 
Just as interested commentators of the 1930s were unable to agree on the 
reasons why people turned to Mosley, the East Anglian sample also presented an array 
of motives to rationalise their fascist allegiances. 
(a) `Britain First' and Empire patriotism 
The twin patriotic themes of `Britain First' and defence of the Empire proved 
irresistible for some regional adherents, including Frederic ('Eric') A. Ball, who 
33 Ibid., p. 17. 
34 F. Mullally, Fascism Inside England (London: Claud Morris Books, 1946), Chapter 1. 
35 Ibid., `Author's Note' opposite p. 7 and p. 25. 
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co-founded the Chingford B. U. F. Branch as an eighteen year old in October 1933.36 
The son of a Bank of England employee, Ball enjoyed a comfortable middle class 
upbringing at 42, King's Head Hill, Chingford and was educated locally at St. George 
Monoux Grammar School. After matriculating at seventeen, he took up a clerical 
position at the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in the capital. 
Heeding the example of his staunch, though non-active, Conservative family, 
Ball first developed Tory political leanings. During the 1931 General Election, he had 
delivered leaflets on behalf of Winston Churchill, the sitting M. P. for the Epping 
division. His Conservatism, however, did not amount to much more than a personal 
admiration for Churchill's `die-hard' stance on imperial issues. Ball eventually 
disassociated himself from the Tory Party in 1933 because he felt that Baldwin and the 
Conservative leadership were resigned to the break-up of the British Empire: 
"The Tories had no idea how to preserve the Empire. They just seemed to let it go bit 
by bit. They had no backbone, no vision. They just washed their hands of it. I couldn't 
agree with this at all. Baldwin and the rest of the `high-ups' were giving away India and 
were cold ihouldering Churchill over the Indian issue". 37 
Shortly afterwards, a conversation with the B. U. F. newspaper seller in 
Chingford, Oliver Mathews, the first local Branch Organiser, convinced Ball that only 
Mosley's policies could protect the British Empire from disintegration. A visit to 
Germany in September 1934 strengthened his attachment to the fascist creed. The 
teenager returned full of praise for the way in which the Nazis had cut unemployment 
and raised the standard of living. 
Ball quickly became a Blackshirt activist and was subsequently appointed 
District Treasurer (1935) and District Leader (1936-1938) at Epping. In 1938, he 
twice stood as a B. U. F. candidate in the local elections at Chingford and was also made 
County Volunteer Transport Organiser for the movement. His other official duties 
included auditing B. U. F. accounts and serving as County Propaganda Officer for 
36 F. Ball. Interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
37 ibid. 
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Essex. Ball's public identification with the Blackshirt cause led to his internment in July 
1940. Following his release in September 1941, Ball served in the Royal Navy until 
1946 and was then re-employed by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. Anxious not 
to jeopardise his job in the early post-war period, he decided against joining the Union 
Movement, despite remaining sympathetic to Mosley's ideas. 
For the Norfolk-born footman, Francis Jenny, then aged 22, becoming a 
Norwich Blackshirt in 1937 reaffirmed the patriotic values he had absorbed as a 
child. 38 Jermy's Conservative voting parents had moved from Pulham St. Mary in 
Norfolk to Walton in Suffolk during his formative years to take over as the tenant 
proprietors of a small hotel. In his new surroundings, Jermy was influenced by an 
ex-naval schoolmaster who constantly extolled the virtues of patriotism and the British 
Empire to his pupils: 
I went to the local council school and the schoolmaster 
there was an ex-naval man and he [espoused] nationalism. 
On Empire Day, he used to walk by and salute the flag. 
We would have a naval commander come along or some 
- army officer come along and talk to us about the greatness 
of the British Empire. We were always drummed in that 
when we were at school, and I liked it. It sounded good 
to me. 39 
Jenny remained politically uncommitted until the mid-1930s when the Italian 
invasion of Abyssinia brought the B. U. F. 's `Mind Britain's Business' platform to his 
attention. He began buying fascist literature on a regular basis and, over a period of 
months, came to endorse the Blackshirt programme. The nationalistic viewpoint 
instilled in him at school underlay his decision to enrol: 
I thought well this is for me. It speaks my language, the 
language that I was brought up at school with. Mosley 
did not make me a Blackshirt. I was born a Blackshirt 
before Mosley ever came ... All 
he was doing was pedalling 
my thinking. Yes it's true. My schoolmaster-brought 
me up with the Union Jack and the flag waving and the 
38 Francis Jermy. F. O. M. taped interview, 1989; Francis Jenny. Taped interview with Stephen Cullen, 
1985. 
39 Jenny. F. O. M. taped interview. 
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great British Empire and all the rest of it. When I looked 
round in life the only man I could find who was doing 
what I wanted to be done was Oswald Mosley. 40 
In 1938, Jermy obtained a butler's post in Kidderminster and transferred to the 
local B. U. F. formation. He eventually became District Leader at Kidderminster, a 
position he retained until he was conscripted into the Royal Army Medical Corp in 
1940. Shortly afterwards, in the June of that year, Jermy was interned under DR 18B 
(IA). He was not released until June 1943. This experience did not dampen his 
commitment to Mosleyite politics, however, since he joined the Union Movement as 
soon as it was launched. 
Schoolboy patriotism also made the young Chingford Catholic, A. D., receptive 
to fascism. 41 As a ten year old in 1936, A. D. became a B. U. F. sympathiser, and, 
although he was too young to join the Epping District, he was allowed to perform 
small tasks in a semi-official capacity, such as leafleting and setting up pitches for street 
meetings. A. D. enlisted in the army in 1942 and was demobilised five years later. His 
faith in Mosley survived the Second World War, and, after enrolling in the Union 
Movement in 1948, he later sat on several of its policy-making committees. 
Predictably, given his age, A. D. had little understanding of the B. U. F. 's social, 
economic or political aims during the 1930s. Rather, his fascist tendencies were the 
product of an idealised view of the British past: "... my interest came from my 
schoolboy history, of being proud of the Empire, things like that... History in those days 
was really the glories of the British Empire. That was the period that was mostly 
taught... "42 This youthful pride in Britain's imperial heritage was nurtured at local 
Blackshirt meetings, where fascists often played the patriotic card: "Somebody 
glorifying in British history and in British traditions. I found history fascinating - [those 
that] built the Empire.. . The speakers would often go on about the Empire and the 
40 Ibid.. 
41 A. D.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
42 Ibid.. 
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glories of the Empire.. . The economic implications didn't really strike me then. It was 
more romanticism than actual politics at the time". 43 
A. D. 's family background reinforced his B. U. F. loyalties by promoting strong 
anti-war feelings. His father, a printer by trade, had been wounded twice when serving 
in the South Staffordshire Regiment during the First World War and thereafter received 
an army pension for the injuries sustained. To A. D., the personal recollections of the 
events of 1914-1918 passed on by his father seemed to justify the B. U. F. 's `Peace 
Campaign' and added an extra dimension to his fascist outlook: 
My father wasn't afraid of war, but he respected what 
happened in that war.... he was patriotic in that sense, but 
he was really deeply disturbed by the death and suffering 
of the First World War. I think that probably rubbed off 
on me, and I did get caught up on the anti-war feeling. I 
should think [that] was probably as big a motive as any- 
thing eventually, after, like, the glamour. But listening to 
them [B. U. F. speakers] so much the international politics 
was a greater emphasis then rather than the economic in 
a way because [of] the Munich Crisis and things like that. 
I think that's why I didn't like other parties. I did regard 
44 them as war parties.. . pro-war rather than anti-war. 
(b) The Peace Campaign 
Indeed, as a number of scholars have noted, in the later 1930s the B. U. F. 's 
determination to avoid any `unnecessary' European entanglements which could lead to 
war provided the organisation with a fresh appeal. 45 Mosley argued that peace and 
imperial security could be preserved by giving Germany a free hand in eastern Europe 
and returning her former colonies (because British interests were supposedly 
unaffected) and by negotiati a disarmament pact between the four major West 
European nations. 46 
43 Ibid.. 
44 Ibid.. 
45 See for example R. Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley (London: Macmillan Press, 1975), p. 332; G. C. 
Webber, `Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of Fascists', Journal of 
Cgntemnm History. Vol. 19 (1984), pp. 597-598. 
46 Oswald Mosley, Tomorrow We Live (London: Abbey Supplies, 1938), pp. 61-69; Oswald Mosley, 
The British Peace: And How to Get it (London: Sanctuary Press, 1939). 
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Many, like Kenneth T. Dutfield, who were anxious to prevent a rupture in 
Anglo-German relations, saw Mosley's movement as the only political force capable of 
achieving this objective. 47 The son of a radio wholesaler, Dutfield was born in 1909 
and studied modern languages at London and Hull Universities. He had originally 
joined the B. U. F. in Berlin, where he was engaged as a film scriptwriter, but, after 
returning to England to work as a clerk in the foreign department of a London 
insurance company, he transferred to the Epping District in the spring of 1937. 
Dutfield's fascist proclivities were attributed to his "Germanophile inclinations" and his 
belief that "there was no other political party as concerned to prevent war with 
Germany". 48 As an Essex Blackshirt, he advertised a German-English translation 
service from his home at 9, Grove Road, Woodford. 49 
(c) Economic and social issues 
Several of the Blackshirts under scrutiny adopted fascism because it appeared 
to offer remedies for a range of economic and social problems at local and national 
level. The Suffolk Mosleyite, Arthur Swan, who was born in 1909, became a founder 
member of the Lowestoft B. U. F. specifically because of the extent of unemployment in 
Britain. 50 After leaving school at fourteen, he was eventually employed as a Prudential 
Insurance agent and built up a round of 200 policy holders in the town. Swan was set 
thinking about economics by the onset of the depression in 1929. Coming from a long 
line of Lowestoft fishermen, his political conscience was pricked by the plight of the 
local fishing industry: 
Hundreds of drifters being pulled up on the hard, never to 
go to sea again, abandoned because there was no market 
for the fish when they brought it in. A cran of herrings 
[fetched] only five shillings. It didn't pay to cart them 
away for manure. As the fishing was abandoned and 
hundreds of men were unemployed and were subjected, 
47 Kenneth T. Dutfield. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, 1985. 
48 Ibid.. 
49 Jjja&sWM 28 October 1937, p. 7. 
50 Arthur Swan. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
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year after year, to the indignities of the means test.. . That was the beginning of my political awareness as such. 51 
An active Conservative in the early 1930s, Swan undertook electoral work for 
Pierse C. Loftus, who became the Tory M. P. for Lowestoft in 1934. Loftus was highly 
critical of the pattern of British foreign investment, which, he asserted, was a main 
cause of the domestic jobless problem. Swan was so impressed by this analysis of the 
unemployment issue that he formed a twenty-strong discussion group to debate 
Loftus's arguments. 
One of the members of this group, George Surtees, a local garage owner and 
car dealer, invited Swan to the annual dinner of the Norwich, Great Yarmouth and 
Lowestoft Chambers of Commerce in 1934. The guest speaker at this function was 
Mosley, who used the occasion to advocate the fascist regeneration of Britain. 
Listening to the Blackshirt leader, Swan discerned views on unemployment that were 
almost identical to those of Loftus and was persuaded that only the B. U. F. 's approach 
would put the country back to work: "When he [Mosley] started the British Union of 
Fascists, it was obvious that that was the only place I could go because all the others 
had proved they could do nothing about it [unemployment], and they never did do 
anything about it". 52 
Surtees and Swan decided at this point that their political future lay with the 
British Union, and they formed the Lowestoft B. U. F. in 1935, becoming District 
Organiser and District Treasurer respectively. Both men retained their posts until they 
were interned under DR 18B(1A) in June 1940. After the Second World War, Surtees 
joined the Union Movement, but Swan declined to do so primarily because he had no 
enthusiasm "for the new idea of getting entangled in Europe". 53 
The Blackshirts' direct involvement in the `tithe war' attracted a number of 
agricultural recruits from across the eastern counties, including George Hoggarth, the 
51 Ibid.. 
52 Ibid.. 
53 Ibid.. 
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District Treasurer of the Eye B. U. F. (1936-1940). 54 Hoggarth was born in 1910 in 
Hong Kong, where his father worked for the colonial police. The family came back to 
England in 1914 to take up farming, first in Kent and then, from 1920, at Eye in 
Suffolk. Completing his education at sixteen, Hoggarth worked as a plough boy on the 
family farm and subsequently ran it in partnership with his brother after their father's 
death. 
Early on in his working life, Hoggarth joined the Agricultural Section of the 
Transport and General Workers' Union in the hope of improving the wages and 
conditions of farm labourers. When the impact of the slump on the farming community 
in the 1930s was compounded by the economic burden of the tithe, Hoggarth also 
became a committee member of the Suffolk Tithepayers' Association, which 
campaigned against tithe extraction, distraints and the compulsory auction of farmers' 
property. His anti-tithe activities took him to Wortharn in 1934, where a fascist 
contingent converted him to the B. U. F. 's agricultural policy: 
When Wortham Manor, a farm on the border of Norfolk 
and Suffolk, was under threat of distraint, I went along to 
lend support. This was the farm of Mr. Rash, husband of 
the well-known East Anglian novelist, Doreen Wallace. 
There I came across a group of Blackshirts, who, under 
the command of Dick Plathen, had come down from 
London to give us a hand. I got into conversation with 
these men, found their policy for overcoming the agricultural 
depression sensible and bought their literature. Dick 
Plathen and his colleagues had taken legal advice before 
coming down to Suffolk and had been told that if they 
were present at an enforced sale with the farmer's 
permission and hindered the bailiffs without using 
force, they would be within the law. So they felled 
trees across the private road leading to the farm 
buildings, dug trenches and put up barbed wire. All 
this attracted nation-wide attention, and many newspaper 
reporters and photographers arrived on the scene. 
Then police reinforcements were brought in, and the 
Blackshirts were arrested under a long-forgotten statute. 
They were taken to Mousehold Heath prison, Norwich, 
54 George Hoggarth, `The Essex Farmworker', pp. 42-45; private information supplied by Hoggarth's 
sister. Hoggarth was interned in June 1940 and later joined the Union Movement. 
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and found themselves in the Assize Court, where they 
were bound over. I was extremely indignant about these 
arrests and with others, including my brother decided to 
join the local branch. 55 
The west Hackney resident and one-time Walthamstow West District Leader, 
P. F. opted for Mosleyite fascism because he was disenchanted with the economic 
record of the liberal-democratic system in Britain. 56 P. F. worked as a bricklayer and 
was also a minor official of the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers. 
Originally, he had been coaxed by two socialist workmates into supporting the Labour 
Party but was quickly repelled by what he considered to be its unpatriotic and 
pro-Russian attitudes. Personal experience of unemployment further undermined his 
fading belief in the political mainstream. After being made redundant in 1929, P. F. had 
to rely on state aid to support his wife and young daughter for six months, during 
which time he spent up to twelve hours each day walking the streets of London with 
his trowel and lines searching for work. 
In 1933, he began buying Blackshirt, attending B. U. F. street meetings in east 
London and talking to local members. As a result of these contacts, P. F. came to 
admire the organisation's clear-cut policies, nationalist tone and stress on leadership. 
Consequently, P. F., then aged 30, joined the Hackney Branch in the same year. His 
recruitment owed much to the B. U. F. 's nationalist economic agenda, which promised 
to safeguard the `British' labour force against `foreign' competition: 
Well, I thought that if they got to power there would be no 
more of this monkey business, bringing in of aliens and all 
that sort of thing, who were no good to the country, who 
were all coming here to live upon us. And Oswald Mosley 
always said that while there is one job that's needed by an 
English person, no alien will be employed. Those were the 
sorts of things that I wanted because I'd suffered in 1929 
quite badly. We were starving ... 
57 
An enthusiastic Blackshirt activist, P. F. held a number of posts in east London 
and Essex. In the mid-1930s, he served as Propaganda Officer and a registered speaker 
55 Ibid., pp. 43-44. 
56 P . 
R. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1993. 
57 Ibid. 
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for the Central Hackney B. U. F.. Then, at the request of Captain Hick from National 
Headquarters, he took over as District Leader of the Walthamstow West formation in 
1937 for a six month period. Following a house move to Chingford shortly afterwards, 
P. F. conducted Blackshirt street meetings in his new area of residence and also stood 
as a local election candidate for the Epping District B. U. F.. 
F. T., a native of Forest Gate, also cited socio-economic reasons for joining the 
West Ham B. U. F. as a fifteen year old Greyshirt in 1935.58 He remained an active local 
adherent until he received his army call-up in October 1939. F. T. finished his schooling 
at fourteen and was working as an office boy for a Southwark iron and steel company 
when a friend, who had already enrolled, introduced him to Arthur Beavan and 
Millicent Bullivant, the Blackshirt leaders at West Ham. Beavan and Bullivant outlined 
the B. U. F. programme to F. T., and he became a member. 
His preference for Mosley's organisation was motivated chiefly by a conviction 
that the established parties had failed to alleviate the country's economic and social 
problems. F. T. 's view that there was an urgent need to improve job prospects and 
welfare provision stemmed partly from his own austere upbringing. His father, a 
commercial traveller-cum-draughtsman, had died in 1925, leaving a widow and three 
children to manage on a small pension and food vouchers. The B. U. F. 's radical 
programme to tackle unemployment and implement social measures supplied F. T. with 
his first political outlet: 
I studied the policies and listened to the speaker. .. and I 
came to the conclusion that it was a good alternative to 
the government that was in power, which actually wasn't 
getting anywhere [with] high unemployment, very poor 
living conditions etc.... I thought these people with their 
policies, they seem to have an answer, and, you know, 
let's go for it. 59 
58 F. T.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1993. 
59 Ibid.. 
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(d) Rejection of parliamentary democracy 
Other Blackshirts, echoing Mosley's demand for a generational revolt against 
the `united muttons' of the liberal democratic `old gang', saw the B. U. F. as the vehicle 
for fundamental political change in Britain. L. B., the Epping District Leader between 
1938 and 1940, slotted squarely into this `anti-parliamentary' category. 60 A south 
Woodford cabinet maker who worked for his father's upholstery manufacturing 
business in south-west Bethnal Green, L. B. joined the Leyton B. U. F. as a 24 year old 
convert in 1934 but then transferred to the Chingford Branch a few months later. His 
fascist loyalties were engendered by a detestation of the `confrontational' and 
regimented nature of the country's parliamentary party system. In L. B. 's opinion, only 
the introduction of the B. U. F. 's major proposed reform, a Corporate State based on 
the Italian Fascist model, could forge a genuine national consensus by moderating and 
synthesising British politics: 
I actually became involved in it because I didn't like the 
quarrelsome attitude of politicians. I didn't like this 
adversarial attitude of British politics. They had to be 
against somebody because he was of a different party. 
I thought fascism would be a mellowing influence on 
British politics. I was very concerned about the individual 
freedom of M. P. s. I very strongly disapproved of the 
whip system, and I felt that M. P. s would be more 
independent if we had a Corporate State. That was really 
how I figured it all out. I thought it was launching [us] into 
a more modern form of politics, which would dissolve 
this constant aggravation between one political party 
and another... Mosley said `Why pay a man to be Prime 
Minister and then pay another man to be Leader of the 
Opposition, so as to oppose him? ' That very much 
impressed me with Mosley because I've always [been] 
and I still feel now that I'm absolutely disgusted with 
politics... because it's all adversarial really. You can't 
advance the lot of mankind at all really. 61 
60 L B.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
61 Ibid.. 
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(e) `National Socialism' 
The B. U. F. 's attempt to fuse elements of nationalism and socialism in a 
coherent political programme also brought in recruits who were attracted by the notion 
of a movement founded on the ideals of patriotism and social progress. One such 
convert was Richard Reynell Bellamy, a pioneer of the East Anglian movement, who 
became a Norfolk Blackshirt in August 1933.62 A Liverpudlian born in 1901, `Dick' 
Bellamy was the son of a former rancher in South America, who later retired to 
Norfolk. He left his Cumberland public school during the First World War and, in 
quick succession, worked as an office boy for a firm of chartered accountants, a 
clerical assistant in a Manchester textile warehouse and an agricultural labourer on a 
Cheshire farm. Having visited France with the British Red Cross after the cessation of 
hostilities, Bellamy then signed on as a deck boy, but his hopes of gaining a Second 
Mate's ticket were thwarted by the post-war slump in shipping. Following unsuccessful 
applications to various imperial police forces, he joined the Royal Irish Constabulary 
(R. I. C. ) in 1921. His one year period of service convinced him that the R. I. C. had been 
made a scapegoat by the `treachery' of the English press and the politicians at 
Westminster. By this stage, Bellamy possessed a few rudimentary political views. He 
applauded Mussolini's fascist experiment in Italy, and his nationalistic bearing was 
buttressed by an anti-communism which had originally been fostered by the harrowing 
tales he had heard as a child about the Paris Commune. 
Unable to find suitable employment in the early 1920s, Bellamy and his brother 
James left for Australia to work as sheep farm apprentices or jackaroos' in New South 
Wales. It was here that Bellamy met and married a British woman. Two years later, the 
trio set up their own 500 acre cotton plantation in Queensland. However, economic 
depression and the state government's political expediency in withdrawing a pledge to 
maintain the cotton bounty reduced the value of their crop to around £40. Facing 
financial ruin, the Bellamys abandoned their cotton growing venture and moved to 
62Richard Reynell Bellamy. Taped interview with Stephen Cullen, 1985. After World War Two, 
Bellamy wrote the `official' unpublished history of the B. U. F., entitled `We Marched With Mosley' 
(Unpublished unabridged manuscript, 1958-1968). 
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New Caledonia, where they founded a 300 acre coffee plantation, but this enterprise 
fared little better. Drought destroyed both the crop and hopes of a permanent future on 
the Pacific island. Shortly afterwards, the young couple embarked on the long sea 
voyage back to Britain. Bellamy's arrival in March 1931 was a traumatic experience: 
When I got home I was absolutely horrified. When we had 
gone abroad there had been a million unemployed and that 
was looked up on as the limit. And I came back to three 
million unemployed... Things were absolutely shocking. 
The thing was ... everybody was prepared to accept 
it. 
I don't think the unemployed were accepting it, but middle 
class families like mine, oh [were saying] `Very bad but 
63 things were bound to get better'. 
Without a job and angered by the smug indifference of his middle class family in 
Norfolk, Bellamy looked to continental fascism for political guidance. In his opinion, 
the national situation could only be retrieved by emulating Mussolini's `revolution' in 
Italy. At first, he was wary of Mosley's movement because an early newspaper report 
had described the B. U. F. as an upper class organisation. Nevertheless, in 1933, a 
meeting with G. S. Gueroult, a local Blackshirt officer, allayed Bellamy's fears by 
reassuring him that the B. U. F. stood for peaceful radical reform. Much to his listener's 
delight, Gueroult's discourse on the benefits of fascism seemed to be unsullied by the 
sort of party political machinations that had dogged the R. I. C. and the Queensland 
cotton planters. Bellamy was finally won over by the B. U. F. 's programmatic 
amalgamation of left- and right-wing tenets: 
And what sealed me was when he said, quoting O. M. 
[Oswald Mosley], `We seek to combine the patriotism 
and good order of the right with the progress and social 
reform of the left. ' Well, that obviously clinched it for 
me because previously if you belonged to the right you 
believed in keeping the workers down and, if, on the 
other hand, it was `up to the workers', you wanted to 
do in the other classes. 64 
63 Ibid.. 
64 Ibid. 
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Hearing Mosley speak at King's Lynn in November 1933 cemented Bellamy's 
allegiance, and, as the local Branch Organiser, he began recruiting at Downham 
Market. In February 1935, he was appointed the B. U. F. 's full-time Political Organiser 
for the South-West Norfolk Division. Seven months later, after successfully staging 
large-scale Blackshirt meetings in the county, Bellamy was made Assistant National 
Inspecting Officer for East Anglia. His connection with the eastern counties was 
broken in 1936 when he was further promoted to Administrative Officer for Northern 
Meetings, a post which covered the region from Birmingham to Newcastle. During this 
period, Bellamy was also selected to be the B. U. F. 's prospective parliamentary 
candidate for the Manchester constituency of Blackley. In 1939, he moved to 
Canterbury as a Blackshirt Political Agent to help Lady Pearson organise the division 
for a fascist election campaign and then became the local District Leader. After 
internment, which lasted from June 1940 to July 1941, Bellamy not only joined the 
Union Movement but also became the B. U. F. 's `official' historian. 
Mosley's synthesis of left and right wing policies also prompted E. G., then a 
thirteen year old schoolboy, to join the organisation at Leytonstone in October 1934.65 
He applied for membership after spending several months reading B. U. F. literature. In 
view of his age, E. G. was summoned to the National Headquarters in London for a 
formal interview with Captain B. D. E. Donovan, a senior official, to demonstrate his 
knowledge of the movement's policies before being given special permission to become 
a Blackshirt. His mother, a laundry office supervisor, renounced her Conservative 
sympathies in order to accompany her son into the Leytonstone B. U. F.. E. G. 's father, a 
disabled First World War veteran who experienced thirteen years of unemployment 
before opening a tobacconist's shop in 1936, had no interest in politics and therefore 
declined to take the fascist road. 
65 E. G.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
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The young recruit concluded that the Blackshirts, by blending patriotism and 
order with social reform, offered the alluring prospect of a `radical Right' programme 
to rejuvenate the country: 
Like many I was very attracted by the vigorous radical 
programme calling for an occupational franchise, military 
preparedness, the revival of British agriculture - then 
in a parlous state - and a huge public works scheme 
which would systematically wipe out the slums and 
provide work for the unemployed... The present day 
political label of `Radical Right' suits the B. U. F. quite 
well. My own description of us would be: `Traditionalists 
who advocated a root-and-branch reform of the economic 
system. ' We were economic revolutionaries rather than 
political ones. 66 
His fascist ideology was sustained by a belief that Britain's existing political 
institutions were hopelessly out of date and incapable of meeting the challenges of the 
modern age: "... we felt that science was transforming society and that we were stuck 
with a system of government established in about 1830 that was making no allowance 
for the fact that we had moved from an age of scarcity to an age of plenty". 67 
Between mid-1935 and the end of 1936, E. G. served as an Organiser for the 
Greyshirt Cadets, the B. U. F. 's Youth Movement. His duties included arranging Cadet 
contingents for B. U. F. street marches and visiting Districts in east London and Essex. 
For a time, he also regularly contributed a youth feature on home and world affairs 
which was published in the Blackshirt press. Once E. G. had left school in March 1936, 
his fascist activities had to be combined with a full-time job as a shipping clerk for a 
central London firm. Early in 1938, he transferred to the Epping B. U. F. owing to a 
family move from Leytonstone to Loughton, where he led a B. U. F. Unit for the next 
twelve months or so. The following year, with financial help from his father, E. G. 
acquired a tobacconist's shop in Forest Gate and rejoined the Leytonstone formation. 
In October 1939, he became Acting District Leader for Leytonstone but relinquished 
the post in the spring of 1940 in order to concentrate on his business. E. G. was another 
66 E. G., `The East London Shopkeeper' in Wise (ed. ), Moslev's Blackshirts_ p. 1. 67 E. G.. Taped interview. 
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interviewee detained under DR 18B (IA), and, on his release in the autumn of 1942, he 
served in the R. A. F. for four and a half years. Although he remained a Mosley loyalist 
after the war, E. G. 's attachment to the Union Movement lasted barely twelve months 
since it "hadn't got the same appeal" as the B. U. F. and "no-one was listening to what 
we had to say". 68 
Another Blackshirt converted by the organisation's ability to fuse nationalism 
and socialism was T. M., the District Treasurer at East Ham between 1938 and 1940.69 
Born in Bethnal Green in 1915, T. M. was one of six children raised by a widowed 
mother. His father, an upholsterer, had been killed serving in the army during the 1917 
Turkish campaign. In the early 1930s, after completing his education at sixteen, T. M. 
moved with his family to a new home in Manor Park and began his working life as an 
upholsterer for a company in Shoreditch. 
Coming from a working class background, T. M. first flirted with socialism. His 
rejection of the class divisions and financial interests associated with Conservatism led 
him briefly, as a teenager, into the Labour League of Youth. However, T. M. 's 
anti-capitalist attitudes were offset by a number of reservations about the 
`internationalism' of the political left. The Communist Party's devotion to Soviet 
Russia, in particular, offended his patriotism. Moreover, he was also alienated by the 
sight of `foreign' communists: 
Whenever I saw any communists, they were nearly always 
Jews, funny enough. It was a fact. Being in east London, I 
used to listen to the communists and I thought some of it 
doesn't seem a bad idea but it was the people who seemed 
to be around. They used to be quite different to the ones I 
used to mix with. Those who surrounded it were usually a 
scruffy, untidy looking lot. Then the speakers were invariably 
foreign types of people - not always but quite often. 70 
Over a two year period, T. M. was able to overcome his original aversion to the 
B. U. F., which had been cultivated by reading hostile press reports. In 1935, he 
68 Ibid.. 
69 T. M.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
70 Ibid.. 
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witnessed a B. U. F. speaker at Hastings being showered with stones as he tried to 
conduct an open air meeting. T. M. 's admiration for this Blackshirt's courage in the 
face of such unstinting opposition encouraged him to examine B. U. F. publications and 
to talk to East Ham members. The enthusiasm, dedication and discipline of the local 
fascists T. M. encountered made a lasting impression, but he was ultimately won over 
by the movement's nationalistic brand of socialism. For T. M., who was "naturally 
something of a nationalist, a patriot", the B. U. F. 's determination to put Britain and the 
Empire first was complemented by a commitment to socio-economic change: "... the 
distribution of wealth and so forth - that's what I was concerned about.. . That was the 
general idea of the British Union -a wider equation of productive results". 71 
By the beginning of 1937, T. M. was intellectually convinced of the merits of 
Mosley's programme and became an active East Ham Blackshirt. Two of his brothers, 
who both worked as local cabinet-makers and french polishers, also enrolled at the 
same Branch in the late 1930s. 
(f) Mosley's leadership 
Mosley's dynamic `hands on' approach to leadership tipped the scales for 
Arthur Beavan, the central fascist figure at West Ham. 72 Beavan, an ardent Blackshirt 
during the 1930s, gravitated towards the B. U. F. from the left of the political spectrum. 
He was born in Cardiff in September 1900, the son of a Fabian socialist, who worked 
as a senior statistician for the Cooperative Wholesale Society. At the age of twelve 
Beavan ran away from home in search of a seafaring career and within two years had 
entered the merchant marine. After spending part of the First World War in the United 
States Navy, he lived in Texas for a time before returning to Britain in the 1920s. 
Throughout the first post-war decade, Beavan fluctuated between unskilled 
casual work and periods of unemployment. His political response was to become a 
71 Ibid.. 
72 AR Beavan. F. O. M. taped interview, 1988; A. R. Beavan. Taped interview with Stephen Cullen, 
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communist, but this attachment proved fragile for two reasons. Firstly, he sensed that 
his fierce patriotism, encouraged by military service and his step-mother, who came 
from a staunch army family, was not shared by the Communist Party. Furthermore his 
doubts about the integrity of the communist leadership were apparently confirmed at 
Hyde Park in 1933: "That was where I made my first break with them... We used to 
have meetings at Hyde Park, which always ended in trouble, but our so-called leaders 
were all sitting in Lyons Cornerhouse at Marble Arch taking it easy. They weren't in 
the scrap. Their leadership was only verbal". 73 
With his faith in communism waning, Beavan attended a B. U. F. meeting in 
Piccadilly, where he heckled the speakers and traded blows with `Charlie' Watts, a 
young Blackshirt activist who later organised the B. U. F. 's London Cab Drivers Group. 
The following day, he met Watts and another fascist called Hussey to discuss Mosley's 
programme. Beavan was struck by the "patriotic yet revolutionary" aims of the 
movement and felt an immediate affinity. 74 Fascism appealed not only to his 
nationalism but also to his belief in social reform, which had been inculcated-by his 
father. The premium placed on discipline, uniforms and organisation by the B. U. F. was 
an additional incentive given Beavan's pronounced `military' outlook. Nevertheless, in 
the last analysis, his transition to fascism hinged on the question of leadership. Beavan 
frankly admitted that he was not wholeheartedly won over to the Blackshirt cause until 
he had seen Mosley `lead from the front' at a rowdy London public gathering in 1933: 
... 
it didn't all convince me until I went to a meeting... where 
Mosley was speaking and that ended in trouble. But, there 
the leader, instead of sitting down and having a cup of 
coffee somewhere, he got down off the van and came in 
[to the crowd]. He proved that he could not only lead with 
his mouth, he could lead with his good left hand ... I think 
that that was the last thing that changed the balance - 
the matter of leadership. 75 
73 Beavan. F. O. M. taped interview. 
74 Ibid.. 
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Beavan initially joined the Mayfair Branch in central London but was soon 
recruited to the `I' Squad, an exclusive B. U. F. Unit which acted as Mosley's personal 
bodyguard when the leader undertook speaking engagements. In 1935, after exposing 
corrupt officials at the West Ham Branch, Beavan was appointed District Organiser for 
the area and handed the task of reviving the fortunes of the local movement. He 
retained this pivotal role in West Ham until his internment under the Defence 
Regulations in 1940, a period of detention which was to last about two years. From the 
late 1940s, Beavan served as the Area Administrator for the No. 1 London Area of the 
Union Movement but subsequently became disillusioned with Mosley's post-war 
organisation, since it was "wishy-washy" and a mere "shadow" of the B. U. F.. 76 
Mosley's platform oratory exerted a powerful influence on Ralph Ratcliffe, a 
resident of Dersingham, Norfolk, when he first heard the B. U. F. 's founder speak at 
King's Lynn in November 1933.77 Ratcliffe, the 28 year old son of a Liberal-voting 
brewery director, was employed as a commercial traveller for a Sheffield firm and had 
no previous political affiliations. He became Propaganda Officer (1934) and Branch 
Organiser (1935) for the King's Lynn B. U. F. before moving first to Eye and then 
Birmingham as a non-active member. Ratcliffe's vague notion that Britain would have 
to undergo a "great change" in order to surmount the "world crisis" of the early 193 Os 
was brought sharply into focus by Mosley's rhetoric: "I heard Sir Oswald Mosley 
speak at the Corn Hall, King's Lynn and joined at once as he put a flame to my 
thoughts which were similar to his programme". 78 A member of the Home Guard 
during the Second World War, Ratcliffe was another former fascist who followed 
Mosley into the Union Movement. 
76 Ibid.; Word Guardian. 20 October 1949. Press cutting in Board of Deputies of British Jews 
T D. B. J. ) C6/9/3/2. Arthur R. Beavan. 
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451 
(g) Anti-Semitism 
In some cases, the British Union's `anti-alien' line played upon and channelled 
personal antipathy towards Jews. R. W., who enrolled in the Walthamstow West B. U. F. 
as a seventeen year old in August 1935, became a committed Blackshirt mainly 
because of his anti-Semitism. 79 Raised in an upper middle class Tory household in 
Walthamstow, R. W. worked as a junior manager for the Victoria Brewery, the 
family-owned local firm, which manufactured a variety of consumer items ranging from 
soft drinks to boot polish. His basic political ideas were shaped by a traditional 
well-to-do Conservative family background, which lauded the virtues of paternalism 
and Britain's imperial `mission', and also by his stridently anti-Communist grandfather, 
who maintained that `Bolsheviks' were chiefly responsible for the nation's problems. 
These sentiments were powerfully overlaid with R. W. 's own hostility to the perceived 
effects of Jewish economic activity in Walthamstow: 
... as the 
district had gone down after the war years [1914- 
1918]... the Jewish immigrants came into the area and took 
over all the small businesses and shops - just the same as in 
later years the Pakistanis and all the rest have done to Britain 
... Those people owed no allegiance to our country. 
All they 
could think of was how much money [could be made]. To 
me, the things that I saw them doing were absolutely 
thoroughly dishonest because I was brought up... [with] the 
idea that an Englishman didn't do things like that. You were a 
cad and all this sort of thing, you know. This is my family 
background coming out. This was the sort of thing, say, from 
the beginning that made me start thinking. 80 
His respect for the bravery of an undaunted local Blackshirt newspaper seller, 
who was regularly subjected to left-wing taunts and, on occasion, physical violence, led 
R. W. to purchase the organisation's publications. Anxious not to offend his family, he 
then secured the permission of his father, an ex-army captain, to join the Walthamstow 
West movement. He responded positively to the B. U. F. since he considered that it 
served a vital function in the defence against an `alien take-over': "I felt a need because 
I could see what was happening to even the market on the streets and the shops and 
79 P W.. F. O. M. taped interview, 1988. 
80 Ibid.. 
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everything were being taken over. We seemed to be losing our grip on everything". 81 
For a time, R. W. was the District Propaganda Officer, and he continued as an active 
member in the area until his army call-up in 1940. A devoted Mosley loyalist, R. W. 
later joined the Union Movement Drum Corps. 
Anti-Semitism also induced M. G., the 21 year old son of a Post Office 
telegraphist, to enlist in the Southend District B. U. F. between 1936 and 1938.82 M. G., 
who lived at Leigh-on-Sea, became interested in fascism in the mid-1930s, when he 
noticed two of his fellow clerical employees in the publicity department of E. K. Cole 
Ltd., a radio manufacturing company, donning black shirts as they were leaving work 
one evening. With his curiosity roused, M. G. perused the movement's literature for a 
few days and then signed up as an activist at the Southend District headquarters in 
London Road. In 1937, he married a locally-employed German domestic servant, who 
belonged to the N. S. D. A. P.. Although he left the Southend formation the following 
year, after accepting a new job at the Wembley administration offices of Great 
Universal Stores Ltd., M. G. remained a member of the B. U. F. until 1940 and 
subsequently stood as a local election candidate for the Union Movement at Harrow. 
Raised in a Liberal voting lower middle class family, M. G. became a Blackshirt 
partly because of Mosley's proposed social and economic solutions. Yet, the B. U. F. 's 
strongest appeal was to his anti-Jewish instincts, which were fortified by the 
atmosphere at the Branch. In particular, Dennis Higgs, the local District Leader and an 
open anti-Semite, set the tone. Higgs worked as a furrier in Southend and resented 
Jewish competition in the trade. His shop windows carried the uncompromising slogan 
`100% English - not naturalised or unnaturalised! '. M. G. remembered: 
I was a bit anti-Jewish at the time. I'll give you one reason 
why. The first job I got was in Bishopsgate. During my lunch 
hour I used to go for a walk round and I didn't know the 
district very well and there were all these Jewish sweatshops. 
You could see all the people slogging away. And not only that, 
all the streets were littered with chicken feathers. It was filthy. 
81 Ibid.. 
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In fact, I got lost one day and it took me twenty minutes to find 
my way back to the office [because] all the road signs were in 
Yiddish. So I didn't take to them very much, the Jews, I'm 
afraid, I must admit, whatever the movement obviously says, 
there was a lot of anti-Jewish feeling. I remember the first thing 
almost we learnt when we became members, and this was 
down out at Southend, was you'd approach another member, 
stop, click your heels more or less, put your arm up and say 
P. J. which meant `Perish Judah'... Well there was a lot of that 
but whether there was much personal agitation against the 
Jews, I don't recall any, apart from the District Leader's 
shop window, you know, `100% British' and all that. 83 
(h) Anti-communism 
For Derrick Millington, the middle class son of a London businessman, 
becoming a Walthamstow Blackshirt in 1934 was primarily an anti-communist 
statement. 84 A 28 year old dispensing optician, Millington had previously conformed to 
family tradition by voting Conservative but confessed to "never being happy with any 
of the old parties". 85 His main worry was that "Communism was getting too strong in 
Great Britaint , and he viewed the B. U. F., with its endorsement of the "Corporate 
State, King, Country and Empire", as an effective barrier to the growth of the extreme 
left in domestic politics. 86 Millington was an active member from the outset and, by 
November 1935, had risen to the rank of District Organiser for the Walthamstow East 
Branch, a post he held briefly. Although he continued as an active local Blackshirt 
during the second half of the decade, he severed his B. U. F. ties at the outbreak of the 
Second World War and eventually joined the Home Guard. 
(i) The B. U. F. Programme 
Another Essex Mosleyite, D. T., represented the type of fascist who was 
attracted by the overall sweep of the movement's programme, rather than by specific 
83 Ibid... 
84 Derrick Millington. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, 1985. 
85 Ibid.. 
86 Ibid.. 
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policy initiatives or single issue campaigns. 87 An eighteen year old London 
stockbroker's clerk, D. T. joined the B. U. F. in late 1936 following a lengthy period of 
persuasion by his friend `Dicky' Boughton, a member of the Leytonstone District, 
employed by Smart's Furniture Company to trace hire purchase debtors. At the time, 
D. T. lived with his pro-Labour parents in East Ham. His decision to enrol in the West 
Ham B. U. F. "appalled" the family, particularly his father, who worked in Silvertown as 
the senior storekeeper for a firm manufacturing plywood and metal foil, but D. T. was 
not deflected from making the Blackshirt movement his first political home. He was 
drawn to Mosleyite fascism because of its broad package of reforms, which aimed to 
stimulate national and imperial revival: 
I think it was pretty general. I don't think there was one 
particular part. In those days in the thirties, there was 
unemployment and we seemed to be denigrating a lot of 
things we had previously believed in... We seemed to be 
neglecting the Empire for one thing, not developing the 
potential that we had in the British Empire in those days 
and generally becoming the `poor man' of Europe.. .1 
felt we could get people to wake up from their lethargy 
and realise what was happening to the country - that it 
was going downhill ... 
[and] raise the country up to what 
we thought was its proper status. 88 
D. T. stayed at West Ham for a few months, often helping the District Leader, 
Arthur Beavan, with routine propaganda activities, such as newspaper selling. In 1937, 
he switched to the Epping B. U. F. and remained there until August 1939, when he was 
conscripted into the army for six years. Immediately after the war, D. T. was 
instrumental in establishing the Mosleyite Epping and District Book Club, which later 
became the local formation of the Union Movement. D. T. was appointed the Epping 
Branch Organiser and, in 1949, stood as a Union Movement candidate for the 
Snaresbrook ward. 
The B. U. F. 's extensive critique of the `failings' of British liberal democracy 
also elicited the support of B. M., a Catholic born in Dovercourt in 1922.89 His father, 
87 D. T.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
88 Ibid.. 
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a Tory-voting customs and excise officer, who worked at Bishopsgate, moved the 
family to Chingford in 1934, and, for the next three years, B. M. attended St. Egbert's 
College, a nearby private Catholic school. The Essex teenager was subsequently 
employed as a junior clerical worker by a local building and civil engineering company. 
His fascist leanings developed in 1937, moulded by the oratory of Blackshirt 
street speakers in the Chingford area. The Epping District Leader, Frederic Ball, 
approached B. M. 's mother to seek permission for her son to join the B. U. F. Cadets. 
However, Mrs. M. refused to let her offspring become formally involved with the local 
fascist movement, a decision which left the young sympathiser "rather disappointed at 
the time". 90 Nevertheless, B. M. 's interest in the B. U. F. continued until 1940, fuelled 
by reading Mosley's Tomorrow We Live and by becoming a weekly subscriber to 
Win. 
B. M. recalled that his fascist inclinations were underscored by an entrenched 
patriotism, a desire for social betterment, a liking for the `politics of action' and a belief 
in the economic benefits of a self-sufficient imperial bloc: 
Well, I was always something of a nationalist, very patriotic, 
chauvinistic, very proud of Britain and the British Empire. 
Also, even at that age, I had a passion for social justice. I 
was aware of the inequalities in society. There seemed to 
be extremes of wealth and poverty. When I used to travel 
up to London you could see the back-to-backs, these little 
houses, you know, wretched places. I knew there were lots 
of slums in our big cities and nothing seemed to be done 
about it. I felt some new system was necessary to do away 
with all that and create a decent new society for everybody. 
Mosley seemed to me to have the answer.. . The emphasis 
was on action. A government should have the power to act 
... 
instead of having an opposition which only seemed to obstruct 
the business of goveriment. It seemed to me that what was 
needed, you know, was a government with the right policies 
and with the mandate to put those policies through. The B. U. F. 
policy itself, this concept of a closed economy, Britain and 
the Empire, as Mosley said, we had all the raw materials we 
needed within the Empire. We were primarily a manufacturing 
89 B. M.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1993. 
90 Ibid.. 
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nation so that a natural balance of exchange existed. We could 
export our manufactured goods... [to the Empire] in exchange 
for their raw materials and thus make ourselves independent 
of world markets. Within such autarchy it should be possible 
to raise the standard of living for everybody. That made great 
sense to me. 91 
Judging that the conflict with Germany was not in Britain's interests, B. M. 
registered as a conscientious objector during World War Two and was granted 
conditional exemption. Between 1942 and 1945, he was assigned to the Civil 
Defence's Light Rescue Service in Woolwich. For a brief period afterwards, he was 
seconded to land work in Loughton and Waltham Abbey. At the end of the war, B. M.. 
joined the Union for British Freedom and quickly fell under the political influence of its 
leader, Victor Burgess, a former B. U. F. member. Subsequently, both men entered the 
Union Movement in 1948, and together they went on to found the Kensington Branch. 
Initially, Burgess led the local formation with B. M. acting as Sales Organiser. When 
Burgess departed in the early 1950s, his protege took over the Kensington leadership, 
a position B. M. was to occupy until 1962. 
Ronald Creasy, a Suffolk landowner, embraced the B. U. F. 's programme after a 
protracted and comprehensive intellectual conversion to Mosleyite fascism. He became 
the founder member and District Leader of the movement at Eye in 1936 and, in 1938, 
was elected to the local council as a British Union representative. Creasy was also 
adopted as the B. U. F. 's prospective parliamentary candidate for the Eye division. His 
high profile and fascist credentials ensured that he was interned under DR 18B (IA) in 
June 1940.92 
Creasy's ancestors held a lordship between Dieppe and Rouen dating from 
Norman times, and the family possessed significant landholdings in Norfolk from the 
beginning of the thirteenth century. Up to 1931, the family had a financial stake in over 
80 farms in Norfolk and Suffolk. His parents, upper middle class land-owning Suffolk 
Conservatives, had their son privately tutored and, in 1930, the 21 year old Creasy 
91 Ibid.. 
92 Ronald N. Creasy. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
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took over the running of the estate at Cranley Manor, near Eye, on the county border 
with Norfolk. 
As an important member of rural society responsible for many tenanted 
employees, he was able to witness at first hand the deteriorating agricultural conditions 
in East Anglia during the early 1930s. In 1933, Creasy's father reportedly declined the 
offer of almost an entire village, which the Church Commissioners had seized as a tithe 
debt, on condition that he paid off the outstanding arrears which had accumulated over 
five years. Creasy also recalled that his father, who had loaned capital to many local 
farmers, sustained personal financial losses in order to alleviate their economic 
suffering at this time. His observation of rural hardship in inter-war East Anglia bred a 
profound sense of disillusionment with the prevailing political and economic system: 
The state of agriculture was completely in the doldrums - 
a dismal struggle for existence in the 1920s and 1930s. 
To such an extent that it was utterly deplorable. Imports 
from cheap sweated countries poured in, making the 
`democratic' speculators rich at the expense of the British 
farmer. Misery and bankruptcy were rife. First class 
agricultural land lay dormant. No-one could afford to 
buy it at £5 an acre. It would have been an encumbrance. 
At the time we were large landowners. No-one better 
than myself to fully understand the deplorable position 
of the defenceless farmers as well as the Tithe iniquity 
framed in the name of 'God'. 93 
For Creasy, it was the liberal democratic party system, through its slavish 
devotion to the policies of `international finance', which had betrayed the interests of 
both the agricultural community and the nation. In particular, he felt that the 
Conservative Party had become little more than a vehicle for speculative financiers who 
put the pursuit of quick overseas profits above the long-term needs of British farming. 
By presiding over the `ruin' of the agricultural sector, the Tories, in Creasy's 
estimation, no longer had a legitimate claim to be regarded as the `farmers' party'. He 
concluded that Toryism preserved the privileges of the few at the cost of widespread 
poverty. 
93 Ronald N. Creasy. Letter to Andrew Mitchell. 15 December 1992. 
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It was also apparent that many of the aspects of the cosseted lifestyle of the 
East Anglian land-owning class alienated Creasy. He disliked the gatherings and `at 
homes' and regarded the social round as empty and trivial. This sense of dissatisfaction 
with leisurely pursuits was strengthened by several visits made to areas in London and 
Paris frequented by the destitute. The harsh conditions endured by the homeless further 
exposed the shallow complacency of their social `betters' and convinced Creasy that 
such glaring inequalities could have no place in a civilised society. 
His experiences also caused him to reject religious orthodoxy. Raised as an 
Anglican from an early age, Creasy became aware of how class distinctions were 
mirrored and condoned by mainstream religion. The reserved pews at the front of the 
local church denoted the family's social position as well-to-do landowners. Less 
prominent inhabitants of the region were expected to sit behind them. These seating 
arrangements seemed to symbolise orthodox religion's broader defence of the 
inequalities of the class system: "I could see our privileges and their lack of privileges 
and so on. To me, I could also see.. . that 
[orthodox] religion was always for those who 
have against those who have not. `The poor man at his gate, the rich man in his castle' 
- that sort of thing". 
94 
Creasy reacted by rejecting the Church of England and all other forms or 
orthodox religion in favour of Pantheism. He considered that his acceptance of natural 
religion had some bearing on his decision to follow Mosley's lead: "A pantheist is 
humbled by his littleness with Nature. Is more realistic, more sensitive to culture and 
the true order of being. Thus more concerned with the welfare of others, as was the 
B. U. F. ". 95 
Having relinquished many of the traditional social and political values of his 
class, Creasy's transition to fascism was prompted by two significant events. In the 
mid-1930s he travelled to Italy and Germany, where he met Mussolini, Goering and 
Goebbels. He was deeply impressed by fascist political and economic methods on the 
94 Creasy. Taped interview. 
95 Creasy. Letter. 
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continent, which only increased his contempt for what he saw as the inefficient, corrupt 
and vacillating British party system of government: 
... Hitler 
[was] a great man... [in] what he achieved for 
Germany... If you knew Germany as I knew it up to 1939 
... If you'd 
have known Germany as I've known it - the 
happiness, the contentment, the wealth, the prosperity. 
God! The worship of that man! Man, woman and child 
... What a man! 
From poverty, from nothing he built up 
a great nation of people... You'd have been like me if you 
had been old enough and had gone and seen the marvellous 
prosperity and happiness and contentment of those people 
and the worship of their leader because he had brought it 
all to them. 96 
After expounding his views in the correspondence columns of the provincial 
press, Creasy received a parcel containing a selection of Mosley's fascist writings from 
William Sherston, the District Leader at Woodbridge. On reading this literature, Creasy 
detected not only a mutual line of thought but also a kindred spirit. The Suffolk 
landowner's predilection for the B. U. F. was reinforced by his identification with 
Mosley as a privileged man, who had abandoned the `good life' in order to embark on 
a selfless political mission to improve the lot of ordinary British people: 
As a result of my own writings [in the local newspapers] 
Mosley's writings came to me... and therein I saw the very 
shaping of my own mind. Therein lay everything that I 
wanted to do myself. Everything that I felt would at last 
be of some importance - to stop the quarrelling... of party 
politics. Someone who could ultimately say `I will do this' 
and it would be done - for the people. I recognised that 
he was a man of very sound background. I recognised all his 
privileges in life as indeed I had privileges. I realised clearly 
that he was sacrificing all that for the people, for future 
generations and that that should be the object of living... 
It was therefore important for me to get in touch, which 
I did, and then I dedicated my life from that moment on 
in full support of Mosley and his policy. 97 
Typically, as a `born' leader, Creasy had firm ideas about his role in the 
movement. At his request, Sherston arranged a personal meeting with Mosley in 
96 Creasy. Taped interview. 
97 Ibid.. 
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London, an encounter which confirmed Creasy's sense of mutual understanding. One 
of his conditions was that he should enter the organisation in a manner befitting his 
social status - as a leader. The B. U. F. 's emphasis on leadership struck a responsive 
chord in Creasy, because it underpinned his place at the apex of a paternalistic rural 
order bounded by the traditional ties of kinship, duty and obligation: 
The fascist idea suited me remarkably well because fascism 
means leadership and I was prepared to be a leader. I don't 
think I had ever been anything else, socially and so on. I was 
born to leadership. We were given it at a very early age, 
almost as children... Therefore that also encouraged me to 
leave the old behind and, for the sake of the people, to go 
into the B. U. F., but as a leader. 98 
(j) Non-Ideological Reasons 
Some fascists joined the B. U. F. for reasons that had little to do with Blackshirt 
policy or ideology. Eric Pleasants, for example, entered the Norwich B. U. F. in 1936 
principally because of the local movement's `external' attractions. 99 Born in 1913, the 
son of a Norfolk gamekeeper, Pleasants excelled at wrestling and boxing from an early 
age. He left school at thirteen but was later awarded a diploma in physical education 
and physiotherapy by Loughborough College. After a succession of short-lived jobs, 
Pleasants earned his living by combining his work as a physical fitness instructor at 
gyms in Norwich and Lowestoft with professional wrestling. 
Pleasants dabbled with communism in his youth but formulated no firm political 
ideas until he had taken up the fascist banner at the age of 23. Although he welcomed 
the Blackshirts' "good honest patriotism", his combative instincts were especially 
drawn to the uniform and the movement's dynamic image. 100 Pleasants relished the 
opportunity to use his physical prowess to maintain order at fascist meetings in the city. 
Shortly after joining, he was assigned to the Norwich B. U. F. 's `defence force', an 
informal protection squad which guarded local and visiting Blackshirt speakers. 
98 Ibid.. 
99 Eric Pleasants. Interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
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Furthermore, membership afforded access to female fascists: "Of course, there was 
another consideration. I treated the local Branch much as other people treated joining 
amateur dramatic societies - as a way of meeting good-looking women. There were 
plenty of `good-lookers' at the Branch, unattached I mean. So I thought there's only 
one way to meet them. Not a very noble reason to join, I know, but it got me with the 
girls". 101 Once in the movement, however, Pleasants educated himself politically by 
reading a wide selection of B. U. F. pamphlets. He left the organisation in the autumn of 
1939 and travelled to Jersey to work as an agricultural labourer for the Peace Pledge 
Union because he had no wish to fight in the war. By then, Pleasants disapproved of 
the B. U. F., since the movement was now "just copying Nazi Germany". 102 
Similarly, political or ideological motivation played no part in N. B. 's decision 
to back the RUF-103 She became a Chingford Blackshirt in 1934 simply because her 
future husband, L. B., who later became the Epping District Leader, was a local 
member. A Lancastrian, N. B. was born at the turn of the century into a middle class 
family headed by her protective father, an industrial chemist. In 1930, she moved from 
Middleton to London in search of work and, by 1932, was employed as an assistant in 
a Bethnal Green baker's shop, where L. B. was a regular customer. Like Eric Pleasants, 
N. B. 's turn to fascism was then followed by a serious attempt to become fully 
acquainted with the Blackshirt programme. After the couple were married in 1937, 
N. B. became Women's District Leader for Epping (1938-1940) and twice stood as a 
B. U. F. local election candidate. 
4. The National Sample 
The life histories of 75 Mosleyites (69 Blackshirts and six B. U. F. sympathisers) 
from outside the three counties, compiled for comparative purposes, tend to mirror the 
motivations of the East Anglian group. Yet, since neither sample can purport to be a 
101 Ibid.. 
102 Ibid.. 
103 N. B.. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1991. 
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representative cross-section of the local or national movement, it would be extremely 
unwise to make far-reaching claims about the attractions of Mosleyite fascism. The 
most that can safely be deduced is that certain facets of the B. U. F. 's appeal in eastern 
England seemed to resonate nationally. 
TABLE 1 
`NATIONAL' SAMPLE OF 75 MOSLEYITE RESPONDENTS 
A. GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION 
AREA NUMBER 
London and the surrounding region (excluding the East End) 28 
East London 16 
Northern England 14 
Central England 6 
Eastern England (excluding Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex) 1 
Western England 1 
Southern England 6 
Not known 3 
B. REASON FOR SUPPORTING THE B. U. F. 
REASON NUMBER 
Socio-economic 19 
Patriotism 11 
B. U. F. 's general programme 11 
`National Socialism' 6 
Mosley 6 
Anti-communism 5 
Non-ideological factors 5 
Poor national leadership 4 
Anti-Semitism 4 
Peace 4 
Approximately one quarter of the 75 people surveyed gave socio-economic 
reasons for their fascist beliefs. As with the four East Anglian members discussed 
earlier, a range of concerns relating to the slump, unemployment, working conditions 
and poverty propelled them towards the B. U. F.. For example, HE. a seventeen year 
old electrician's mate, joined the Central Hackney Branch in 1937 because he thought 
fascism would end the economic depression which had ruined his parents' hotel 
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business. 104 Others were recruited through B. U. F. regional campaigns, such as T. R, 
the Assistant District Leader at Middleton and Prestwich, who enlisted in 1935 at the 
age of sixteen. 105 A junior clerk in a cotton spinning mill, T. R. was impressed by 
Blackshirt plans to revitalise the Lancashire textile industry: 
I was attracted by the Movement's policy for Cotton. 
Living in Lancashire and having just commenced work 
in the Office of a Spinning Mill I was acutely aware of 
the neglect the present and previous Governments had 
shown towards the Cotton trade. The results of this neglect 
were to be seen everyday then, in the Dole queues, the 
silent Mills and many other conditions. 106 
Sometimes, a general unease about social and economic conditions was enough 
to ensure a commitment to fascism. This was the case with I. E., an eighteen year old 
Finchley member and trainee hairdresser, who enrolled in 1938, since he endorsed the 
B. U. F. 's schemes to create jobs. 107 Intellectual convictions could also stimulate an 
interest in British Union. The Sussex-based Catholic, A. R., then a publisher's assistant 
in his early twenties, became a sympathiser due to the overlap between his Distributist 
views on the desirability of small-scale economic organisation and the B. U. F. 's 
antipathy towards combines and chain stores. 108 
A further eleven members of the sample were captivated by the Blackshirts' 
patriotic image. Here again though, individual motives varied. At one end of the 
spectrum an instinctive, unfocussed nationalism acted as the catalyst. Thus, S. G., a 
nineteen year old Leeds grocery shop manager, and R. S., a Streatham hairdresser, aged 
27, were short term `Rothermere recruits', influenced by the Daily Mail 's vision of the 
B. U. F. as a robust patriotic adjunct to the Conservative Party. 109 Conversely, the 
District Leaders at Bromley (late 1930s) and Limehouse (1936-1938) were long-term 
members, encouraged to join by the fascist nationalism enshrined in Mosley's `Britain 
104 H. E.. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, 1985. 
105 T. R. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, c. 1985. 
106 Ibid.. 
107 I. E.. Completed questionnaire for Andrew Mitchell, 1994. 
108 A. R. Letter to Andrew Mitchell. 15 January 1994. 
109 SG. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, c. 1985; RS.. Completed questionnaire for 
Stephen Cullen, c. 1985. 
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First' policy. 110 B. U. F. loyalists like V. H., a founder member at Weymouth in 1933, 
responded to Blackshirt pronouncements on imperial affairs. After spending much 
of his childhood in Canada, V. H. formed the impression that Britain's territorial 
possessions were not being developed to their full potential, and the twenty year old 
clerk seized upon the autarchic remedies contained in The Greater Britain as signalling 
a "completely new attitude to the Empire". 112 
Eleven other respondents put their fascist allegiances down to the B. U. F. 's 
broad policy objectives. Robert Row, a nineteen year old clerk, who served as the 
District Treasurer at Lancaster, succumbed in 1934 because fascism reflected his 
"patriotism, revulsion against unemployment; low opinion of the parties". 113 Along the 
same lines, P. T. and J. R., District Leaders at Watford and Birmingham respectively, 
found that British Union ideology ended their search for a political creed which was 
dynamic, nationalistic, virulently anti-communist and would tackle both the jobless 
problem and the shortcomings of the parliamentary system. 114 On occasion, this 
identification with the B. U. F. 's general programme was infused with a youthful 
romantic idealism. An ex-Slough Blackshirt offered the following reasons for signing 
up as a teenage schoolboy in 1933: "... deep sympathy for Germany; distaste for gutter 
press' and films' strident anti-Germanism...; in love with beautiful blue-eyed blonde; 
distaste for left-wing oafs and louts; sense that Britain was a sick nation with a shaky 
I10 E. F. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, c. 1985; Arthur Mason. Completed 
questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, c. 1985. E. F., then a 23 year old shop manager at Clerkenwell, 
joined the Bromley B. U. F. in 1936 and subsequently became District Leader. 21 year old Arthur 
Mason was employed as a doctor's manservant when he joined the B. U. F. at Welwyn Garden City in 
1933. After a period at National Headquarters, he was appointed District Leader at Limehouse in 
1936. 
111 V. H.. F. O. M. taped interview, n. d. V. H. became the District Leader at Weymouth. 
112 Ibid.. 
113 Robert Row. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, c. 1985. 
114 P . T.. 
Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, c. 1985; J. R. Completed questionnaire for 
Stephen Cullen, c. 1985. P. T., a twenty year old metal turner, joined the Watford Branch in November 
1933. J. R, a twenty year old salesman, became a Blackshirt at Maidenhead in 1934 and moved to the 
Whitstable Branch the following year. In 1936 he relocated to Birmingham where he was appointed 
District Leader and District Inspector. 
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empire; love of Kipling, Rupert Brooke, Wagner, Vaughan Williams, Cavaliers - all 
that was gallant, elegant, chivalric and antithetical to democracy and oafishness". 115 
Mosley's synthesis of nationalism and radical social and economic reforms was 
another feature of the B. U. F. 's appeal which transcended regional barriers. The Lincoln 
garage director, 0.1., joined the local District in October 1937 because, in his view, 
only the Blackshirt movement could revive agriculture and protect the Empire. 116 An 
eagerness to fight social deprivation and maintain the country's patriotic traditions first 
led Y. K., a seventeen year old female Mosleyite, into the New Party and then into the 
B. U. F.. 117 Y. K. became a Battersea fascist in 1932 while working as a junior clerk for 
a central London firm. This Blackshirt variant of `national socialism' also enabled C. S., 
the District Leader for the North-East Leeds formation in the later 1930s, to reconcile 
his patriotic, middle-class, Tory family background with the perceived need for radical 
measures to counteract the type of grinding poverty he had witnessed as a 
Stoke-on-Trent schoolboy a decade earlier. 118 Dorchester's leading fascist, Robert 
Saunders, a 23 year old farmer in 1933, was also persuaded by the B. U. F. 's "logical" 
economic reforms and its "emotional" glorification of Britain and the Empire. 119 
Others opted for the B. U. F. because of their dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the government. One such member was P. H., a twenty year old Branch 
speaker at Leicester. 120 He chose fascism in reaction to what he considered to be an 
impotent national leadership. The Assistant District Leader at Richmond, H. A., and 
AN, an out of work seventeen year old Wood Green member, were similarly 
motivated by the feeling that the Tory-dominated coalition lacked direction. 121 These 
opinions were neatly summarised by J. Y., who, after becoming a teenage fascist in 
115 S . W.. Completed questionnaire 
for Stephen Cullen, 1986. 
116 O. I.. F. O. M. taped interview, n. d.. O. I., who took over as District Leader at Lincoln in 1939, had 
an agricultural family background. Both his father and grandfather had been farmers. 
117 y. K.. Interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1993. 
118 C. S.. F. O. M. taped interview, n. d.. C. S. worked as a clerk in a wholesale warehouse and joined 
the Leeds B. U. F. as a nineteen year old in 1934. 
119 Robert Saunders. Taped interview with Andrew Mitchell, 1992. 
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121 H. A.. F. O. M. taped interview, n. d.; A. N. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, c. 1985. 
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1933, was taken on to the permanent staff at National Headquarters. 122 J. Y's fascist 
beliefs were based on the assumption that he was "helping the country to get rid of 
misgovernment by sad old men". 123 
British Union's pronounced anti-communism accounted for the fascist 
affiliations of five East London residents in the sample. For some, fascism originally 
provided a means of protesting against local communist violence. The physical 
`wrecking' tactics employed by the extreme left at the `Battle of Cable Street' in 
October 1936 prompted B. T., a 30 year old timber porter, to support the movement in 
Bethnal Green. 124 H. V., the Limehouse Women's District Leader in 1939-1940, was 
also converted to the B. U. F. cause after observing the disturbances at Cable Street. 125 
The 24 year old factory worker from Stepney was shocked to see left-wing 
demonstrators using strong-arm methods against the police: "We saw for ourselves the 
communists with their clenched fists, rolling marbles under the horses' feet, stuffing 
glass in their noses to bring the police down, and we were really disgusted. I made up 
my mind from then on to be an active member no matter what". 126 
More reasoned opposition to communism could breed Mosleyite sympathies as 
well. The Poplar sixth-former, L. C., fraternised with the fascist leadership at East Ham 
in 1933-1934 because he wished to see "the extirpation of Marxism throughout the 
world". 127 He looked upon the B. U. F. as an anti-bolshevik force, which would 
challenge the communists' denunciation of nationalism, disregard for Britain's heritage 
and reliance on subversion. However, L. C. was not an uncritical admirer and was never 
tempted into the movement. His Church of England family background and his 
reservations about the Blackshirts' `fuhrerprinzip' orientation and `Action Press' 
122 J. Y.. Completed questionnaire for Andrew Mitchell, 1994. 
123 Ibid.. 
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uniform made certain that L. C. 's deeply-held anti-communist opinions did not 
culminate in formal B. U. F. membership. 128 
Anti-Semites, of course, also found the B. U. F. an attractive proposition. In 
some cases, hostility towards Jews rested on perceptions at the work place. John 
Wynn, a Birmingham manufacturer of film and sound equipment was recruited in 1938, 
chiefly because he resented the alleged Jewish `stranglehold' on the British cinema 
industry. 129 Moreover, K. F. joined the Blackshirts as a twenty year old in 1934 since 
he was "fed up with the Jews". 130 A well-known fascist figure in the Willesden and 
Harlesden areas, K. F. later became the District Leader at West Willesden. His job as a 
London shipping clerk, which brought him into regular contact with Jewish 
immigrants, fostered his anti-Semitism: 
There were so many Jews coming into the country... 
Shipments of their belongings came through [the 
company]... So many Jewish properties, so many 
Jewish things all went to... north-west London... They 
brought their goods and sold them here [to] make 
money-, always making money... Unfortunately, I was 
in the part of the company that dealt with the Jewish 
population coming here. 131 
Such negative attitudes were not always related to a person's occupation. The 
former District Leader at Marylebone originally enlisted in the B. U. F. as a 23 year old 
apprentice coach trimmer in c. 1933 after reading, and taking at face value, anti-Semitic 
tracts such as Mein 132 B. J., a Croydon member first approached the 
Blackshirts in 1938 after convincing himself that Jews wielded excessive influence in 
the local business community. 133 For the eighteen year old junior engineer, this proved 
that the `hidden hand' of the Jewish economic lobby was operating in Britain: "I 
noticed a tremendous amount, in the business field, of shops which were mainly 
128 Ibid.. 
129 John Wynn (Untitled unpublished autobiography, n. d. ). 
130 K. F. F. O. M. taped interview, 1994. 
131 Ibid.. 
132 G . P.. 
F. O. M. taped interview, n. d.. G. P. joined the B. U. F. at Kilburn and served as Assistant 
District Leader at East Willesden before taking charge of the Marylebone formation. 
133 BJF. O. M. taped interview, n. d.. 
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Jewish-owned in my high street, all Jews. I felt this was wrong, that... people who were 
not native to this country ... should 
be having such a widespread influence in commerce 
and industry. This, I felt, was not right". 134 
In addition, several respondents revealed that their interest in fascism was first 
aroused by the B. U. F. 's anti-war stance of the late 1930s. These reminiscences lend 
weight to the available evidence which suggests that Mosley's `Peace Campaign' 
between 1938 and 1940 mobilised a new wave of support. 135 For example, M. M., then 
a seventeen year old shop assistant, joined the B. U. F. in 1938 rather than any other 
party since she was "afraid of war and felt that this one at least talked peace". 136 A 
corresponding desire to prevent European conflict in 1939 also turned F. G., a 22 year 
old bakery worker, into a Blackshirt sympathiser at Welwyn Garden City. 137 Mosley s 
anti-war policy was the crucial factor too in N. P. 's decision to sign up at the Hull 
Branch in 1938.138 The nineteen year old storeman who had known various local 
fascists for a number of years was increasingly perturbed by the deterioration in 
Anglo-German relations: 
I'll be quite honest, I'm not particularly interested in Mosley. 
I never was. I was, however, always pro-German for 
various reasons.. . The only great attraction 
B. U. had for 
me [was that] it was the only political organisation in the 
country that was genuinely opposed or seemed capable 
of offering resistance to this trend to war. It was the 1938 
Czech crisis that gave me the push to actually join the B. U. F.. 139 
The British Union's most valuable asset was, or course, Mosley himself, not 
least because the B. U. F. leader could command allegiance through the sheer force of 
his dynamic personality and platform oratory. A. V. 's membership was a testimony to 
134 Ibid.. 
135 See for example Robert Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley (London: Macmillan Press, 1981), pp. 
331-333; G. C. Webber, The Ideology of the British REht 1918-1939 (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 
pp. 43-46; R. Thurlow, Fascism in Britain- A History 1918-1985 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 
122-130. 
136 M. M.. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, c. 1985. 
137 F. G.. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, 1986. 
138 Np. F. O. M. taped interview, n. d.. 
139 Ibid.. 
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Mosley's ability to fire an audience with enthusiasm. 140 A door-to-door 
salesman-cum-chimney sweep, A. V. joined the Leeds B. U. F. immediately after hearing 
the founder of the Blackshirt movement make an address in the city in 1934. The 
young northerner was particularly struck by Mosley's `Errol Flynn' image and his 
direct style of public speaking. 141 A. V. did not acquire more than a basic 
understanding of the B. U. F. programme until he attended speakers' classes some 
months later. The Anglo-Italian Blackshirt, M. B., then a fourteen year old schoolboy, 
was recruited in much the same way at the beginning of 193 7.142 He joined the B. U. F. 
at Camden, where his parents ran a small cafe, after witnessing Mosley hold a street 
meeting in London. M. B. recalled being "very impressed" with the B. U. F. founder's 
"absolutely... brilliant" speech on the problems facing England at that time. 143 
Even when potential adherents tended to endorse Blackshirt aims, the leader's 
charismatic appeal could tip the scales in favour of active involvement. Mosley 
provided the impetus for G. L., the District Leader at Huddersfield, to become a fascist 
in 1935 at the age of 29.144 With his engineering apprenticeship punctuated by periods 
of unemployment and low paid casual work, G. L. 's belief in patriotism and the need to 
eradicate poverty was sharpened by his disdain for the `failure' of the mainstream 
parties to tackle existing social problems. Yet, although this made him more susceptible 
to Blackshirt propaganda, G. L. stressed that it was hearing the B. U. F. leader on the 
speaker's podium which sealed his commitment. Before becoming the District Leader 
at Hull (193 5-1940), John Charnley underwent a similar conversion process at 
Southport in 1933.145 Having been temporarily laid off from his job in the baking 
trade, 23 year old Charnley found the B. U. F. 's economic proposals persuasive but, 
140 A. V.. F. O. M. taped interview, n. d.. 
141 Ibid.. 
142 M. B.. F. O. M. taped interview, n. d.. M. B later became a B. U. F. Sales Organiser in Islington and 
also belonged to the Italian Fascist Party's Youth Movement 143 Ibid.. 
144 G. L. (Untitled unpublished autobiography, n. d. ). 
145 John Charnley. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, c. 1985. 
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ultimately, was won over by Mosley's "obvious sincerity" in trying to reduce 
unemployment. 146 
Finally a small number from the sample entered the B. U. F. either as 
`non-ideological' adherents or literal social fascists. Two members automatically 
accepted the political preferences of a parent. Sid Bailey was a thirteen year old 
schoolboy when he followed his father, an unemployed east London manual worker 
who had lost his faith in Labour's capacity to raise working class living standards, into 
the Bethnal Green movement in 1934.147 Paternal influence also rubbed off on P. G., an 
eighteen year old trainee theatrical costume maker. 148 She enrolled in 1932 merely 
because her father, a rubber manufacturer, was already a member. For a short time, 
P. G. acted as an assistant to Lady Maud Mosley's secretary but resigned from the 
organisation in 1935, since she was "sickened" by the B. U. F. 's anti-Semitism. 149 The 
Manchester Blackshirt, Tom Pickles, was fleetingly seduced in 1933 by pro-fascist 
friends and the local movement's sporting facilities. 150 Within three months though, 
the 24 year old woodworker had abandoned the B. U. F. for good. Another Manchester 
member adopted fascism in 1934 specifically to pursue a romantic interest. Agnes 
Barlow was attracted to a uniformed fascist and joined the Moss Side Branch to get to 
know him. 151 Once the couple were engaged, Barlow and her fiance held official 
positions in the local formation, but after their wedding she continued only as a 
non-active member until 1940. 
146 Ibid 
147 Sid Bailey. Completed questionnaire for Stephen Cullen, c. 1985. 
148 P . G.. Completed questionnaire 
for Stephen Cu len, c. 1985. 
149 ibid.. 
150 Tom Pickles. Transcript of taped interview with Stuart Rawnsley, 1977. 
151 Agnes Barlow. Transcript of taped interview with Stuart Rawnsley, 1976. 
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CONCLUSION 
Having examined the emergence, development and ultimate demise of the 
B. U. F. in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex between 1933 and 1940, it remains only to 
review and draw together the central findings of this thesis. The present investigation 
has concentrated on five key issues to facilitate a deeper understanding of the 
Mosleyite fascist presence in the three counties, namely (1) the extent and 
consequences of the B. U. F. 's intervention in the East Anglian `tithe war' in 1933-1934, 
(2) the provincial dimension to the B. U. F. 's Peace Campaign from 1938 and the local 
impact of Defence Regulation 18B (1 A), (3) local levels of recruitment and the nature 
of the B. U. F. 's social base in the region, (4) the considerations which motivated 
individuals from the area to join or support the movement, and (5) the factors which 
prevented the `East Anglian' B. U. F. from making significant political progress. 
Blackshirt involvement in the `tithe war' formed a crucial element in the 
movement's campaign to establish itself in Norfolk, Suffolk and provincial Essex. In 
part, fascist intervention at particular farms under notice of distraint certainly 
represented an opportunistic bid for rural support, but the B. U. F. 's objections to rent 
charge also had a more principled aspect. For example, fascist literature condemned the 
anachronistic nature of the tithe and put forward proposals to fund the Church of 
England from general taxation. The arrival of B. U. F. detachments at Hall Farm, 
Fincham in Norfolk and Delvyns Farm, Gestingthorpe in Essex also indicates that, 
contrary to the impression given by earlier studies, Suffolk was not the only local arena 
for this type of fascist activism. 
Up to a point, the Blackshirts' interventionist strategy was successful. The 
B. U. F. 's anti-tithe activities generated much publicity and, taken together with other 
factors including the Rothermere press campaign, helped to boost the eastern counties' 
membership to approximately 2,500 by mid-1934. It is evident that the fascist 
affiliations of some East Anglian farmers, such as Arthur Barker and George Hoggarth, 
stemmed directly from Blackshirt involvement in local tithe disputes. A B. U. F. 
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formation was also set up at Diss in south Norfolk, apparently in response to the 
presence of 'imported' Mosleyites who were protesting against rent charge. The 
sources available suggest that the B. U. F. was invited to participate in the Wortham 
tithe affair by a member of the family concerned, and that during this particular distraint 
there was a degree of collusion between the Blackshirts and the tithepayers. The 
reasons for the overall failure of the B. U. F. 's anti-tithe campaign will be discussed 
later. 
The regional B. U. F. 's Peace Campaign from 1938, based on conventional and 
clandestine propaganda methods, partly substantiates revisionist arguments about the 
impact of the fascist anti-war platform. Impressionistic evidence suggests that some 
local Districts, such as those at Norwich, Eye, Leytonstone, East Ham, West Ham and 
Walthamstow West, witnessed an increase in recruitment due to the Blackshirt peace 
policy but this was far from a uniform trend. Similarly, it would appear that, during the 
late 1930s, certain formations in the area, including the Epping B. U. F., attracted the 
allegiance of disaffected pro-appeasement middle class Conservatives who concurred 
with Mosley's anti-war line. Once again, though, many local Districts did not 
experience an influx of alienated Tories and, in any case, the numbers involved were 
relatively small. 
A detailed examination of the impact of Defence Regulation 18B (1A) on local 
Districts has shown that the government round-up of regional Mosleyites in mid-1940 
proceeded in an inconsistent manner. Several factors account for the rather haphazard 
nature of the operation. Many local B. U. F. formations were locked into a process of 
constant change at this time owing to the agitation over barley and peace, members' 
reactions to international developments, and the impact of the military call-up. The 
prevailing `fifth column' mentality added another dimension to the problem. 
Furthermore, the authorities did not possess up-to-date information on the B. U. F. 's 
provincial membership and some police recommendations for arrest appeared to be 
both arbitrary and indiscriminate. Circumstantial evidence relating to a number of local 
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cases also suggests that enlistment in the services or establishment connections could 
prevent Blackshirts from being interned. 
Using the assumptions and methodological frameworks underpinning Webber 
and Linehan's work on the B. U. F. membership, this thesis was able to draw several 
important, if tentative, conclusions about the local Mosleyite following. I Firstly, the 
assembled evidence indicates that membership levels in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex 
followed Webber's projected national recruitment trends between 1934 and late 1938. 
After peaking at around 1750 members in mid-1934, the local movement shrank to just 
175 or so by late 1935 before mounting a modest but steady recovery to c. 578 by the 
end of 1938. Impressionistic evidence provided by ex-Blackshirts from the area 
suggests that women constituted between ten and 30 per cent of the local membership, 
again broadly in line with informed academic estimates of national recruitment patterns. 
Secondly, detailed consideration of a regional sample of 230 Mosleyites from Norfolk, 
Suffolk and Essex indicates that most local members and supporters came from the 
lower and intermediate levels of the middle class. Within this social class category the 
three largest occupational groups represented in the sample were junior or 
middle-ranking white collar employees, self-employed merchants and farmers. A 
significant minority of the 230 Mosleyites examined were manual workers. 
Research conducted for this thesis also endorses earlier accounts which found 
that dissident Conservatives were joining the B. U. F. at various locations across the 
country. Within the three counties, numerous identified local fascist officials had 
previous connections with the Conservative Party and impressionistic evidence 
obtained principally from the local press and former Blackshirts indicates that 
disaffected Tories provided the regional movement with a significant proportion of its 
recruits and supporters. The middle class bias of the Mosleyite sample examined 
reinforces this conclusion. 
1 G. C. Webber, `Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of Fascists', Journal of 
Contemporary istorv, Vol. 19 (1984), pp. 575-606; T. P. Linehan, East London for Mosley: The 
British Union of Fascists in East London and South-West Essex 1933-40 (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 
Chapter Six. 
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The oral and written testimonies of 22 regional and 75 other Mosleyites were 
consulted to investigate the highly subjective issue of why individuals either joined or 
supported the B. U. R. On the basis of the memoir material gathered, it seems plausible 
to contend that the Blackshirt movement in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex possessed a 
multifaceted appeal. In this respect, the `East Anglian' sample confirms Rawnsley's 
observation that adherents joined the B. U. F. "for a variety of reasons" and illustrates 
the fundamental weakness inherent in explanations based on supposedly `stereotypical' 
Blackshirts. 2 
Some local recruits and sympathisers were attracted by the patriotic tone of the 
B. U. F. 's `Britain First' policy and pro-Empire orientation. Other adherents gravitated 
towards the movement because of its campaign to preserve peace in Europe. Blackshirt 
remedies for social and economic problems, including unemployment and the tithe, also 
brought in members and supporters, as did the fascist rejection of parliamentary 
democracy. The B. U. F. 's variant of `national socialism', with its synthesis of patriotism 
and social progress, engendered Blackshirt loyalties and Mosley's `dynamic' leadership 
acted as a further inducement to develop fascist affiliations. Conversion to the B. U. F. 
could often be prompted as well by personal antipathy towards Jews and Communists. 
Moreover, other Mosleyites from the region were drawn to the organisation by the 
general Blackshirt programme which aimed to safeguard Britain's imperial interests 
and implement radical economic and political reforms. Conversely, some interviewees 
maintained that `non-ideological' factors, such as the availability of female company or 
a husband's attachment to a local formation, were the prime considerations. 
The diverse justifications for following Mosley given by those in the `national' 
sample add weight to the argument that fascist motivation was complex and could not 
be reduced to a small number of categories. In addition, the fact that the `East Anglian' 
and `national' samples exhibited similar motivational characteristics would seem to 
2 S. Rawnsley, `The Membership of the British Union of Fascists' in K Lunn and R Thurlow (eds. ), 
British Fascism- Essays on the Radical Right in Inter-War Britain (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 
164. 
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indicate that various aspects of the B. U. F. 's appeal transcended regional barriers. An 
examination of the two samples also makes it clear that the decision to enrol in, or 
support, the B. U. F. was not always related to interests and perceptions arising from an 
individual's occupation or social class. 
Finally, this thesis has attempted to demonstrate that the absence of key 
determining factors in the Griffin-Copsey conjunctural model prevented a Blackshirt 
`take-off in the three counties. Crucially, socio-economic conditions in the region were 
distinctly unfavourable. The depression in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex did not develop 
into the type of major structural dysfunction which eroded the legitimacy of the liberal 
democratic system, fostered widespread political and personal disaffection and made 
sections of society responsive to the fascist message. As discussed in Chapters 
Three-Five, three features of the economic downturn militated against the creation of 
such a crisis in this predominantly rural area. Firstly, the gradual onset of the slump 
lessened its impact and helped to marginalise radical economic and political solutions. 
Secondly, the depression's lack of uniformity meant that many districts and types of 
farming operation survived relatively unscathed. Finally, the modest recovery from 
1933 helped to raise farm income and ease the producer's cost-price ratio. This 
economic context also compromised the B. U. F. 's anti-tithe campaign. 
The extent and experience of unemployment in the three counties further stifled 
the emergence of a `subjective sense' of crisis. For most of the 1930s, unemployment 
levels in Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex remained below the overall rate for Great Britain. 
Moreover, after peaking in 1932-1933, local unemployment began to fall. It also seems 
to be the case that, across the eastern counties, most of those without work responded 
passively to their predicament, an attitude which was more likely to encourage apathy 
rather than political agitation. Certainly, research has shown that in areas such as 
Norwich, where the unemployment rate remained comparatively high for much of the 
decade, the operation of the relief system, together with the conservatism and modest 
aspirations of the bulk of the unemployed, prevented the mass radicalisation of the 
jobless. 
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Lacking the fundamental precondition of a destabilising crisis or conducive 
socio-economic context, the B. U. F. was further handicapped by its inability to `open 
up' significant political space and thus establish a solid constituency of support. The 
National Government's agricultural policy, based on tariffs, deficiency payments and 
market regulation proved a key obstacle to the recruitment of the B. U. F. 's hoped-for 
`farming legions'. By protecting, organising and subsidising the farming sector, the 
government undermined the appeal of the Blackshirt agricultural platform and kept 
defections to a minimum. Indeed, as several scholars have noted, eastern England was 
the prime beneficiary of this type of state support. The importance of wheat and sugar 
beet subsidies to the area can be gauged from the fact that, at this time, almost 50 per 
cent of the wheat and 80 per cent of the sugar beet produced in England and Wales 
came from East Anglia, the East Riding and Lincoln. Farmers in other areas of the 
country "looked askance at the subsidies paid on these two crops". 3 According to 
calculations made by J. A. Venn, a contemporary authority on agriculture, in 1934 
Norfolk producers received "appreciable" state support consisting of £436,000 in 
wheat payments, £666,000 in sugar beet subsidies, £650,000 in rating reliefs, and 
£200,000 in other forms of assistance. In total, this amounted to a net gain of £1 8s. 
per acre. 4 
Similarly, government legislation to reform the tithe rent charge system in 1936 
effectively closed down what political space was left for the B. U. F. on this issue. 
Several concessionary features of the Tithe Act, such as the 60 year redemption period 
and the low annuity redemption rate, satisfied non-fanning landowners in particular, 
and dampened anti-tithe agitation. The personal liability provision also permitted the 
use of legal procedures to recover annuity arrears directly. In this way, the publicity 
which often accompanied the more public methods of forced sales and distraints could 
be avoided. 
3 E. Whetham, The Agrarian Histoly of England and Wales 1914-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), p. 245. 
4 J. A. Venn, `The Financial and Economic Results of State Control in Agriculture', The Economic 
Journale Vol. 45 (1935), p. 656. 
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Blackshirt efforts to create a sizeable working class following were thwarted by 
the ideological and moral pressures exerted by the labour movement (together with 
other factors). The relative strength of agricultural trade unionism in East Anglia 
imposed an obvious political barrier to the B. U. F. 's recruitment of farmworkers, not 
least because the National Union of Agricultural Workers took a strong anti-fascist line 
in its journal The Land Worker. Enduring working class loyalty to the Labour Party in 
urban socialist strongholds, such as Plaistow and Silvertown, also meant that Blackshirt 
calls for manual support went largely unheeded. Local labour figures used the 
speaker's podium and the regional press to warn of the dangers fascism posed for the 
working class, and constituency Labour Party organisations urged their members to 
stay away from B. U. F. events. Furthermore, Blackshirt speakers were rarely permitted 
to address left-wing bodies. 
The Suffolk Tithepayers' Association (S. T. A. ) and the Suffolk County Branch 
of the National Farmers Union also played central roles in denying the B. U. F. political 
space during the `tithe war' of 1933-1934 and the `barley crisis' of 1938-1939- 
respectively. Led by respected local farmers, both organisations had been established 
before the arrival of the B. U. F. in the county and provided recognised channels for 
agricultural protest. These bodies also adopted a `non-partisan' approach in their 
pragmatic law-abiding campaigns for change and firmly rejected Blackshirt offers of 
cooperation. Consequently, the B. U. F. could neither supplant these pressure groups 
nor act in formal alliance with them. 
Other external and internal factors made it impossible for Mosley's movement 
to construct any semblance of political legitimacy in the area. The denial of council 
(and private) halls, particularly in Labour-controlled Boroughs such as Norwich, 
Walthamstow and Leyton, removed valuable indoor venues for high-profile political 
campaigning. As a result, the Blackshirts were forced to rely heavily on open-air 
meetings which meant that the B. U. F. was not only more vulnerable to the disruptive 
tactics of anti-fascists but also less likely to attract `respectable' support, given the 
movement's association with street politics. The disturbances and violence which 
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accompanied anti-fascist `direct action' methods at Canning Town, Braintree, Great 
Yarmouth and elsewhere served to discredit the B. U. F. further by identifying it with 
disorder and physical confrontation. Instances of fascist violence and disruption merely 
compounded the problem. Regional newspapers reinforced negative public perceptions 
of the B. U. F. through their coverage of disturbances at Blackshirt events and the 
excesses of British and continental fascists. Editorials and regular columns were often 
highly critical of Mosleyite efforts to gain local recruits. 
Internal deficiencies deprived the `East Anglian' B. U. F. of the dynamism and 
organisational coherence which was also required to establish Blackshirt political 
credibility. Frequent personnel changes and the appointment of inadequate officials 
prevented a number of local Branches, including those at King's Lynn and Ilford, from 
developing a sense of stability and continuity. Furthermore, political and personal 
conflicts within the regional movement led to the departure of much-needed activists, 
such as Will Smith and John Smeaton-Stuart, which brought unwelcome publicity and 
hampered fascist propaganda initiatives in the eastern counties. The socially 
conservative nature of much of the local membership also had adverse consequences 
since these recruits possessed neither the activist mentality nor the ideological 
conviction to commit themselves openly to the B. U. R. Entrenched notions of social 
and commercial respectability ensured that most Blackshirts in the three counties were 
reluctant to participate in any form of political work for the movement. This type of 
support base tended to be transient and precluded the creation of a long-term stable 
membership. 
Campaign and organisational initiatives revealed other serious shortcomings. 
For example, the Blackshirt strategy adopted during the `tithe war', which was based 
on unsolicited interventions and imported detachments of mainly urban fascists, was 
hardly designed to win over the agricultural community. The May 1935 decision to 
remodel the movement along parliamentary constituency lines exposed additional 
weaknesses. Across the three counties, the resulting rudimentary B. U. F. Divisional 
structures were starved of personnel, finance and regular District-N. H. Q. contact. 
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Inevitably, they failed to develop into viable electoral machines and political 
organisations. 
This lack of `favourable contingency' was compounded by the reaction of the 
state. The authorities played a central role in monitoring and then terminating B. U. F. 
involvement in the `tithe war', following fascist intervention at Wortham in February 
1934. Official concern that the fascists were engaging in illegal activities led to the 
arrest of nineteen Blackshirts at Rash's farms and the removal of other Mosleyites from 
the area before the impounded stock was collected. State management techniques were 
also employed to minimise the publicity value of the subsequent legal proceedings for 
the movement. The fascist connection was played down at the committal hearing by 
counsel for the Director of Public Prosecutions and the case was transferred to the Old 
Bailey to prevent the trial of the nineteen defendants being held in Suffolk, where it 
was more likely to be exploited by the B. U. F. as an anti-tithe propaganda platform. 
Ultimately, of course, the implementation of Defence Regulation (DR) 18B 
(IA) in mid-1940 destroyed the regional B. U. F.. The authorities, confronted with the 
Nazis' rapid military advance, a press-fed fifth column panic, the possibility that 
Mosley might become a British `Quisling' and the implications of the Tyler Kent affair, 
perceived British. fascists to be a threat to national security. DR 18B (IA) was used to 
detain hundreds of B. U. F. members between May and July 1940. In the process, a 
number of Blackshirt officials and activists from Norfolk, Suffolk and Essex were 
interned, and the organisational base of the regional movement was effectively 
dismantled. Under the terms of DR 18B (AA), the government banned the B. U. F. on 
10 July 1940. 
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